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This dissertation assesses the historical engagement of Canadian state and society with the 
Palestine problem. Canada’s contemporary position on the pro-Israel edge of the spectrum of 
world politics raises questions about long-term patterns of change and continuity in Canadian 
politics concerning the Middle East. Liberal patriotic historical narration of Canadian foreign 
policy conventionally invokes what Lester B. Pearson referred to as ‘the broad and active 
internationalism’ with which Canadian officials approached the world in the years after World 
War II. Moderate voices within the contemporary Canadian mainstream typically counterpose 
this history to a narrow support for Israel that pits Canada against a majority of the world 
community. This dissertation argues that contemporary political opposition in Canada needs 
to find other historical precedents to build upon. The established liberal internationalist 
framing obscures the formative influence upon Canadian foreign policy of a racialized politics 
of empire. The development of Canadian politics within the framework of the British Empire, 
and the domestic structures of racial power that formally endured into the twentieth century, 
need to be taken into account if the historical evolution of Canadian external affairs policy on 
Palestine – as more generally – is to be understood. Historical and political analysis 
structured around the assertion of national innocence undercuts the kind of understanding of 
the past that can inform constructive engagement with the problems of the present. As 
against the pervasive theme of fair-minded Canadian innocence, this dissertation finds that 
the implication of both the Canadian government and Canadian civil society in the denial of 
Palestinian rights has deep historical roots. It is critical to look not only at the scope of 
internationalist tendencies within Canadian political history, but also at their exclusionist 
boundaries. In so doing, this study positions Canada within wider Western structures of 
support for Israel against Palestinian and neighbouring Arab societies.
Introduction
Introduction
‘Many professors in academia are fond of the term “postcolonial,” and it has become fashionable to say 
that we are living in the postcolonial era. But since I live in the so-called Middle East I know that it is a 
word which speaks a partial truth in order to hide a more important truth, to hide the fact that we live in a 
new or neocolonial era where colonialism is transnational, led by the United States, and has taken on 
more sophisticated economic, military, technological and cultural forms.’1 
-Nawal El Saadawi, ‘Breeding Terror, or An 
Uncivilized Clash of Civilizations’ (2010)
‘Theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the 
community as a whole, and which possesses facilities denied to subordinate groups or individuals for 
imposing its views of life on the community. Theories of international morality are, for the same reason 
and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations or groups of nations. For the past 
hundred years, and more especially since 1918, the English-speaking peoples have formed the dominant
group in the world; and current theories of international morality have been designed to perpetuate their 
supremacy and expressed in the idiom peculiar to them.’2
-E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939)
* * *
Academic debates about Western politics on Palestine can never stand apart 
from the political struggles that frame them. Perhaps this is true of all discussion within 
what Edward Said dubbed ‘the ideological sciences.’3 One needn’t look beyond the 
International Relations canon for comments suggesting as much. In his classic IR study
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, E.H. Carr underscores the basic point: ‘purpose precedes and
conditions thought,’ whether one likes it or not. In the ‘political sciences,’ argues Carr, 
unlike in the ‘physical sciences,’ the very line between analysis of a topic and the topic 
being analyzed is blurred: ‘Every political judgement helps to modify the facts on which 
it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of political action.’4
This may be a universal truth. As concerns the question of Palestine, it is 
especially difficult to ignore. On this, at least, agreement can be found on both sides of 
the ideological divide. ‘There is no state in the modern world whose progress has been 
more dependent on idealistic and moral postulates’ than has Israel.5 So declared Abba 
Eban, one of the most iconic diplomats to ever represent Israel on the world stage. 
1 Nawal El Saadawi, The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: A Reader (London: Zed Books, 2010), 147-8.
2 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(New York: Perennial, 2001), 79-80.
3 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 9.
4 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 5.
5 Abba Eban, ‘The Toynbee Heresy,’ in Voice of Israel (New York: Horizon Press, 1957), 165-6.
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Naturally, Eban considered Western veneration of the Israeli state to be just and proper.
Others were less enthusiastic. In his path-breaking The Question of Palestine, Edward 
Said argued that liberal celebration of Zionism and Israel relied upon a studious 
indifference to their impact on Palestinian society. For Said, this amounted to ‘one of the
most frightening cultural episodes’ of the twentieth century.6 Neither Eban nor Said 
doubted that liberal intellectuals had contributed to Israel’s standing in Western political 
culture, and, in turn, to the international support it could call upon.
Political power is often shored up by the invocation of ‘idealistic and moral’ 
claims. In his analysis of the factors determining a state’s position in international 
hierarchies of power, Antonio Gramsci flagged the significance of ‘the ideological 
position that a certain power occupies in the world, insofar as it represents the 
progressive forces of history.’7 The point is now well established; state power and the 
mythologies that buttress it develop in parallel. For domestic as well as international 
reasons, construction of the historical record in any given society tends to reflect and 
enforce existing relations of power. This dynamic is an especially striking feature of the 
struggle over Palestine. Michael Oren, the Israeli scholar-statesman who served as the 
Netanyahu government’s ambassador to the United States from 2009-13, had good 
reason to suggest that ‘[t]he Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps more than any other modern 
dispute, has been a conflict both in and of history.’8 The dispute has rarely been 
confined to the Middle East.
This dissertation considers how Canadian society and the Canadian state have 
engaged with, and been implicated in, the Palestine problem. Canadian society has 
generally not been troubled by direct exposure to the details of the issue. A few years 
before the Israeli state was established, the main Middle East specialist within 
Canada’s department of external affairs, Elizabeth MacCallum, expressed her concerns
about the political climate that resulted: ‘there is little knowledge on this continent of 
what has actually happened in the Near and Middle East in the past 50 years, and … it 
is consequently easy to manipulate the record so as to encourage the view that Arab 
6 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 113.
7 Antonio Gramsci, ed./trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 240.
8 Michael B. Oren, ‘Out of the Battleground,’ Radical History Review 45 (1989), 85.
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claims in the present controversy may be dismissed as all but irrelevant.’9 The problem 
persists today, if in a different form. There is no lack of material about the topic. But the 
challenge remains: not of shedding light on an unexplored field of research, but of 
pushing through a thicket of myths, taboos, and misconceptions. These do not only 
stem from depictions of the Palestine conflict itself. They have been nurtured by 
decades of association between Israel and the Western powers. In the process, Israeli 
and local patriotic mythologies have become entangled.
The Middle East has become one of many sites onto which a self-flattering 
rendering of Canadian foreign policy has been projected. The conventional wisdom is 
summarized by Canadian diplomat Michael Bell, who held numerous ambassadorial 
posts in the region. The editors of Canada and the Middle East, a 2007 volume bringing
together the perspectives of Canadian policy-makers and academics, relay his 
judgement: ‘Michael Bell holds the opinion that Canada’s traditional approach to the 
Arab-Israeli issues can best be described as fair-minded.’10 Israel’s Michael Oren uses 
precisely the same label to describe Canada’s Middle East diplomacy, specifically in its 
‘liberal internationalist’ heyday. Oren explores the theme in an article for Diplomacy & 
Statecraft under the title, ‘Faith and Fair-Mindedness: Lester B. Pearson and the Suez 
Crisis.’11 Respected Canadian academics have helped to flesh out the narrative of 
official Canadian fair-mindedness and moderation. The University of Calgary’s David 
Bercuson, for example, concluded that ‘Canadian policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
generally even-handed.’12 David Dewitt and John Kirton likewise insist upon ‘the long-
established balance between Israel and the Arabs in Canada’s diplomatic posture.’13 For
the most part, mainstream Canadian scholars and policy-makers shared this narrative 
throughout the late twentieth century.
9 John F. Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [henceforth DCER] Vol. 11 (Ottawa: 
External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1990), 1906. 
10 Michael Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspective on Canada-Middle East Relations,’ in Heinbecker and 
Momani, Canada and the Middle East, 8.
11 Michael Oren, ‘Faith and Fair-Mindedness: Lester B. Pearson and the Suez Crisis,’ Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 3, No. 1 (1992), 48-73.
12 David Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 240.
13 David Dewitt and John Kirton, ‘Foreign Policy Making Towards the Middle East: Parliament, the Media, 
and the 1982 Lebanon War,’ in eds. David Taras and David H. Goldberg, The Domestic Battleground: 




There was a curious feature of ‘Canada’s policy and practice of scrupulous 
impartiality,’ as another historian described it.14 It often involved aligning with Israel 
against majority world opinion, and against massive voting majorities at the United 
Nations. In the late Cold War, the Globe and Mail could refer with little controversy to 
‘Canada’s position as Israel’s No. 2 friend at the UN,’ outdone only by the United 
States.15 Year after year, on vote after vote, Canada joined Israel and the US in 
opposing a diplomatic consensus on Palestine supported by nearly the entire Third 
World. This involved obvious diplomatic isolation. But in the analysis of the scholars 
cited above, it was altogether appropriate. The convergence of close support for Israel 
with even-handed balance served to vindicate both.
In the twenty-first century, the ‘impartiality’ narrative faced a withering attack – 
from the right. Not that there were no grounds for criticism from the left. In 2004, to take 
a strong academic example, Sherene Razack’s Dark Threats & White Knights incisively
challenged the Canadian peacekeeping mythology that had grown up since the Suez 
Crisis. Razack’s study was structured around the 1993 scandal involving Canadian 
military abuse in Somalia, and did not deal with Middle East policy at any length. But 
her analysis applies more broadly. Razack suggested that even Canadian interventions 
framed around disinterested conflict resolution operate within ‘a universe structured by 
a civilized North and an uncivilized South.’16 ‘We still have not abandoned our sense of 
the world as a place where we sally forth, often as the “hero’s friend,” to help those less 
fortunate than ourselves,’ wrote Razack. ‘We cannot imagine that we are implicated in 
the crises we set out to solve.’17 For anti-racist critics like Razack, the narrative of 
impartial beneficence obscured Canada’s core, racialized position on the world stage. 
For political forces on the right, on the other hand, it got in the way of openly enforcing 
this position.
In the early years of the twenty-first century, right-wing political forces in Canada,
emboldened by the US-led ‘war on terror,’ thus initiated a concerted challenge to 
14 Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel, 1958-1968 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2010), 100.
15 Michael McDowell, ‘Friend of Isael, Canada is target of Arab states diplomatic feelers,’ The Globe and 
Mail (26 May 1983), 21.
16 Sherene Razack, Dark Threats & White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New 
Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 165.
17 Razack, Dark Threats, 11.
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Canada’s traditional liberal mythology. In the place of a national ethos of peacekeeping 
beneficence, they asserted the need for aggressive Canadian involvement in wars 
against perceived threats to Western civilization. During the build-up to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, this agenda was most clearly advanced by opposition politicians 
associated with a short-lived political party of the populist right, the Canadian Alliance. 
Alliance politicians including Stephen Harper, Stockwell Day, and Jason Kenney called 
on the governing Liberals to rally the country for war alongside Canada’s ‘traditional and
historical allies.’18 Aggressive support for Israel factored prominently in the Alliance’s 
approach to foreign policy. 
In late 2003, these politics gained a broader platform when the Alliance merged 
with Canada’s established federal Tory party, the Progressive Conservatives. As leader 
of the newly united Conservative Party of Canada, Stephen Harper advocated support 
for Israel as a core commitment. ‘I don’t see Canada as neutral,’ Harper explained soon
after assuming the party’s leadership. ‘Maybe that’s where the Liberals have gone, but 
my view is that Israel is part of the democratic family of nations.’19 Federal elections in 
early 2006 consigned the Liberals to the opposition benches, and a new Conservative 
government under Stephen Harper took power. Pro-Israel partisanship became official 
government policy.
The traditional Canadian approach of presenting support for Israel as good 
objective policy, impartial as well as righteous, became strained as the Harper 
government struck a position of ostentatious support for Israel against Palestinian and 
neighbouring Arab societies. ‘Neutrality’ was gradually transformed from a pretence of 
Canadian diplomacy into an epithet levelled against opponents. A major flashpoint for 
these changes was the summer of 2006, when Israeli warfare, at the outset of the 
season focused against the Gaza Strip, in turn expanded with a large-scale Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. Partisan rivalries in Canada complicated the conventional framing.
Former Liberal foreign affairs minister John Manley hastened to affirm that ‘Canada has
never been a neutral or pacifist country.’20 The contemporary basis for the narrative of 
18 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 118.
19 Robert Fife, ‘Harper to crack down on anti-Semitism; Tory leader says criminal charges, not more 
education, the way to tackle problem,’ Ottawa Citizen (25 June 2004).
20 John Manley, ‘Canada was never neutral: Stephen Harper is right that we are a friend of Israel; but 
friends tell friends when they are wrong,’ Ottawa Citizen (28 July 2006).
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historical impartiality eroded. A Globe and Mail editorial endorsed Canadian support for 
Israel against the forces of ‘radical Islam’ under the title, ‘The honest broker that never 
was.’21
In the years since, the surge of official Canadian support for Israel has 
underscored the need for a sustained challenge to Canadian foreign policy in the 
Middle East. The strength of contemporary criticism will depend in part on its 
engagement with the historical record.
The Legacy of Past Precedents
What is true of the debate between Canada’s main political parties is, too often, 
also the case of academic representations of Canada’s political past: they are tightly 
bound by patriotic premises. Nathan C. Funk’s contribution to Canada and the Middle 
East sums up the established terms of discussion. ‘The search for national consensus 
on foreign policy remains elusive,’ he writes, ‘with advocates of a traditional, liberal 
internationalist position calling for a balanced or even-handed foreign policy that seeks 
diplomatic solutions within frameworks imbued with broad, multilateral legitimacy and 
proponents of a newer, more insistent approach emphasizing military preparedness and
support for key allies.’ In the contest to define Canada’s place in the world, Funk notes 
that ‘proponents of the liberal internationalist vision find themselves on the defensive.’ 
Part of the dispute, he explains, is a ‘competition to define past precedents,’ in which 
the contending schools of patriotic opinion invoke different historical interpretations of 
Canadian foreign policy, from which their contemporary proposals are said to extend.22 
It is, unfortunately, exceedingly difficult to use the record of Canadian governing circles 
as inspiration for a just approach to the Middle East.
Indeed, the Palestine question is among the global issues on which Canadian 
officials have most consistently pitted themselves against majority world opinion and 
diplomacy. One former Canadian prime minister, the Tory Joe Clark, has expressed 
21 Editorial, ‘The honest broker that never was,’ Globe and Mail (28 July 2006).
22 Nathan C. Funk, ‘Applying Canadian Principles to Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East,’ in 
eds. Heinbecker, Paul, and Bessma Momani, eds., Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2007), 25-7.
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misgivings about this habit. In assuming the office of Canadian prime minister in 1979, 
Clark was at the centre of a significant controversy concerning Palestine, when he 
pledged to effectively endorse Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem by relocating the 
Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv.23 He retreated from this position in the face of the 
ensuing controversy; and in the years ahead, he began to express concerns about the 
more general gap between Canadian and majority world diplomacy on Palestine. ‘The 
Israel-Palestine conflict is,’ he recently wrote, ‘most contentious and dangerous in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the Middle East. However, it is also a lighting-rod issue 
between developed nations and the developing world, where many see Palestinians as 
a symbol of broader exclusion.’24 Of this there can be little doubt. In the conflict over 
Palestine, a number of allied Western states have continually opposed a wide Third 
World consensus. For its part, Canada has tended to stand not only with the Western 
powers, but with the most rigid supporters of Israel among them.
It would not be impossible to construct a patriotic counter-narrative to Canadian 
support for Israel against the Palestinians. The search for ‘past precedents’ noted by 
Funk focuses on the record of the Canadian government. Some of its personnel, 
especially those directly observing the realities of Israeli policy, have left a fragmentary 
record of sympathy with the Palestinians that could be worked with. E.L.M. Burns, for 
example, was the first Canadian peacekeeping commander in the Middle East, sent in 
1954 to head up the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that monitored the 
Arab-Israeli armistice lines after the war of 1948. Sustained exposure to the realities of 
the Palestine conflict made it more difficult for him to accept the Israeli narrative than it 
would have been from a distance. Concerning a meeting he had in the summer of 1956 
with then Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir, Burns expressed common-sensical 
confusion as to why the Israeli government, which was constantly launching ‘retaliatory’ 
border raids, claimed to see no grounds for Palestinian hostility. He wrote: ‘It seemed to
me symptomatic of a certain blindness to the human reactions of others that so many 
Israelis professed not to understand why the Arabs who had been driven from their 
lands should continue to hate and try to injure those who had driven them out.’25 By 
23 See George Takach, ‘Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair: Initiative and Constraint in Canadian 
Foreign Policy,’ in eds. Taras and Goldberg, Domestic Battleground, 144-166.
24 Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2013), 80
25 E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Ltd, 1962), 162.
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Canadian standards, Burns distinguished himself with this public airing of Palestinian 
grievances concerning the expulsions of 1948.
A patriotic counter-narrative, building upon such fragments, could also find 
material from the summer of 1982, when Palestinian refugees were targeted on a 
massive scale in Israel’s first sustained invasion of Lebanon. Canadian prime minister 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau maintained his country’s position on the pro-Israel fringe of world 
diplomacy. His government’s representative in Beirut, however, was sharply critical, at 
least for as long as he was allowed to remain in Lebanon. The Globe and Mail reported:
Canadian Ambassador Theodore Arcand termed the situation ‘a living hell’ before he was ordered
out of West Beirut on Aug. 2. ‘This is truly a scene from Dante's Inferno,’ he said after watching a 
14-hour bombardment from his fourth-story embassy window. Mr. Arcand was the last high-level 
Western diplomat to leave the war-torn city after opening the first floor lobby to homeless
refugees. His own house had been demolished by artillery shells in late July.26
Dewitt and Kirton note that the ambassador’s outrage was in no way matched by prime 
minister Trudeau; rather, ‘the executive of the Canadian government seemed to be 
offering Israel its tacit support.’27 Still, Canadian support for Israel, however one 
approaches the topic, should not be considered monolithic.
Unfortunately, rather than working with these (mostly dissident) fragments, liberal
historical narration of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East tends, as Funk notes, 
to invoke the Canadian government’s supposed internationalism in the years after 
World War II. Here we run across another curious feature of established Canadian 
mythology. Some anti-racist critics contend that Canadian politics have yet to overcome
their racist heritage: ‘Canadian national identity,’ writes Sunera Thobani, ‘remains 
inextricably infused with the colonial tropes of white racial supremacy and western 
civilizational superiority.’28 Thobani’s argument is compelling, but has little place in 
mainstream Canadian discussions. Canada’s history of state-sanctioned racial 
discrimination, extending in force into the 1960s, is roundly acknowledged. But liberal 
conventional wisdom holds that the subsequent adoption of multiculturalism as official 
state policy moved Canada beyond realities of structural racism.
26 Dan Connell, ‘For the civilians, terror and despair,’ Globe and Mail (16 August 1982).
27 Dewitt and Kirton, ‘Foreign Policy Making,’ 180.
28 Sunera Thobani, Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007), 249.
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Concerning foreign policy, on the other hand, Canadian liberalism’s prized 
heritage is bound up with the history of pre-‘multicultural’ Canada. That domestic 
structures of racism reflected political realities which also shaped Canadian activity on 
the world stage, that postwar Canada’s international alignments were carried over from 
the age of overt racial identifications – these are central points, but ones that patriotic 
historiography either bypasses or quietly accepts as natural features of Canadian 
politics. Challenging the conventional depictions, John Price has argued for the need to 
centre the question of racism in discussion of Canadian engagement with East Asia.29 
This rethinking also needs to extend to Canadian engagement with the Middle East.
Direct Canadian interests in the Middle East were to slow to develop. Canadian 
engagement with the region was, then, necessarily internationalist to some extent, in 
that it operated within terms set by allied powers. It is difficult to imagine what a purely 
Canadian parochialism concerning the Middle East would look like. The issue is not 
whether Canadian politics were bound up with interests wider than Canada’s, but rather
concerns the scope and character of the internationalism that resulted. The great anti-
racist W.E.B. Du Bois opened the twentieth century by drawing attention to a defining 
issue for the coming period: ‘The problem of the twentieth century,’ he famously wrote, 
‘is the problem of the color-line, – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in
Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.’30 Throughout the century ahead,
Canadian internationalism was never other than an internationalism of the West. When 
Canada’s self-styled ‘radical mandarin’ Escott Reid declared in 1947 that Canada ought
to economically and military rally with ‘the peoples of the western world,’ this was not 
only an internationalist but also an exclusionary vision.31
The racialized character of ‘the West’ as a political construct is discussed in a 
2003 essay by Alain Badiou, focusing on ‘war on terror’ politics in France. Badiou wrote:
‘let’s recall for the sake of the younger among us that for many decades the political 
deployment of the term “Occidental” was confined to the extreme, racist right wing, to 
29 See John Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2011).
30 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1903), 13.
31 Michael Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71.
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the point of being a name of one of its most violent small groups.’32 The term has a 
different historical resonance in France than in the English-speaking West. As Carr 
suggests in the quote cited at the outset of this introduction, the international 
predominance of Anglo-American power has been accompanied by its identification 
with wider world interests: it has been common to assert the essential congruence of 
Anglo-American, Western, and global order. Canadian politics have largely developed 
under this ideological cover. This does not change the realities of narrow political 
alignments.
On the Middle East as more generally, it is important to delineate the imperial 
and racial boundaries of Canada’s historical commitments. Consider the following 
comments from Arnold Smith, in a telegram dated December 1960. Smith was serving 
as Canadian ambassador in Cairo, at the time of Egypt’s political union with Syria within
the framework of the United Arab Republic. Smith’s telegram lays out his perspective on
Canada’s local interests. The development of a local market for Canadian manufactured
goods was conceivable, he suggested, and Egyptian cotton could perhaps be of use to 
the Canadian textiles sector. For the time being, however, Canadian investments were 
extremely limited. Smith mused,
Canada’s main interests in the U.A.R. are thus political, and more as a member of ‘the West,’ 
than bilateral. Quite apart from the possible danger of a sudden crisis which could lead to military
hostilities on some scale, small or great, with the possibility of direct great power intervention, 
there is the more long-term but perhaps more serious problem of the future relations between the
white nations of western Christendom and the rest of the world.’33
For Smith, Canadian structures of racial power at home clearly carried over into the 
global arena, where the Canadian government’s task was to represent the interests of 
one of ‘the white nations of western Christendom.’ Smith was serving on behalf of the 
Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker. His approach, however, 
was at base shared not only by Diefenbaker but also by his Liberal predecessors; and it
endured well after open racial rhetoric of this kind became taboo.
The enduring association of Canadian state and society with racialized alliance 
politics has been noted by critics abroad. Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz, for example, 
32 Alain Badiou, Circonstances I: Kosovo, 11 septembre, Chirac/Le Pen (Paris: Léo Scheer, 2003); among
the works translated by Steve Corcoran and published as Polemics (London: Verso Books, 2011), 38.




discussing the politics of empire in the Middle East as they have evolved into the 
twenty-first century, identify Canada as part of ‘the Anglo-Saxon bloc of peoples,’ guided
by ‘a feeling of deep shared solidarity, when confronted with other cultures in the 
planet.’34 On the right wing of contemporary Canadian politics, this is sometimes 
proclaimed more or less openly; amidst his pro-Israel diplomacy during the summer of 
2006, prime minister Harper stressed Canada’s share in the heritage of ‘the people of 
the British race.’35 On the liberal left of Canada’s governing spectrum, meanwhile, the 
influence of this heritage is scarcely less decisive.
It may be most useful to simply discard the requirements of intellectual 
patriotism. As Sherene Razack writes of Canadian intellectuals, ‘in the cultural story we 
tell about our international role, we always go to the South as innocent parties who are 
not implicated in the terrible histories we confront there.’36 Concerning the Middle East, 
it would, in order to sustain this approach, be necessary to depict the twenty-first 
century intensification of Canadian support for Israel as an aberration, against which a 
traditional Canadian politics of impartiality and balance should be honoured and 
ultimately restored. This dissertation instead focuses on patterns of continuity. It 
emphasizes Canada’s long-term association with the politics of empire in the Middle 
East, first within the British Empire and later within the widened Western alliance 
centred around US power. It suggests that this association, from early on, encouraged 
Canadian support for Zionist proposals concerning Palestine.
The scope of research for this dissertation includes not only government policy, 
but also the politics of Canadian civil society. Voluntary Canadian support for the 
colonization of Palestine cannot be neatly disentangled from state policy or from the 
reigning political culture in which it was embedded. On the one hand, this approach 
gives to the Canadian Zionist movement its due place in the record of Canada’s 
engagement with the Palestine problem. On the other, it looks to intellectual 
representations of Canadian engagement with the Middle East as forming part of the 
political reality under discussion. The focus of this study is historical. Its attention is 
34 Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World: Patterns and Prospects for the New 
Relationship (London: Zed Books, 2005), 58.
35 Stephen Harper, ‘Address by the Prime Minister at the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce,’ Office of 
the Prime Minister of Canada, 14 July 2006. Accessed in December 2013 at  
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/07/14/address-prime-minister-canada-uk-chamber-commerce>. 
36 Razack, Dark Threats & White Knights, 156.
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directed to the earliest alignments of Canadian with Zionist politics, and to the evolution 
of old colonial patterns through the age of decolonization and liberal Canadian 
internationalism. But this study is not, nor could it be, insulated from contemporary 
politics. To the contrary, it takes as its theoretical point of departure the primacy of 
contemporary politics in determining the relevance of historical research. 
Theory and Its Implications
In ‘Writing and Freedom,’ the Egyptian feminist Nawal El Saadawi provides 
useful guidance for thinking about intellectual work and structures of power. Just as the 
exercise of power is today global, El Saadawi emphasizes that struggles around its 
legitimacy, whether in structures of family or structures of state, cut across all spheres 
of social life. This particular essay of El Saadawi’s combines reflection upon her 
imprisonment by Egyptian authorities with commentary on other barriers to free thought.
She describes how the politics of power and the accusations against those opposing it 
flow ‘downwards and upwards, from the tip of the pyramid where international 
legitimacy resides to the bottom, to local governments, patriarchal and legislative 
authorities, to religious institutions, cultural institutions, the media, the press, the 
intellectuals, the writers and the literary critics.’37 From this perspective, intellectual work
fits within and generally enforces the existing social order. Against this El Saadawi 
advocates a politics of democratic opposition, including by means of ‘simple, clear and 
direct writing.’38 On intellectual work as on contemporary colonialism, El Saadawi’s work
should inform politically responsible theory.
Additional guidance in navigating the relationship between intellectual work and 
political power is provided by Gramsci, writing several decades earlier from an Italian 
prison. In one notebook entry on the topic, Gramsci works through some of the 
historical analysis behind his argument that ‘intellectuals have the function of organizing
the social hegemony of a group and that group’s domination of the state.’39 He relies 
upon an encompassing definition of intellectuals and a sweeping historical analysis of 
37 El Saadawi, The Essential, 135.
38 El Saadawi, The Essential, 138.
39 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 2, 200-201. 
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their function. For present purposes, the notable passage in this notebook entry 
concerns the question of intellectual monopolies. The example he cites is the historic 
authority of ‘Catholicism and ecclesiastical organization, which for many centuries 
absorbed most intellectual activity and exercised a monopoly of intellectual 
administration, including penal sanctions against those who sought to oppose or even 
elude the monopoly.’40 This is also a useful reference point for thinking about intellectual
authority.
It goes without saying that parallels between different systems of power are only 
ever partial. But the notion of a monopoly claimed by accredited intellectuals is of more 
than historical significance. The partial monopoly on political thought that is claimed by 
what Edward Said describes as ‘Social Scientese,’ with its ‘specialized style’ and its 
pretensions to scientific objectivity,41 is obviously different from what Gramsci describes.
Still it exists, and it fits within the social hierarchy that El Saadawi identifies. To treat 
accredited scholarship concerning history or politics as if it stands apart from other 
forms of political thought is to make a theoretical choice. And it is a choice with social 
consequences. In the same measure that El Saadawi’s proposals for directness and 
clarity are democratic, the politics of specialized expertise can act as a buffer against 
democratic opposition.
On this point this dissertation takes its cue from some of the critical literature that
was produced at the margins of US academia during the era of the Vietnam War, a 
context in which the political claims of expert scholars were particularly extravagant and
their social function particularly prominent. It looks in particular to the early work of 
Howard Zinn and Noam Chomsky, focusing on the essays collected in Zinn’s The 
Politics of History and Chomsky’s American Power and the New Mandarins. The essays
in these volumes reflect a shared analysis of the relationship between ideas and power.
At the same time, the two authors suggest different theories of oppositional research. 
Together they set useful terms of discussion for researchers wary of falling into the 
academic world’s deeply worn political ruts.
Zinn and Chomsky were both writing about academic research in general and 
criticizing ‘US Social Scientese’ in its political heyday. In Zinn’s estimation, the pretence 
40 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 2, 203.
41 Said, Orientalism, 284.
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of neutrality in research is a barrier to intellectual honesty. It is neither possible nor 
desirable to research and write about issues of human consequence with genuine 
neutrality. ‘There is no question,’ he writes, ‘of a “disinterested” community of scholars, 
only a question about what kinds of interests the scholars will serve.’42 To feign 
disinterest and decry bias is not to truly opt out of political struggles, but to accept 
prevailing social norms and the prevailing social order as given. In the final count, no 
person can stand apart from the social struggles of their time. In one of the essays 
published in The Politics of History, Zinn introduces the phrase later adapted into the 
title of his autobiography: You Can’t be Neutral on a Moving Train.43 
While Zinn’s work centres on a critique of intellectual service to power, it is not 
restricted to its most obvious forms (e.g., ‘the open sanctification of racism, of war, of 
economic inequality’).44 Also at issue is the ‘professionalization, and therefore the 
dehumanization of the scholar’ through mechanisms that position research neatly within
the established order.45 One such mechanism is the pull of ‘pretentious conceptualizing 
in the social sciences’; where straightforward alignment with power does not define 
research, the politics of personal and institutional advancement still may. ‘Schemes and
models and systems are invented which have the air of profundity and which advance 
careers, but hardly anything else.’46 
Zinn’s critique does not preclude the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. 
Whereas Carr, in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, writes that ‘thinking for thinking’s sake is as 
abnormal and barren as the miser’s accumulation of money for its own sake,’ Zinn’s 
The Politics of History is less rigid.47 Zinn writes, ‘I am not directing my criticism against 
those few histories which are works of art, which make no claim to illuminate a social 
problem, but instead capture the mood, the color, the reality of an age, an incident, or 
an individual, conveying pleasure and the warmth of genuine emotion.’48 In history, as 
perhaps in political theory, ‘thinking for thinking’s sake’ has its place. But generally 
speaking, historiography and political analysis relate in one way or another to the plane 
42 Howard Zinn, The Politics of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 10.
43 Zinn, Politics of History, 35.
44 Zinn, Politics of History, 45.
45 Zinn, Politics of History, 23.
46 Zinn, Politics of History, 8.
47 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 3.
48 Zinn, Politics of History, 19.
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of possible political action. A decisive element of any political research is its orientation 
towards this relationship.
Against the general pattern of intellectual alignment with power, Zinn essentially 
argues that academics should switch sides. He writes, ‘Let the economists work out a 
plan for free food, instead of advising the Federal Reserve Board on interest rates. Let 
the political scientists work out insurgency tactics for the poor, rather than counter-
insurgency tactics for the rich. Let the historians instruct or inspire us, rather than 
amusing us, boring us, or deceiving us.’49 It is concerning this link between accredited 
intellectual work and political opposition that Chomsky takes his analysis in a slightly 
different direction.
In Zinn’s analysis, the tendency towards ‘pretentious conceptualizing in the 
social sciences’ is identified as one way that the significance of knowledge is dissipated.
In Chomsky’s, it is identified as a service to power in its own right, a natural companion 
to the politics of centralized authority. For Chomsky, the classing of political thought as a
specialized vocation is both a reflection and a guarantor of the political 
disempowerment of the general population. Legitimacy accrues to accredited 
intellectuals at the expense of unaccredited critics: ‘the non-specialist does not, after all,
presume to tell physicists and engineers how to build an atomic reactor.’50 Here the 
argument is not for specialist research in the service of political opposition movements 
so much as for analysis that erodes the political claims of academic specialization in 
order to widen the scope of political opposition. Academics may have the time and 
resources for especially thorough research. But this does not set academic work on 
history and politics apart from popular political debates. ‘There is no body of theory or 
significant body of relevant information, beyond the comprehension of the layman, 
which makes policy immune from criticism.’51 Exaggerated theoretical rigour figures into 
this analysis not as unnecessary but as presumptuous and politically irresponsible.
The essays in which Zinn and Chomsky develop this analysis speak above all to 
the United States of the Vietnam War era, where the connection between technocratic 
authority and state power was especially strong. But the theories of oppositional 
49 Zinn, Politics of History, 14.
50 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), 317-8.
51 Chomsky, American Power, 335, 342.
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research that they develop, explicitly and by example, remain relevant. Rejection of the 
pretence of academic objectivity is an agreed point of departure. Moving forward from 
there, Zinn’s call for academic work in the service of political opposition and Chomsky’s 
criticism of specialized social-scientific claims point to parallel paths for dissident 
academic research. They converge in a challenge to the ideas that envelop the 
exercise of power and offer it unwarranted legitimacy.
This approach is not without its own theoretical basis and lineage. Chomsky’s 
analysis, for its part, is rooted in the anarchist tradition and its radically democratic 
critique of state power. He explores this heritage more explicitly in a later essay, 
‘Intellectuals and the State.’ But the decisive element of such oppositional research is 
not its identification with a particular theoretical school of thought; it is its attentiveness 
to the political consequences of ideas. The suggestion is that oppositional research 
should identify and seek to undercut the political function of established academic 
patriotism. For all the declared objectivity of post-war US historiography, for example, 
Chomsky notes that at the outset of the Cold War, the president of the American 
Historical Association himself identified ‘social control’ as an important task for patriotic 
scholars: ‘Total war,’ declared Conyers Reed, ‘whether it be hot or cold, enlists 
everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The historian is no freer from this
obligation than the physicist.’52 The critiques above suggest that the politics of patriotic 
scholarship operate even where they are are not so bluntly conceived and articulated.
For their part, governing groups in Israel, as in the US, have been aggressively 
committed to promoting state power ‘with the weapons of ideas.’53 In Israeli strategic 
parlance, calculations of military strategy and intellectual representation often 
intermingle. Shimon Peres recalls the oft-cited position of his mentor, Israel’s founding 
prime minister David Ben-Gurion: ‘Ben-Gurion knew that every war and conflict takes 
place twice – once on the battlefield and then in the history books.’54 This conception 
echoes through contemporary research and academic discussion. Hence Gerald 
Steinberg’s insistence, in the aftermath of Israel’s 2008-9 assault on the Gaza Strip 
52 Noam Chomsky, ‘Intellectuals and the State,’ in Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis
and How We Got There (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 71.
53 Natan Sharansky with Shira W. Weiss, ed. Ron Dermer, Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in 
Protecting Democracy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 210. 




(‘Operation Cast Lead’), that intellectual supporters of Israel should consciously 
approach academic debates as the terrain of an ongoing ‘narrative war.’55 Steinberg 
was writing not as a marginal polemicist, but as the chair of Bar Ilan University’s political
science department. The influence upon the West of pro-Zionist and pro-Israel 
polemicists, even in the narrowest sense, should not be ignored. However, it alone does
not account for the skewed Western intellectual record with regards to the Palestine 
problem.
The issue is also the way in which the Zionist or Israeli cause has been attached 
to the projection of Western power. On the plane of power politics, as Bashir Abu-
Manneh emphasizes, Western association with Israel reflects a politics of empire which 
extend well beyond Palestine.56 Canada’s Lester B. Pearson was expressing a common
conception when he decribed Israel as an advanced allied base – ‘an outpost, if you 
will, of the West in the Middle East.’57 On the plane of ideas, meanwhile, Western 
liberalism has both rationalized and urged on this association. Edward Said, invoking 
Gramsci, describes the dynamic as a ‘complete hegemonic coalescence between the 
liberal Western view of things and the Zionist-Israeli view.’58 It has left an enduring 
imprint on Western popular and academic discussions.
The conventional pro-Israel narrative that resulted has lost much of its 
intellectual legitimacy since the late twentieth century. Celebratory narration of Zionist 
colonization as a story of swamps drained, of deserts made to bloom, and of purely 
defensive Israeli wars is increasingly at odds with norms of liberal academic 
professionalism – a change owing partly to the work of Palestinian and allied 
researchers, partly to the availability of archival material directly contradicting 
established Zionist claims.59 Though quite real, this progress should not be 
exaggerated. In much Canadian scholarship and journalism, the old mythology 
continues to prevail. Significant sections of this dissertation are devoted to challenging 
55 Gerald M. Steinberg, ‘Taking Back the Narrative,’ Jerusalem Post (30 May 2009), 
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=143914>.
56 Bashir Abu-Manneh, ‘Israel in the US Empire,’ Monthly Review 58, no. 10 (2007), 
<http://monthlyreview.org/2007/03/01/israel-in-the-u-s-empire>.
57 John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 
Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 219.
58 Said, Question of Palestine, 37.




the Canadian intellectual reliance on discredited pro-Zionist assumptions. Basic 
questions of fact are often at issue. Nonetheless, little is to be gained by correcting the 
historical record in the spirit of disinterested analysis.
Indeed, it may be appropriate to concede a point suggested by Ben-Gurion and 
Steinberg: the study of history and politics bears unavoidably on the issues being 
studied. Since a genuine opting out of this relationship is not possible, researchers 
should aspire, with Zinn, to ‘participate a bit in the social combat of our time.’60 To what 
ends is of course another question. Put differently, Zionist mythology demands criticism 
not only for skewing the factual record, but also and above all for its function in blocking
opposition to the international politics of perpetual warfare against Palestinians. 
Meaningful criticism, while addressing historical distortions of fact, ought to focus on 
confronting those myths that constrain contemporary political opposition.
This does have some theoretical implications for research. For example, the 
insistence that Zionism and Western support for it cannot be considered apart from their
impact on Palestinians has consequences for methodology and sourcing. Where the 
established Zionist narrative has not even superficially accommodated the documentary
evidence, as is often the case in the literature on Canada, available Israeli and Western
documents themselves offer strong grounds for a challenge. Nonetheless, as Saleh 
Abdel Jawad argues, a fixation on official archival materials can reproduce the relations 
of power inherent in the dispossession of the Palestinians and the development of the 
Israeli state.61 The brute realities of expulsion and occupation, among other factors, 
have undercut the documentary record of Palestinian experiences. To establish a fuller 
picture of key historical events (notably, the war of 1948), it is necessary to turn to the 
literature incorporating Palestinian oral history.
Still, in the final count, a critical approach to Palestine does not require much 
theoretical radicalism. The denial of Palestinian rights has been egregious even by 
conservative standards. Significantly, to assertively demand today that Palestinians be 
subject only to conventional imperialism – that they be allowed a ‘quasi-state’ with 
security forces allied with foreign powers, with a dependent economy, but freed from 
60 Zinn, Politics of History, 3.
61 See Saleh Abdel Jawad, ‘La guerre de 1948: Entre archives et sources orales,’ Revue d’études 
Palestiniennes 96 (summer 2005), 59-77.
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direct foreign occupation – is to align with the ‘pro-Palestinian’ section of the Western 
political mainstream.62 To insist that a liberal democratic norm such as universal adult 
suffrage be applied to Palestine/Israel – ‘one person, one vote’ – is to move out to the 
‘anti-Israel’ margins. In debates about such a situation, different traditions of political 
theory are generally not what structure the discussions.
In fact, the concepts that best make sense of Western engagement with the 
Zionist enterprise cut across theoretical traditions. Consider analysis of Zionism as 
settler colonialism and of the politics of Western imperialism that have empowered it. 
Two of the most influential thinkers to have developed this analysis are Maxime 
Rodinson, an independent French Marxist, and Walid Khalidi, co-founder of the Institute
for Palestine Studies. Their work informs the analysis developed in this study. While 
Rodinson, for his part, was writing from the left, Khalidi argues that one needn’t go 
further than the conservative wing of the IR canon to identify Zionism with imperialism; 
in Khalidi’s estimation, Israel fits ‘Hans Morgenthau’s preeminent non-Marxist definition 
of imperialism in modern Western international political theory.’63 The landmark volumes
that Khalidi has produced, including From Haven to Conquest and All That Remains, 
are effectively radical but theoretically conservative.
That Khalidi sought to put conservative IR to good use is not enough to 
rehabilitate the theories advanced in Morgenthau’s The Politics of Nations, which would
have us free ‘the administration and safeguarding of empire’ from the stigma of 
imperialism (acquiring an empire may be imperialism, Morgenthau allows, but 
maintaining one is not).64 But it is another reminder that a critical approach to Palestine 
does not require elaborate radical theory. It may not be necessary to sink to the level of 
Morgenthau. Dwelling on theoretical differences, however, can dissipate meaningful 
opposition. As Ilan Pappé has suggested, burying straightforward oppositional analysis 
62 For a discussion of the concept of Third World ‘quasi-states,’ see David Williams, ‘Aid and Sovereignty: 
Quasi-states and the International Financial Institutions,’ Review of International Studies 26, no 4 (2000), 
557-573.
63 Walid Khalidi, ‘Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,’ in Ilan Pappé, The Israel/Palestine Question: 
A Reader (London: Routledge, 2007), 109.




in the language of radical theoretical nuance is sometimes more a means of academic 
self-protection than of relevant dissent.65
This study focuses on challenging liberal historical myths that continue to factor 
into struggles over Canadian politics on Palestine. Prominent among these are the 
historical presumption of Canadian innocence, which casts Canada in the role of a 
blameless observer weighing into Middle East conflicts to lend impartial help, and the 
celebratory depiction of postwar liberal internationalism, which serves to deflect 
contemporary opposition towards a nostalgic patriotism aligned with Canada’s more 
moderate governing elements. Its findings suggest that a meaningful challenge to 
Canadian politics on Palestine can only be mounted within the framework of a broader 
challenge to Canadian structures of political power.
Approaching Canadian Politics on Palestine
This dissertation asks why Canada, a country geographically far removed from 
the Middle East, has positioned itself on the pro-Israel, anti-Palestinian end of the 
spectrum of world politics. What factors have historically shaped Canadian engagement
with the Palestine question, and in the process, to what extent have the Canadian state 
and Canadian society implicated themselves in the denial of Palestinian rights?
The systematic denial of Palestinian rights as an element of Zionist colonization 
and Israeli state policy has been wide-ranging. Its core is identified in the work of 
Palestinian intellectuals including Nur Masalha, Karma Nabulsi, and Jamil Hilal as the 
effort to suppress the presence of Palestinians. This has taken its most direct and 
devastating form in the Zionist politics of ‘transfer,’ the origins of which Masalha reviews
in Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought, 
1882-1948. Masalha shows how the Zionist leadership’s fixation on settling Palestine 
with a Jewish majority, also explored at length by the Israeli scholar Yosef Gorny, was 
accompanied by explicit strategies for displacing Palestinians to clear the way for this 
purpose.66 These strategies were most aggressively translated into action in 1948, 
65 Ilan Pappé, The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge (London: Verso, 2014), 148.
66 Yosef Gorny, trans. Chaya Galai, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948: A Study of Ideology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987).
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through the large-scale expulsions addressed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. But the 
same fundamental priorities continue to characterize Israeli politics up the present.
The effort to suppress the presence of Palestinians is directed in the first 
instance at Palestinians’ physical presence in Palestine, and then against their political 
presence in all that concerns it. In addition to sheer physical exclusion (‘transfer’), it 
takes the form of systematic hostility to Palestinian political self-representation. At first 
this involved outright denial of Palestinian national existence. In the famous formulation 
of then Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, there is ‘no such thing as Palestinians.’67 A fall-
back position, as bare Palestinian existence has become more difficult to ignore, is the 
denial of Palestinian rights to select their own political representatives. From this 
position, institutionalized hostility towards particular organizations within the Palestinian 
national movement has developed as a surrogate for hostility to the Palestinian people 
as a whole. 
For decades this hostility was focused above all on the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). Circumstances shifted as a result of the US-sponsored ‘peace 
process’ of the 1990s, which folded the PLO leadership into a dependent Palestinian 
Authority (PA) on parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An institutionalized hostility 
towards Palestinian political self-expression nonetheless remained. The PA itself was 
constructed in such a way as to ensure that the PLO’s mechanisms for democratic 
participation would be diminished in relation to its leadership’s cooperation with Israel 
and with the international donors organized by the US. The politics of allied contempt 
for Palestinian rights to self-representation were showcased with particular violence 
after the PA legislative elections of 2006, in which a Hamas electoral slate won a 
majority. But as Nabulsi and Hilal remind us, marginalization of Palestinian popular 
participation was built into the very framework of the Oslo process.68
It is precisely the politics of physical and political exclusion that have defined the 
colonialism facing Palestinians. It is thus an ironic twist of Zionist intellectual diplomacy 
that many polemicists, seeking to dissociate Israel from the stigma of colonialism, spin 
67 Janice J. Terry, ‘Zionist Attitudes toward Arabs’, Journal of Palestine Studies 6, no. 1 (1976), 72.
68 See Karma Nabulsi, ‘The State-Building Project: What Went Wrong?,’ in eds. Michael Keating et al., 
Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine (London: Chatham House, 2005), 117-
128; and Jamil Hilal, ‘The Polarization of the Palestinian Political Field,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 39, 
no. 3 (2010), 24-39.
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these exclusionist politics as a redeeming element of Zionist history. Yoav Gelber, for 
example, insists that the Zionist fixation on Jewish demographic predominance over 
Palestinians is nothing less than a democratic virtue. The Zionist movement ‘strove to 
arrive at a demographic majority in the Land of Israel before taking political control of 
the country,’ recalls Gelber; with Arabs reduced to a minority, political dominance by the 
Jewish majority is only a matter of self-determination, serving ‘to refute the identification
of Zionism with colonialism.’69 Palestinian existence is, in this thinking, only an external 
dilemma for Israeli liberalism. In his contribution to The Domestic Battleground: Canada
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Canada’s Irving Abella makes a similar point: ‘Israel’s 
democracy is at war with Arab demography’.70 Since Israeli liberalism needs to exclude 
the Palestinians in order to preserve Jewish representative dominance, the war against 
Arab demography is not colonial but democratic. Needless to say, the argument that 
Zionism is, by virtue of its exclusionist ethos, exempt from charges of colonialism 
should not deflect analysis of what is an unmistakably colonial history, or of the role of 
external actors within it.
In truth, the commitment to controlling Palestinian land without Palestinians 
hardly removes the Zionist movement or Israel from the colonial tradition. In an 
important essay entitled ‘Pioneering in the Nuclear Age,’ Eqbal Ahmad noted that this 
colonial path has been well worn, albeit mostly by settlers operating before the onset of 
formal decolonization. ‘Israel obviously shares many similarities with South Africa and 
may in time come to resemble the apartheid state more than most liberal Zionists 
suspect,’ wrote Ahmad. But, he continued, there are other parallels: 
the Zionist movement and state share significant similarities with the early form of colonial 
movements that transformed the Western Hemisphere into the ‘New World’ of the West . . . It is a
pioneering colonialism, one that seeks to exclude and eliminate the native inhabitants rather than
to occupy and exploit them. Although produced by the process and power of imperialism, it is a 
form of colonialism that offers refuge to the disinherited, to persecuted minorities and to the 
surpluses, marginals, and misfits created by industrialism and modernization in the metropolis. A 
colonialism committed to replacing the native people, it is racist and extremist by nature. Yet, a 
product of the Western metropolis, constituted mostly of the dispossessed, of dissidents and the 
persecuted, it is often liberal in ideology and humane in rhetoric. Hypocrisy, the compliment paid 
by vice to virtue, is the hallmark of the exclusionist settler style.71
69 Yoav Gelber, The New Post-Zionist Historians (American Jewish Committee, 2008), 30.
70 David H. Goldberg and David Taras, eds., The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), 244.
71 Eqbal Ahmad, eds. Carollee Bengelsoorf et al., The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad (New York: 
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Ahmad’s analysis chimes with more recent work in the emerging field of comparative 
settler colonialism. Introducing one of the main texts in the field, Caroline Elkins and 
Susan Pedersen likewise identify ‘a logic of elimination and not exploitation’ as a 
defining characteristic of the form of settler colonialism pioneered in the Americas.72 
Elkins and Pedersen make an important related point. This logic does not only 
result in particular military campaigns or massacres against native populations; it is 
applied systemically. Under settler colonialism, in Patrick Wolfe’s influential formulation, 
‘invasion is a structure not an event.’73 The implications for analysis of Palestine are 
significant. The politics of exclusion do define the major atrocities against Palestinians. 
Since 1948, the most devastating Israeli attacks have targeted Palestinian population 
centres in which refugee populations offered a social basis for organized challenges to 
Israeli marginalization of the Palestinians. So it was with Israel’s 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon, and so it has been in successive assaults on the Gaza Strip. But the denial of
Palestinian rights cannot be reduced to the numbers of dead or wounded in the course 
of various Israeli military campaigns. The core problem is the cumulative process which 
these attacks enforce.
The international politics of the Palestine question are best considered as part of 
this reality. Put simply, if Israeli invasion is a structure, it is one that has been crucially 
buttressed by international support. The Zionist and Israeli leadership have not been 
hapless proxies of the Western powers; they have had their own goals, and bear the 
most direct responsibility for the destruction of Palestine. Nonetheless, they have 
operated with considerable external assistance. ‘Surely,’ as Jawaharlal Nehru 
remarked, addressing Third World delegates from across the world in 1955 Bandung, 
‘no one is going to say that Zionist imperialism is strong enough, powerful enough to 
shake the world, in spite of everybody?’74 This dissertation positions Canada within the 
international support systems upon which Israel’s development has relied.
In his comments at Bandung on ‘the tremendous tragedy’ of Palestine, Nehru 
emphasized that it was necessary not only to look at the politics of Zionism, but also at 
72 Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, 
Practices, Legacies (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2.
73 Elkins and Pedersen, Settler Colonialism, 3.
74 G.H. Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), 256.
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‘the forces behind the movement.’75 Although anti-colonial analysis of the Palestine 
question never gained the widespread endorsement in Western countries that it would 
in much of the Third World, in 1967 Les Temps Modernes published a nearly one-
thousand page volume presenting various perspectives on the Arab-Israeli conflict.76 
Contributors to the volume ranged from Shimon Peres to Khaled Mohieddine, an 
original member of the Free Officers movement that overturned Egypt’s monarchy in 
1952. The opening essay was contributed by Maxime Rodinson. A few years later, 
Rodinson’s contribution was translated into English and published under the title, Israel:
A Colonial-Settler State? Notably, since the printing of this volume of Les Temps 
Modernes coincided with the war of June 1967, Rodinson’s analysis concerns 
developments before Israeli expansion into the newly occupied territories.
Rodinson’s work offers a good starting point for analysis of the relationship 
between Israeli settler colonialism and the Western powers. He argued for the 
fundamental validity of many Arabs’ contention that they faced in Israel ‘a powerful 
colony backed by the European-American nations as a whole. These nations, indeed, 
constituted the true mother country [metropole] of the Yishuv.’77 Rodinson asserted that 
this relationship, initially centred on the support that Zionism received from the British 
Empire during and after the First World War, also encompassed the West more broadly.
As Rodinson’s essay was published, US-anchored support for Israel was undergoing a 
massive expansion.
Around the same time, Walid Khalidi provided a more nuanced analysis of the 
same relationship in an extended introduction to his documentary anthology From 
Haven to Conquest. Rodinson’s suggestion that the Western powers collectively acted 
as metropolitan sponsor to the Zionist movement was illuminating, but somewhat 
schematic. In a sweeping analysis of the international politics of the Palestine problem 
up to 1948, Khalidi pieced apart the dynamics of this relationship in greater detail. His 
analysis also emphasized ‘the colon status’ of Zionist settlers during the period of British
75 Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism, 256.
76 Apart from Rodinson’s translated essay, the only contribution to this volume cited below is that of 
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rule in Palestine,78 and charted the evolution of the dynamic external support system 
upon which the Zionist movement relied, structured first around British and later around 
US power. From his analysis there emerges a picture of a metropolitan support system 
centred on a primary Great Power sponsor but more widely diversified. An especially 
interesting feature of Khalidi’s analysis concerns the interplay between the support that 
the Zionist movement received from state leaders, guided by strictly imperial 
calculations, and the development of an organized base of sub-state support for 
Zionism in the West. The research conducted for this dissertation produces 
complementary conclusions.
Early Canadian engagement with Palestine cannot be understood apart from the 
Canadian state’s emergence as a component part of the British Empire. To a 
considerable extent, then, Canadian politics on Palestine first developed within the 
wider evolution of the Zionist movement’s strategic association with British power. The 
first chapter of this dissertation explores this history. It looks at Canada’s original status 
within the British Empire; at the emergence of political Zionism in the age of high 
imperialism; and at the early connections between the two. This chapter also introduces
analysis of the support that elements of Canadian civil society provided for Zionist 
colonization efforts in Palestine. The following chapter extends this analysis. It reviews 
the Canadian Zionist movement’s evolution towards the end of Britain’s Palestine 
mandate, and assesses its direct association with the transformation of Palestine in 
1948 by the force of arms.
The third chapter turns back to the level of state policy. It assesses the changes 
in Canadian foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II, and the way in which 
Canadian officials approached the Palestine problem in this context. It thus deals with 
the onset of a self-styled liberal Canadian internationalism. Its finds that, on Palestine 
as more generally, the Canadian leadership remained committed to narrow international
alignments carried on from the age of formal imperialism. Here the alignment of 
Canada’s main putative internationalists with Anglo-American power is emphasized.
In the fourth and final chapter of this dissertation, this theme is explored at 
greater length. The focus of this chapter is the prized apex of liberal Canadian 
78 Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 
1948 (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), xxxv.
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internationalism in the Middle East: the Suez Crisis of 1956-7. In Canada, this is 
typically regarded as the high-point of the ‘golden age’ of Canada’s internationalist 
foreign policy in the Middle East. The standard liberal Canadian invocation of the 
tradition of ‘Pearsonian internationalism’ hinges on Lester B. Pearson’s diplomatic 
peformance during this period on Canada’s behalf. For the moment, suffice it to note 
how a leading Canadian scholar at the time described its reception outside of allied 
quarters: ‘It is one thing to bask, as Mr. Pearson has done more than once, in the abuse
of Pravda; it is another to be called a “stooge of Zionism” by a member of the Afro-Asian
group.’79 A close analysis of the record of Canadian diplomacy on Palestine during this 
period clarifies the restrictive scope of the internationalism with which Canadian officials
approached the world.
Given the scope of this research project, an exclusive reliance upon primary 
sources has not been possible. In this case it is, moreover, not necessary for originality. 
In order to challenge the established intellectual record of Canadian engagement with 
the Palestine problem, it is in the first instance necessary to reinterpret the documented 
details of the Canadian case in light of the accumulation of more credible scholarship 
on Palestine over recent decades. A synthesis of the local literature concerning 
Canadian engagement with Palestine with credible secondary sources produced by 
Israeli, Palestinian, and other international scholars can itself yield new understanding 
of local developments. Analysis of a wide range of secondary sources has permitted the
scope of this research project while guiding engagement with primary materials.
The main source of primary documents used for this dissertation is the 
Documents on Canadian External Relations series. The first volume of this series was 
published by Canada’s department of external affairs in 1967, marking the Canadian 
state’s centennial. There are now twenty-nine volumes available in this series, providing
extensive internal government documentation from the establishment of the department
of external affairs in 1909 through to the early 1960s. Research for this project involved 
the compilation of all materials on Palestine that could be found in these volumes. 
Additional government documents are cited from a range of other sources, including 




published documentary anthologies and relevant volumes of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States series.
Other materials used for this research project include biographies, memoirs, 
diary collections, newspaper articles, and two works of historical fiction. A fuller listing of





‘The Zionists were the initiators. But they were also, as they still are, the protégés of their Anglo-American
sponsors and the emanations of their power, resources, and will.’1
-Walid Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest (1971)
‘In the days when I had responsibilities to dissuade politicians from posturing, by demonstrating against 
or withdrawing from the Commonwealth, I sometimes observed in speeches in various parts of the world 
that so far from being a ghost of Empire the Commonwealth was largely the creation of leaders of 
successful national liberation movements. I added that the first of these was Sir John Macdonald [the first
prime minister of Canada: 1867-1873, 1878-1891].
‘Although not of course the whole truth, this was a significant and a useful aspect of the truth.’2  
-Arnold C. Smith, noted Canadian diplomat (1980) 
* * *
Canada and Israel have a shared imperial heritage. At the broadest level, both 
states developed out of settler projects initiated from Europe and imposed on 
Indigenous populations that were displaced and subordinated in the process, often by 
force. More specifically, both projects developed under the jurisdiction of the British 
Empire. An analysis of this shared heritage is the necessary point of departure for 
discussion of early Canadian engagement with Palestine and the Zionist enterprise.
The politics of British North America and of the Zionist movement as they 
operated on the world stage, and the initial connections between them, took shape 
through global processes that were determining the place of settler colonies in 
international affairs. If, as Bashir Abu-Manneh has suggested, even critical scholarship 
on Palestine too often neglects the question of empire,3 research concerning the 
broader politics of settler colonialism can provide some guidance in addressing this 
problem.
1 Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948
(Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), xxi.
2 Arnold C. Smith, ‘Britain and Canada in the Wider World,’ in ed. David Dilks, Britain and Canada: A 
Colloquium Held at Leeds, October, 1979 (London: Commonwealth Foundation, 1980), 46. Cited in part 
in ed. Phillip Buckner, Canada and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 19.




This chapter begins by identifying the parallel between Zionist and Canadian 
history, both defined by an imperial heritage downplayed in patriotic historiography. It 
goes on to argue that in spite of the anti-imperialism sometimes written into their 
histories, both the Zionist movement and the Canadian state developed in alignment 
with a European politics of empire that combined strategic power projection and racism.
The early sections of the chapter set the broader context for these cases, addressing 
the historical place of settler colonialism in imperial strategy and the association of 
British settler colonies with metropolitan politics. The latter sections identify the specific 
relationship that took shape between Canadian society and Zionist colonization within 
the orbit of what is known as the ‘Third British Empire.’
In recent years, the comparative study of settler colonialism has become a field 
in its own right.4 This dissertation is more concerned with Canadian engagement with 
Palestine than with similarities and differences between the Canadian and Zionist 
experiences; nonetheless, the comparative analysis of settler societies yields some 
relevant insights. It is, for example, instructive to note that the empowerment of settlers 
by central imperial authorities, and the privileged position afforded to them, is often 
retrospectively downplayed in the patriotic historiography of settler societies. The place 
of these societies in imperial strategy and world order is correspondingly obscured.
National mythology is typically structured around ‘useful aspects of the truth,’ to 
borrow a phrase from the Canadian diplomat Arnold Smith. And the national 
mythologies of states produced by colonial settlement tend to emphasize friction rather 
than alignment with imperial power. Tension between settlers and metropolitan 
authorities figures more prominently in official historiography than does accord; 
Indigenous populations are pushed to the margins of narratives that emphasize the 
pursuit of settler self-governance and political authority against metropolitan 
opposition.5 It is against this theme that genuinely anti-imperialist historical analysis 
needs to be pursued. The theme’s place in both Canadian and Zionist political culture 
thus deserves attention at the outset.
4 For an overview, see eds. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth 
Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: Routledge, 2005).
5 As discussed, for example, in Kenneth Good, ‘Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class 
Formation,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 14, no. 4 (1976), 597-620.
29
Entangled Imperial Roots
The obvious differences between the Canadian and the Zionist experiences only 
suggest the breadth of this tendency. Within the British Empire, in the period considered
in this chapter, the Canadian and the Zionist leaderships occupied nearly opposite 
poles on the spectrum of settler privilege. In Canada, politicians including the country’s 
founding prime minister, John A. Macdonald, sought self-governance for those colonies 
within the British Empire that had a British majority.6 ‘By 1867, the year of 
Confederation, an estimated two-thirds of British North America’s population was British
in origin.’7 The dominant layers of Canadian society expected a measure of self-
governance within the Empire, and were on their way to gaining it well before 
Confederation. They remained full British subjects, however, with full access to the 
metropolitan political system. A distinct Canadian citizenship was not even available 
until 1947. The first half of the twentieth century saw twenty-nine Britons born in 
Canada take up office in the House of Commons in London. One of these, the Tory 
Andrew Bonar Law, became the only British prime minister to have been born outside of
the British Isles.8 The Zionist movement, in contrast, was only formally tied to the 
Empire after the First World War. Britain’s patronage of Zionism in the years that 
followed had an enormous impact. But there was no comparable ethnic or civic 
identification to cement it.
Zionism’s imperial heritage is nonetheless central to its history. It is true that in 
the 1940s the Zionist movement dramatically broke with Britain, up to that point its 
primary Great Power sponsor. But this does not negate the movement’s formative 
development, or its enduring orientation towards the leading Western powers. Soon 
before the Suez Crisis erupted in 1956, a Canadian diplomat quite supportive of Israel 
observed that ‘Israel is looked upon by most of the anti-colonial nations of Africa and 
Asia as something in the nature of an imperialist stronghold.’9 This criticism, widespread
in the formerly colonized world, punctuated Third World diplomacy on the Middle East in
6 Phillip Buckner, ‘Introduction,’ in ed. Phillip Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005), 4. 
7 Daiva Stasiulus and Radha Jhappan, ‘The Fractious Politics of a Settler Society: Canada,’ in eds. Daiva 
Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and 
Class (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 108.
8 Colin M. Coates, ‘Preface: From Parliament Hill to Vimy Ridge,’ in ed. Colin M. Coates, Imperial 
Canada, 1867-1917 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Centre of Canadian Studies, 1997), iii.
9 Greg Donaghy, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [henceforth DCER] Vol. 22 (Ottawa: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001), 78.
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the postwar period. Liberal diplomats were unable to entirely ignore it. In the liberal 
scholarship concerning Israel’s development, it is too often brushed aside.
Some of Europe’s leading intellectuals did observe that the Zionist movement’s 
interwar development rested upon imperial sponsorship. E.H. Carr emphasized that it 
was only after and as a result of achieving Great Power backing that the Zionist 
movement gained any appreciable strength.10 Hannah Arendt attributed the Zionist 
movement’s embrace of British patronage to a strategy of ‘seeking the protection of the 
Great Powers, trying to trade it against possible services,’ an approach which, as she 
explained, foreclosed any ‘alliance with the national revolutionary peoples of Asia and 
participation in their struggle against imperialism.’11 The point was not lost on nationalist 
leaders in the Global South: leading Zionists were neither allies nor neutralists in the 
struggle against colonialism. As Jawaharlal Nehru observed as early as 1933, ‘They 
have preferred to take sides with the foreign ruling power, and have thus helped it to 
keep back freedom from the majority of the people.’12 
This aspect of Zionist politics is obscured in most Israeli and Western narration. 
It is traditionally overshadowed by a focus on the Zionist movement’s eventual rupture 
with Britain. Notably, and in something of a paradox, propaganda downplaying the 
British imperial connection factored prominently in the cultivation of Israel’s main 
alternative base of support, in the United States. In the resulting narrative, pre-state 
Zionist history culminates in an Israeli ‘War of Independence’ waged by implication 
more against Britain than against the Palestinians.
The most influential text in this tradition is Exodus, the novel written by Leon Uris
and re-made into a Hollywood film of the same name. ‘Scholars across the political 
spectrum have noted the power of Exodus in shaping the dominant historical narrative –
and its attendant moral lessons – of the birth of Israel,’ writes Amy Kaplan. ‘Written 
during a period of global decolonization, Exodus contributes to the mystique of Israel’s 
birth as an anti-colonial struggle of national liberation and disavows its origins in settler 
10 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New 
York: Perennial, 2001), 139.
11 Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered,’ in eds. Jerome Kohn and Ron Feldman, Hannah Arendt, The 
Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 366, 364.
12 G.H. Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), 183.
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colonialism, a denial that mirrors the origins of American exceptionalism.’13 Roger Owen
suggests that Britain’s support for the Zionist project may finally be receiving focused 
scholarly attention,14 but the historic weight of the Exodus narrative is difficult to 
overstate.
For its part, the Canadian case is less dramatic – here it is both more difficult and
less important for patriotic intellectuals to obscure the state’s imperial origins. The 
gradual redefinition of Canada’s relationship with the British Empire over the course of 
the twentieth century is a pale equivalent of the Zionist movement’s conflict with British 
authorities in the years leading up to the establishment of the Israeli state. And opinion-
makers in Canada have not had as pressing a need to engage with global perceptions 
as their counterparts in Israel, a state whose establishment was undertaken in an age 
of decolonization, and whose regional position still rests on massive international 
support. Despite this, retrospective diminishment of the imperial connection has 
become a feature of Canadian intellectual life as well.
This ideological oddity is pieced apart in a series of publications brought together
by Phillip Buckner, including a recent companion volume to the Oxford History of the 
British Empire concerning Canada.15 Buckner discusses how the once proud imperial 
historiography of Canada became a forgotten inconvenience. He identifies a variety of 
factors, including the moral force of decolonization, the anti-imperialist sentiment that 
swept the world amidst the US war on Vietnam, and the avowed Canadian nationalism 
of most historians working on the topic. Whatever the spark, Buckner observes that late
twentieth-century Canadian scholarship reflected a desire ‘to gloss over the part 
[Canadians] played in the making of the British Empire, both in the extension of British 
authority over the upper half of the North American continent and in the support they 
gave to the extension of British authority in other parts of the globe.’16 In the process, 
the struggle-for-independence theme gained ground.
For present purposes, one example can suffice: Desmond Morton’s A Military 
History of Canada. In this standard text, now in its fifth edition, Morton writes of 
13 Amy Kaplan, ‘Zionism as Anticolonialism: The Case of Exodus,’ American Literary History 25, no. 4 
(winter 2013), 872, 878.
14 Roger Owen, ‘Britain’s role revealed,’ Al-Ahram Weekly no. 904 (July 2008), 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/904/op2.htm>.
15 For full citation details, see note 2, above.
16 Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire, 3.
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Canadian participation in the First World War that ‘the Great War was also Canada’s 
war of independence even if it was fought at Britain’s side against a common enemy.’17 
The assertion strains credulity. But it dovetails with Arnold Smith’s diplomatic narration 
of Canadian history. In this narrative, the British Empire’s gradual accommodation of 
autonomy for its ‘white Dominions’ is recast in terms of self-determination and national 
liberation.
As politically expedient as it may be, the disassociation of Zionist and Canadian 
from imperial history is more convenient than truthful. The chapters that follow look at 
Canadian engagement with the Palestine question amidst the actual establishment of 
the Israeli state and in the decades since. This chapter focuses on the earlier history. It 
explores how early Zionist and Canadian politics fit into the global projection of 
European power. In sum, Canada factored into early Zionist history in two ways: first, as
part of the Western world to whose governments and Jewish communities the Zionist 
leadership looked for support; and second, as one of the white Dominions of the British 
Empire, reference points for the privileged incorporation of settler colonies into the 
imperial order.
In this setting, Canadian engagement with Zionism and the Palestine question 
was from the outset bound up with a racialized politics of empire. It partly reflected the 
ambiguous position of Jews in the prevailing Canadian racial hierarchy. It was further 
structured, both at the levels of government policy and of organized civil society, by the 
modes of settler self-governance and international representation through which 
Canada was finding its place in the world. The interplay between Canadian state and 
society on this question shows an interesting continuity: British policy on Palestine in 
the years after the First World War reverberated in Canadian society much like US 
policy has since 1967. Support for Zionism from Canada’s leading international ally 
(then Britain, more recently the US) lined respectable opinion up behind what was 
referred to in Britain as ‘patriotic Zionism.’18 In the most established and assimilated 
circles of the Canadian Jewish community, support for Zionist colonization did not raise 
concerns about dual loyalty. Rather, it spread with the force of official policy and 
17 Quoted by John H. Thompson, ‘Canada and the “Third British Empire,” 1901-1939,’ in ed. Buckner, 
Canada and the British Empire, 96-7. Emphasis added.
18 Stephan Wendehorst, British Jewry, Zionism, and the Jewish State, 1936-1956 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 85.
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patriotic political culture. Its respectability as near to the core of Canadian civil society 
as Jews could ever find themselves was rarely in question.
Canadian Zionism, then, cannot be understood as a narrow Jewish communal 
phenomenon. It was oriented by, and indeed formed part and parcel of, the accepted 
Canadian approach to immigration problems and to settlement on the imperial 
periphery. Alongside government policy, the activities of the Canadian Zionist movement
should thus be recognized as forming an integral part of Canada’s record of 
engagement with the Palestine question.
Empire and Settler Colonialism
The historical role of settler colonialism in the politics of imperial power projection
has received insufficient academic attention. In a certain sense, this neglect may result 
from its very centrality to the history of the powers that came to predominate world 
politics. A limited parallel exists in Western thinking about air power as means of state 
terrorism. In Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, Beau 
Grosscup discusses how a tendency to focus on the crimes of official enemies has 
often exempted one of the deadlier tools of Anglo-American warfare from critical 
scrutiny.19 In both areas, the intellectual force of Anglo-American hypocrisy has made 
itself felt.
Discussion of whether there exists a specifically Anglo-American politics of 
imperial hypocrisy – what de Gaulle, discussing US political culture, described as the 
‘will to power, cloaking itself in idealism’ – is long-standing.20 In Jean Genet’s 
provocative phrasing, ‘What I like about the English is that they are such liars...’.21 
Srdjan Vucetic, in a study of the racial politics of the English-speaking West, recalls that
the issue is addressed in a classic of Anglo-American IR scholarship, E.H. Carr’s The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis. Vucetic wryly observes that somehow, ‘these lines are often 
19 Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (Kuala Lumpur and 
London: SIRD and Zed Books, 2006).
20 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), 333. 




skipped over.’22 These lines are a good place to start. For Carr, it was an acknowledged 
fact that the projection of Anglo-American power has been enveloped in an especially 
dense fog of self-flattery. What he sought to do was explain the phenomenon.
Carr noted that a strong tradition of cultivated self-righteousness had sometimes 
been enough to trigger the impression ‘that the English-speaking peoples are past 
masters in the art of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general
good, and that this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteristic peculiarity of the 
Anglo-Saxon mind.’23 For Carr, essentialist theories of this kind were quite unnecessary. 
The truth was less mystical: ‘For the past hundred years, and more especially since 
1918, the English-speaking peoples have formed the dominant group in the world … 
the view that they are consummate international hypocrites may be reduced to the plain
fact that the current canons of international virtue have, by a natural and inevitable 
process, been mainly created by them.’24 From this perspective, effective hypocrisy 
appears as just another feature of Anglo-American power. In this case as in others, 
patterns of military, economic, and ideological predominance form part of an integrated 
whole.
This reality has impacted the Palestine problem is more ways than one. On the 
plane of ideas, it is reasonable to suggest that the Zionist project and Israel have 
evaded critical scrutiny in part by virtue of their strategic attachment to Anglo-American 
power, and thus their incorporation into the associated mythology. Equally significant is 
the fact that they have involved a form of settler colonialism long practiced by the 
predominant powers themselves. Similar colonial settlement was a notable feature of 
the British Empire; and it is of course to this history that the US, the other major power 
centre of the English-speaking West, traces its origins. Whatever significance one 
assigns to this link in the study of Zionism generally, early Canadian engagement with 
the Palestine question can scarcely be understood apart from it. A review of Canada’s 
place in the history of modern settler colonialism is therefore in order.
There is no agreement on when the Canadian state emerged as a distinct 
political entity. In his contribution to a Canadian studies conference at the University of 
22 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 4.
23 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 79.
24 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 79-80.
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Edinburgh, David Cannadine noted that Canada ‘has no defining moment of 
independence, like 1776 for the United States, or 1947 for India: the Durham Report 
and Confederation are by comparison singularly unepic things.’25 British North America, 
as it came to be called in the years after Britain issued the Durham Report of 1839, was
Confederated in 1867 within the framework of the British Empire. Confederation 
encompassed the principal North American colonies that Britain controlled by the 
nineteenth century, though at first not all of them. It included what had been New 
France, the major British conquest in the American theatre of the Seven Years’ War 
(1756-63); it did not yet include either Newfoundland to the east, which remained a 
distinct unit within the Empire until 1949, or much of the west. Although the Pacific 
colony of British Columbia soon joined the Confederation, British forces had yet to 
conquer vast Indigenous territories throughout much of what is now western Canada. 
Even within settler society, Anglo-Canadian hegemony was not absolute. Daiva 
Stasiulus and Radha Jhappan identify one of its principal limits: ‘Efforts of British and 
Canadian elites demographically to swamp and assimilate the French-Canadian 
population with imported anglophones not only failed, but also fuelled a sense of 
national oppression among francophone Québeckers.’26 The supremacy of Anglo 
business and political interests was nonetheless a governing principle.
The demographic and institutional basis of British North America had been 
partially laid in an earlier period of colonization. However, it was only well into the 
nineteenth century that something approximating the contemporary Canadian state took
shape, and only by means of further consolidation and conquest after Confederation 
that its control was established from coast to coast. Canada emerged, then, as a 
component part of the British Empire in an age of renewed imperial expansion. 
Economically, its ties to Britain existed alongside the pull of a continental political 
economy dominated by the US. In matters of military and strategic policy, on the other 
hand, the Canadian government’s over-riding orientation was British. London retained 
formal control of Canadian external affairs well into the twentieth century. It is thus 
useful to step back from the North American context to look at the strategic function that
British settler colonies generally were understood to fulfill.
25 David Cannadine, ‘Imperial Canada: Old History, New Problems,’ in Coates, Imperial Canada, 4.
26 Stasiulus and Jhappan, ‘Fractious Politics,’ 99.
36
Entangled Imperial Roots
The topic is addressed by Kenneth Good in the Journal of Modern African 
Studies, in one of the rare critical studies of the role of settler colonialism in imperial 
strategy. Good analyzes British strategy in Africa within the context of the wider 
nineteenth-century scramble for empire across the globe, which Britain so thoroughly 
came to dominate. Britain adopted a policy of ‘systematic aggressiveness,’ writes Good,
driven partly by its rivalry with France. One instrument of British strategy was the Royal 
Navy, another the maintenance of bases such as Simonstown. ‘A third strategic 
element,’ Good explains,‘was the settler colonies, involving initially Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand, and most importantly Cape Colony.’ He writes:
More than defence was again represented. In British thinking the settler states were ‘the natural, 
as well as the most rewarding mode of imperial expansion,’ the ‘most loyal and energetic 
partners,’ with the ‘supreme virtue of being self-propelling.’ This last most significant quality 
tended to mean, in the metropole at least, low-cost administration. Thus, the settlement of 5,000 
British immigrants in South Africa was agreed to by Parliament in 1819 as an ‘economy 
measure’ – Britain would be relieved of surplus labourers, and the metropole’s expenditure on 
frontier defence would be reduced.27 
British officials were not the only ones to consider settler colonialism an important 
instrument of imperial strategy. The French minister of war spelled out a similar 
approach in 1843, advocating massive French settlement in Algeria ‘in order to 
sanction, to consolidate, and to simplify the occupation we achieve by arms.’28 Still, as 
Good notes, it was the British Empire that most widely employed settler colonialism – 
both as an outlet for ‘surplus’ emigration and as a means of ‘frontier defence.’ And it 
was as one of the principal British settler states that Canada developed its foreign 
policy.
In fact Canadian ‘domestic’ policy, or the Canadian state’s consolidation of 
control within what are now its borders, was itself an imperial undertaking. It was not for
nothing that the founding leadership of Canada’s central province called it ‘Empire 
Ontario,’ as Indigenous scholar Bonita Lawrence reminds us.29 Buckner notes that 
patriotic Canadian historiography only recently came to downplay this heritage: ‘As 
George Brown accurately pointed out, the British Commonwealth of nations was not 
merely “an association of states,” it was also “an association of empires,” which in 
27 Good, ‘Settler Colonialism,’ 601.
28 Good, ‘Settler Colonialism,’ 601.
29 Bonita Lawrence, ‘Rewriting Histories of the Land: Colonization and Indigenous Resistance in Eastern 
Canada,’ in ed. Sherene H. Razack, Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society 
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 44.
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Canada’s case included even in 1953 (when Brown made the comment) a vast northern
territory, inhabited largely by Indigenous peoples but run by a bureaucracy appointed 
and controlled from Ottawa.’30 Traditionally, Canadian patriots have celebrated the 
country’s expansion at Indigenous expense as the spread of civilization. As Edmund 
Oliver boasted for The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Canadian 
Confederation brought settled society to areas ‘where, in 1867, only buffalo and Indians
roamed.’31 Patriotic Canadian historiography continues to sanitize this record.32
As Bonita Lawrence emphasizes, ‘the works of the experts alone, which provide 
powerful and detailed histories of the Canadian settler state, do not represent the full 
picture.’33 A fuller picture would not only take into account ‘the forcible and relentless 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples, the theft of their territories, and the 
implementation of legislation and policies designed to effect their total disappearance 
as peoples’; it would also place at the centre of Canada’s history the long history of 
Indigenous resistance to these processes, from sustained military action to resourceful 
international diplomacy.34 Lawrence insists that the established studies of Canadian 
history, ‘which never mention racism, and which do not take as part of their purview the 
devastating and ongoing implications of the policies and processes that are so neutrally
described,’ require more than simple correction.35 They need to be upended by the 
recognition ‘that Indigenous communities should be seen as final arbiters of their own 
histories.’36
This dissertation may not adequately respond to this challenge. But at a bare 
minimum, it is necessary to recognize that the Canadian national motto that emerged 
soon after Confederation, A Mari Usque Ad Mare (‘from sea to sea’), was a colonial 
declaration. Even the limits of Canadian participation in overseas imperialism stem 
partly from internal conquests. Buckner argues that ‘during the first three decades of 
30 Buckner, ‘Introduction,’ in Canada and the British Empire, 6.
31 Edmund H. Oliver, ‘The Settlement of the Prairies, 1967-1914,’ in eds. William M. Kenney et al., The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. 6: Canada and Newfoundland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1930), 546.
32 For an especially retrograde perspective, see Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).
33 Lawrence, ‘Rewriting Histories of the Land,’ 46.
34 Lawrence, ‘Rewriting Histories of the Land,’ 23-4.
35 Lawrence, ‘Rewriting Histories of the Land,’ 24.
36 Lawrence, ‘Rewriting Histories of the Land,’ 24.
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Confederation, Canadians were unlikely to give their consent to participation in external 
wars since they were engaged in their own imperial war against the Indigenous peoples
of western Canada.’37 Well into the twentieth century, respectable Canadian opinion did 
not shy away from placing this history of warfare against Indigenous and Métis 
communities within the framework of a global expansion of the British Empire.
To place British colonialism at the centre of Canadian history is not to suggest 
that settlers from the British Isles functioned as a homogeneous unit. Here as 
elsewhere, narrow business interests both dominated and reaped the main rewards 
from state policy. Looking at Canada in the age of high imperialism, Rosa Luxemburg 
was struck that the state had handed resources over to investors close to it ‘on an even 
more monstrous scale than in the United States. Under the Charter of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway [CPR], private capital perpetrated an unprecedented act of robbing the 
public.’38 But localized profiteering was pursued within a global British frame. To stick 
with Luxemburg’s example, Tory nepotism with US and Anglo-Montreal business in the 
case of the CPR was so flagrant as to help bring down John A. Macdonald’s 
government in 1873, faced with resentment from competing interests.39 The global 
imperial rationale remained. The Canadian delegate to the British Colonial Conference 
of 1887, Sir Sandford Fleming, made a point of stressing that trans-continental 
Canadian infrastructure could help better connect the British Empire with its Pacific 
possessions.40 ‘From the Canadian perspective,’ writes Buckner, ‘western expansion 
would add more to the wealth of the Empire than expansion into Africa, and the CPR 
was as much an Imperial highway as any of the railroads built in India.’41
There now exists a body of anti-racist literature that sheds light on the privileged 
position of Canada’s leadership in this era – a privilege to which the Zionist leadership 
would effectively aspire. The Canadian Confederation, like other imperial holdings, was 
a site of private accumulation and an instrument of Realpolitik. But in the presumed 
37 Buckner, ‘The Creation of the Dominion of Canada, 1860-1901,’ in ed. Buckner, Canada and the British
Empire, 74.
38 Rosa Luxemburg, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 390.
39 R.T. Naylor, Canada in the European Age, 1453-1919 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1987), 382-3.
40 Newton W. Rowell, ‘Canada and the Empire, 1884-1921,’ in eds. Kenney et al., Cambridge History of 
the British Empire, 712.
41 Buckner, ‘Creation of the Dominion of Canada,’ 74.
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racial and civilizational hierarchies of the time, settler colonies of this kind stood apart 
from other colonial possessions. As Stasiulis and Jhappan write, although Canada 
‘shared with the so-called “dependent colonies” a peripheral position in the international
political economy prior to the twentieth century, as a cultural, social and political entity, it
was a chip off the metropolitan block.’42 A major contribution to understanding of these 
politics has been made by Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds with their study Drawing 
the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of 
Racial Equality. Lake and Reynolds’ findings go some way towards clarifying both 
Canada’s enduring relationship with its ‘Anglo-American betters,’43 and the Zionist 
movement’s approach to the politics of the colour line. These are key realities around 
which Canadian politics on Palestine have been structured.
As Lake and Reynolds show, the global context in which Canada entered the 
twentieth century, and in which the political Zionist movement was launched, saw 
leading figures of what would become the North Atlantic alliance pair doctrines of Anglo-
Saxon racial superiority with the politics of exclusionary settler colonialism. A prominent 
British advocate of this logic was the scholar-statesman James Bryce. Bryce, who 
would later serve as Britain’s ambassador to the United States, fleshed out his theories 
in an influential series of lectures published in 1902 as The Relations of the Advanced 
and the Backward Races of Mankind. In 1898, he explained the virtue of exclusionary 
settler colonialism: ‘The only British territorial expansion that really worked well, he 
argued, was “the establishment of the British stock as colonists in temperate regions, 
where they are in little or no contact with black or yellow races, and where they can 
establish self-governing republics, so as to be parts of the English nation enjoying 
complete home rule”.’44 For Bryce, it was not enough that colonial territories be 
controlled militarily or economically; it was necessary that they be conquered 
demographically. These politics of racial power were at the core of what Arnold Smith 
would later spin as ‘national liberation’ for settler societies on the periphery.
42 Stasiulus and Jhappan, ‘Fractious Politics,’ 97. Cited in Sunera Thobani, Exalted Subjects: Studies in 
the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2007), 286.
43 DCER Vol. 22, 5.
44 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 111.
40
Entangled Imperial Roots
In the US, meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt argued along similar lines. In 1899, 
he suggested that Anglo-Saxon (he preferred ‘Anglo-Celtic’) settler colonies were the 
bearers of a unique civilizing mission: ‘The kind of colonizing conquest, whereby the 
people of the United States have extended their borders, has much in common with 
similar movements in Canada and Australia, all of them standing in sharp contrast to 
what has gone on in Spanish-American lands.’45 Roosevelt’s proud differentiation of 
Anglo-American from Spanish colonialism came in the context of the clash with Spain 
under cover of which the US conquered Cuba and the Philippines. Promoting the virtue 
of the English-speaking peoples was then particularly expedient. But Roosevelt was 
also promoting a doctrine of racial, national, and civilizational vigour that he argued was
best upheld by pairing conquest-by-settlement with resolute opposition to 
miscegenation. In this respect, the imperialism of the English-speaking peoples did 
stand out.
Canada’s founding leadership shared in this global doctrine. The country’s first 
national military mobilizations, targeting Indigenous and Métis communities, were 
accompanied by a constantly-proclaimed commitment to segregationist settlement. It 
was only natural, we read in the Cambridge History of the British Empire, that ‘the 
French-speaking population of the province of Quebec sympathized with the French 
half-breeds,’ forcing John A. Macdonald’s government to push past intra-settler 
divisions in order to execute the Métis leader Louis Riel: ‘He shall die though every dog 
in Quebec bark in his favour,’ the prime minister declared.46 Anglo-Saxonist doctrine in 
Canada was quick to evolve, especially given the need to incorporate French-speaking 
and other non-British settlers into the national project. But it is not just a relic of the 
nineteenth century. John Price explains: ‘What came to overlay, but not entirely to 
replace, Anglo-Saxonism was the notion of “whiteness,” the idea that Canada was to 
become a “white man’s country.” This notion fired the popular imagination as well as 
government policy.’47 Price rightly insists that this racism would have a long-term 
influence on Canadian foreign policy. For now, compare James Bryce’s praise for the 
‘constant cordial co-operation’ between different branches of the Anglo-Saxon race 
45 Lake and Reynolds, Global Colour Line, 101.
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(1898) with a young Lester B. Pearson’s championing of ‘close understanding and 
friendly cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon peoples’ (1935).48
Needless to say, in the presumed racial and civilizational hierarchy of the time, 
the Zionist movement’s founding leadership was not so comfortably positioned as was 
Canada’s. The organized effort that would culminate in the establishment of the Israeli 
state traces to the establishment of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in 1897, 
under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. Herzl proposed organized Jewish emigration 
from Europe and Jewish national settlement overseas. In the first instance, this was a 
response to the grievous crisis facing Europe’s Jews, as antisemitism swept across the 
continent. There is no diminishing the racism with which European Jews were targeted. 
This does not change the fact that Zionist proposals bore the imprint of Europe’s wider 
politics of overseas expansion and settlement. Many of the European Jews who looked 
to Palestine knew little about it, a fact dramatized in Hannah’s Arendt’s description of 
early Zionist settlers who ‘escaped to Palestine as one might wish to escape to the 
moon.’49 The WZO’s founding leadership, however, discussed Palestine not as the 
moon, but quite specifically as part of Europe’s imperial periphery. In The Jewish State, 
a foundational Zionist text published just before the WZO was established, Herzl 
famously proclaimed that a Jewish state in Palestine should ‘form part of the wall of 
defence for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. We should as a 
neutral state remain in contact with all of Europe, which would have to guarantee our 
existence.’50 Much the same racism that spelled crisis for European Jews shaped 
Herzl’s proposal to address it.
In debates over Zionist proposals, the distinction between immigrating to a 
country on equal footing with its people and settling it on the presumption of 
civilizational superiority was not in the least bit obscure. European antisemites well well 
known for attacking Jews as ‘an Asian people foreign to our continent,’ as Johann 
Herder had put it.51 In the years after the establishment of the WZO, some European 
critics argued that the Zionist movement was effectively capitulating this charge, 
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proposing ‘detachment of the Jews from advanced Western culture and their decline 
into the backward Asiatic East.’52 Consider the response of Max Nordau, the one Zionist
leader of the early twentieth century more prominent even than Herzl.53 At the Eighth 
Zionist Congress of 1907, Nordau offered a direct rebuttal: ‘We will not become Asiatics,
from the point of view of anthropological and cultural inferiority, any more than the 
Anglo-Saxons became redskins in North America, Hottentots in South Africa, or 
Papuans in Australia.’54
In leading Canadian circles, Zionist reasoning struck a familiar note.
Zionism, Canadian Internationalism, and the ‘Orient’
Yitzhak Laor summarizes it well: ‘Zionism thought it would politically resolve the 
exile within Europe – Jews as “Orientals inside the Occident” – not just by an Exodus, 
by going elsewhere, but by going to the heart of the colonial hinterland of Europe, the 
East, not to become part of that East but in order to become representatives of the 
West “over there,” far away from the exile we were subjected to “here,” inside Europe.’55
Antisemitism and colonial racism were evolving in parallel. Jews, simultaneously 
present in the West and attacked as foreign to it, were ambiguously positioned. Zionism
was shaped by this contradiction, in Canada as elsewhere.
European antisemitism gained pace throughout the nineteenth century. The 
situation worsened in 1881, when the assassination of the Russian Czar Alexander II 
prompted a wave of state-sponsored mob violence against Jews. Jewish westward 
migration accelerated. And in Western Europe, the migrants were met with virulent 
racism. This was no matter of isolated prejudice. As Étienne Balibar has written, ‘anti-
Semitism functioned on a European scale.’ Through the internal exclusion of Jews, 
national and racial identities across the continent 
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were defined against the same foil, the same ‘stateless other,’ and this has been a component of 
the very idea of Europe as the land of ‘modern’ nation-states or, in other words, of civilization. At 
the same time, the European or Euro-American nations, locked in a bitter struggle to divide up 
the world into colonial empires, recognized that they formed a community and shared an 
‘equality’ through that very competition, a community and an equality to which they gave the 
name ‘White.’
   
Balibar is insightful in his discussion of a paradox ‘which a number of those who have 
studied the question have run up against: there actually is a racist “internationalism” or 
“supranationalism” which tends to idealize timeless or transhistorical communities such 
as “Indo-Europeans,” “the West,” “Judaeo-Christian civilization.”’56 The internationalist 
scope of racial identification meanwhile varied from place to place. Racial theorists of 
Anglo-Saxon colonialism, fixated on different racial ‘others,’ were not nearly as 
concerned with Jews as were their counterparts in France and Germany. The place of 
Jews in frontier racism was especially unclear.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the racial champions of the 
English-speaking peoples were split on the Jewish question. On the US east coast, 
strict Anglo-Saxonists like the Republic senator Henry Cabot Lodge spoke for a narrow 
interpretation of ‘white,’ convinced that loose definitions had diluted the racial character 
of the US by allowing in too many European immigrants of essentially alien stock.57 In 
Australia, however, like in British Columbia and California, the main perceived 
demographic threat was East Asian. Accordingly, politicians like the Australian 
eugenicist Richard Arthur sought to broaden racial definitions in order to bolster 
European numbers. Lake and Reynolds note that Theodore Roosevelt, himself fixated 
on the supposed Asian threat, ‘lent his support to Arthur’s campaign to widen the 
definition of whites to embrace Italians, Spanish and Jews.’58 In Canada, similarly, 
Jewish immigrants occupied an ambiguous position as Europeans of questionable 
pedigree.
Canadian Jews did not form part of the country’s upper racial tier. But nor were 
they ever the main target of racism. The principal Canadian Jewish community was in 
Montreal, where a number of Jews had accompanied the initial British influx following 
the conquest of New France. The community was for the most part amicably associated
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with the city’s English-speaking community. At first, it was also quite small. By the mid-
mark of the nineteenth century, at a time when the US Jewish community numbered 
more than 50,000 people, less than five hundred Jews lived in the whole of British North
America.59 Official and popular racism were focused on other groups. A telling episode 
came when one of France’s leading antisemitic philologists, Ernest Renan, developed a
theory comparing Hebrew with the Indigenous North American languages of the 
Iroquoian and Algonquin peoples. For most Canadians, the position of Jews in relation 
to the society’s foundational colour line was obvious. The principal of Montreal’s McGill 
University, William Dawson, himself solicited a critical review of Renan’s work from a 
recent Jewish immigrant to Montreal from London. The author of the review, Abraham 
de Sola, came from a respected British Jewish family; de Sola quickly gained 
prominence in his new city, and would deliver McGill’s convocation speech in 1864.60
Jewish immigration to Canada accelerated in the 1870s and continued with 
limited government restrictions until the First World War. Three decades after the 
Russian pogroms of 1881, and the worsening of the European Jewish crisis that they 
signalled, the Canadian Jewish population, if still relatively small, stood at more than 
75,000.61 Gerald Tulchinsky, in the most authoritative study of Canadian Jewish history 
to date, describes the reception of these mostly East European immigrants. His 
description goes some way towards explaining the support that Zionism found in 
respectable Canadian society.
By the time this new wave of Jewish immigrants arrived, a small Jewish 
Canadian establishment had already developed, centred in Montreal. Its notables, like 
Abraham de Sola, operated comfortably in Anglophone upper society. ‘De Sola’s son 
Clarence was probably typical of this group,’ writes Tulchinsky. ‘He attended the balls 
and dances, socializing with members of the Anglo-Saxon elite.’62 This budding 
communal leadership stood apart from the community of recent immigrants. The new 
arrivals tended to be poorer, Yiddish-speaking Jews, viewed by the establishment as 
culturally foreign and as a burden on the community. By the 1870s, Montreal’s 
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established Jewish families were up in arms that organizations like the Jewish 
Emigration Society in Britain were sending so many unskilled Jewish workers to 
Canada, in the time-honoured British tradition of offloading the surplus. De Sola 
travelled to London to protest in person; ‘following this visit and for the time being, 
anyway, the export of poor Jews from London ceased.’63 The immigration to Canada of 
East European Jews kept up pace.
By the turn of the century, Zionism seemed to offer a way to deflect these 
immigrants away from the Western centres and towards the imperial frontier. In the 
meantime, a similar possibility seemed to exist within Canada. ‘The west still beckoned,’
writes Tulchinsky, ‘as it had in the United States a generation earlier, and the unofficial 
national agenda was to conquer the territory.’64 Of course, this was neither empty 
territory nor a frontier that beckoned to everyone. For Canada’s founding leadership, 
European settlement was the necessary companion to the military repression of 
Indigenous and Métis society. Prime minister Macdonald explained the logic in 1870, 
the year of a joint deployment against the Métis by regular British forces and the 
Canadian militia in the newly-declared province of Manitoba: ‘these impulsive half-
breeds . . . must be kept down with a strong hand until they are swamped by the influx 
of settlers.’65 To accomplish this, it was necessary to enforce Anglo-Saxon settlement 
with a ‘polyglot mixture’ of other Europeans.66 The wrong kind of immigrants, however, 
were considered as much of a demographic threat as were the Indigenous and Métis. 
Hence, for example, the imposition of an escalating ‘head tax’ on Chinese immigrants 
beginning in 1885.67
Some Canadian antisemites tried to extend the politics of anti-Asian racism. As 
early as 1878, Goldwin Smith, whom Tulchinksy dubs ‘Canada’s most famous Jew-
hater,’ staked out his position that Jews were ‘another element originally Eastern [which]
has, in the course of these events, made us sensible of its presence in the West.’68 But 
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the argument had only limited traction in Canada. European Jewish immigrants 
straddled the colour line. They were often not white enough for the main centres. On 
the frontier, though, they could be positioned within the framework of Canadian 
demographic priorities. Jewish communal relief organizations thus promoted a series of 
experiments with Jewish agricultural settlement, especially in the north-west. ‘That such
a substantial part of Canadian Jewish assistance took the form of western colonization 
efforts,’ explains Tulchinsky, ‘underscores the fact that Canada (or Montreal, at least) 
believed it could not cope with the influx in any other way.’69 
It is worth looking more closely at Canadian immigration policy, which sheds light
on prevailing conceptions of racial hierarchy. The first wave of official discrimination 
targeted Chinese immigrants; soon after joining Confederation, the government of 
British Columbia demanded anti-Chinese legislation as a matter of priority. The federal 
government imposed it from 1885 through to the late 1940s. It took further measures in 
the early twentieth century to target immigrants from Japan, despite its alliance with 
Britain, and India, despite its central position in the Empire.70 In 1913 William D. Scott, 
Superintendent of Immigration in Ottawa, explained the broader application of measure 
taken in 1908 to exclude Indians:
Primarily it was the large influx of Hindoos which directed the attention of the then Government to
the question of Asiatic immigration . . . it was felt that with the possible exception of Russia in 
Asia that continent did not supply to this country a class of people who would become 
assimilated and form true Canadians in the best and widest meaning of the term. The regulation .
. . was, therefore, intentionally drafted so that it would include not only the Hindoos but also 
Arabians, Turks, Syrians and Persians.71
Racial boundaries were in place, but were not always precisely drawn. Just as it was 
possible for other East European immigrants to slip from being considered ‘true 
Canadians’-in-the-making to being derided as ‘dirty, poor, ignorant Slavs,’72 Jewish 
immigrants were on the edge.
Consider the politics of Winnipeg. The city’s Jewish presence grew considerably 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Jewish immigrants showed their 
preference for urban over pioneering life. Robert Wardaugh traces the shifting attitudes 
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of the city’s British establishment. In the nineteenth century, respectable opinion in 
Winnipeg hoped for broadened European immigration as a means of shoring up 
Canadian demography in contested territory. ‘In the years prior to the First World War,’ 
however, ‘immigration became an enemy to, rather than an ally in, the preservation of 
the city’s Britishness. Imperial attitudes of racial superiority, or what Arthur Lower has 
called “Britishism,” found practice in a city where the Anglo-Saxon came into contact 
with indigenous peoples and then a massive influx of immigrants from eastern 
Europe.’73 In this context, antisemitism built up as part of a wider wave of hostility 
towards European foreigners.
As efforts to deflect Jewish immigrants towards Canada’s north-western frontier 
faltered, Zionism seemed convenient for reasons having very little to do with Palestine. 
It is worth recalling that Herzl, in The Jewish State, put Argentina as a possible 
destination for Jewish emigrants on almost equal footing with Palestine.74 For Herzl 
himself, emigrant colonization was the essential idea; the site was an important but 
secondary consideration. Herzl’s flexibility in this respect was in evidence in the early 
offers he solicited from British officials. In 1901, British colonial secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain looked into promoting Zionist colonization in the Egyptian Sinai, at al-
Arish; in 1903, Herzl presented the Sixth Zionist Congress with a British offer to initiate 
Zionist colonization in present-day Kenya (a proposal known in Zionist historiography as
‘the Uganda scheme’).75 Respectable Canadians greeted British-oriented Zionist 
initiatives with enthusiasm. The main newspaper of the Canadian Jewish establishment,
the Jewish Times, expressed its hopes for Zionist settlement in East Africa well after the
WZO itself had dropped the idea.76 As for Palestine, the Muslim ‘Orient’ was scarcely 
more familiar to Canadians than East Africa. However, the global framework of the 
British Empire had brought it, too, into Canadian consciousness as a known imperial 
periphery.
It was France that opened the era of Western imperial expansion into what came
to be known as the Middle East, with Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt. But here too, 
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Britain emerged as the dominant power. The Ottoman Empire stretched over most of 
the region, including the whole of Palestine, until the First World War; and in the course 
of the Napoleonic wars, Britain became its principal external trading partner.77 For 
Britain, continued Ottoman rule safeguarded against the territorial expansion of 
competing powers. In loose cooperation with France, the British thus worked to expand 
their regional influence within the framework of Ottoman sovereignty. This effort 
repeatedly crept into Canadian politics, if mostly at the margins. Consider the 
experience of the Crimean War (1853-6), which Palestinian scholar Mahmoud Yazbak 
identifies as a pivotal moment in the expansion of European commercial influence in 
Palestine and throughout the region.78 A British imperial regiment was recruited from 
Upper Canada to support the war effort.79 Meanwhile the Canadian parliament passed a
motion pledging £20,000 ‘as a contribution to the Imperial Government “to show that 
Canada made common cause with England and with France in the Crimean War.”’80
Britain’s presence in the region expanded towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. A turning-point was the Egyptian rebellion of 1881-2. This rebellion (nothing 
less than a ‘revolution,’ writes Egyptian political economist Anouar Abdel-Malek) 
challenged both absolutist rule under the Ottoman vassal state of Khediv Tewfiq, and 
the European economic control of the country which the Khediv was facilitating.81 Britain
intervened to crush the uprising, imposing a military occupation of Egypt that was not 
fully lifted until 1954. The Canadian part in such distant campaigns was limited; 
Canadians had their local conquests to focus on. For the British home government, it 
was viable to exempt ‘self-governing’ colonies like Canada from large-scale military 
contributions since funds and military personnel could be extracted from the 
‘dependent’ colonies, and especially from India.82 Canada nonetheless shared in these 
wars of the Empire. So it was during the 1884 Siege of Khartoum, when British forces 
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commanded by Charles Gordon, defending imperial interests in Egypt, launched their 
ill-fated expedition against the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan. The Canadian contribution 
to the expeditionary force to assist Gordon was modest, consisting of 386 raftsmen and 
militia officers.83 But local mobilizations were infused with knowledge of these distant 
exploits. Some likened Canadian repression of the North-West Rebellion of 1885 to the 
campaigns in Egypt and the Sudan. Addressing the House of Commons, prime minister
Macdonald even derided Métis leader Louis Riel as ‘a kind of half-breed Mahdi.’84
Gradually, Canadian Zionism was therefore enforced from two angles. On the 
one hand, it provided an opportunity to address unease about Jewish immigration with 
seemingly positive solutions. And on the other, it presented a picture of friendly 
settlement on a hostile frontier, especially to the extent that it could be associated with 
the British Empire. The influence of a shared settler ethos is difficult to pin down with 
precision. In any case, Canadian Zionism’s early patriotic esteem is a matter of record.
Michael Brown, one of the most committed Zionist ideologues that Canada has 
produced, cites the WZO official Nahum Sokolow to describe the phenomenon: ‘In 
Canada, unlike most other countries, early Zionism attracted not only poor immigrants, 
but “the most active and most respected section of Jewry” as well.’85 The Canadian 
Jewish establishment received more than a little encouragement from its Anglo-Saxon 
brethren. Another Canadian Zionist historian, Bernard Figler, explains: ‘at succeeding 
[Canadian Zionist] Conventions, the highlight at Conventions was the presence of 
eminent and representative Christians – professors, mayors, ministers of provincial and 
federal cabinets and premiers of provinces, speaking for their government.’86 In 
Canada, in fact, the poorer East European Jews most like those the establishment 
hoped would settle in Palestine – the leaders of Western Jewish communities never 
contemplated uprooting themselves – were conspicuous in their absence from positions
of Zionist leadership. It was respectable opinion that counted.
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To a significant extent, the politics of the early Canadian Zionist movement were 
the politics of one man: Clarence de Sola. In 1899, de Sola positioned himself at the 
helm of the Federation of Zionist Societies of Canada, encompassing all of the Zionist 
groups that had sprung up in Canada since the WZO’s establishment. He held the 
organization’s presidency for twenty years. Through him, established structures of class
and cultural power within the Jewish community were ruthlessly enforced: notables 
were to make decisions and new arrivals were to know their place. This was explicit. 
Gerald Tulchinsky records de Sola’s response to one Jewish critic that challenged his 
authority: ‘de Sola exclaimed that he would brook no opposition from one “of no 
influence of the community, a comparatively recently arrived emigrant” who had dared 
to attack “the leading Jews in Canada, and the power and authority that they 
represent.”’87 Writing to the Central Zionist Bureau in Cologne, Germany, de Sola 
explained his organizational philosophy: ‘the greatest fault of the Jewish people to-day 
is their unwillingness to submit to discipline . . . In Canada, we have had a rigid almost 
military discipline in our Federation.’88
It was with de Sola’s messaging that Zionism was pressed across the country. 
‘Largely because of de Sola,’ writes Irving Abella, ‘the Federation took hold of significant
segments of Canadian Jewry. He had an enormous correspondence with individual 
Jews from Glace Bay to Victoria and travelled extensively to meet them.’89 In the 
published fragments of this correspondence, we read a message strikingly similar to 
that which de Sola’s father brought to Britain in the 1870s, when Montreal’s 
establishment felt besieged by Britain’s ‘export of poor Jews.’ As de Sola the younger 
wrote to a contact in New Brunswick: ‘for an organized mass of people to flood these 
western countries under no direction, and with no proper training for agriculture, or 
other means of living, will be disastrous, and must naturally only produce misery.’90 
Most of these immigrants showed no desire to find their place on western 
frontiers. In the main cities, meanwhile, the prospect of further Jewish immigration was 
viewed with growing unease. Better to send them to Palestine.
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If Max Nordau once drew a parallel between proposed Zionist and actual Anglo-
Saxon settlement, voices of the Canadian Jewish establishment like the Jewish Times 
were much more direct, their support for Zionism forming a secondary component of 
enthusiastic identification with the British Empire.91 The First World War and its 
aftermath seemed to vindicate this approach. It is important to note, however, that this 
outcome was not a foregone conclusion.
As bizarre as it seems it retrospect, after the experience of Nazi antisemitism 
and the Holocaust, the possibility of German sponsorship also figured prominently in 
early Zionist thinking. This had been Herzl’s first preference – and whereas he faced 
widespread Jewish condemnation for negotiating with Czarist officials to coordinate 
Jewish emigration from Russia,92 negotiations with Germany were not so controversial. 
Until its overthrow in 1917, the Russian government was the world’s worst purveyor of 
antisemitic violence. Germany seemed its principal external enemy. It remained so as 
Europe moved towards the Great War, while the Allies sided with the Russian Czars. 
The German government thus cultivated a reputation as a possible saviour of Jews 
from Czarist brutality. Some tried to align Zionism with this effort; in autumn 1914, the 
German Zionist leader Heinrich Loewe wrote that it was ‘only from the German side that
the Jews will find protection and freedom.’93 For their part, British officials repeatedly 
considered the possibility that Germany might express support for Zionism as a means 
of asserting its stake in the Middle East.94 Things turned out quite differently, however. 
Instead, developments during and after the First World War allowed Canadian Zionism 
to hitch itself to the victorious expansion of the British Empire.
The British hypocrisy discussed by Carr and others was rarely more glaring than 
in the expansion and reconstitution of the Empire through the Great War. Alfred 
Zimmern, a co-founder of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), 
provides a typical interwar sample: ‘The British Empire survived the war because it had 
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in it a principle of vitality which the other empires lacked. And that principle, that seed of
continuing life, is the spirit of liberty.’95 As a leading historian of the Empire explained, 
British power ‘was no longer to be associated with scrambles for Africa or the extraction
of concessions in Asia. It was inspired by a new idealism and it represented a spirit 
hitherto unknown in history.’96 British officials marvelled at the diversity of ‘autonomous 
states, dependencies, colonies, protectorates, mandated territories, feudatories, and 
allies which are comprehended within the orbit of our polity.’97 This was the global orbit 
of what came to be described as the ‘Third British Empire.’98 It was through it that 
Canada formalized a distinct position in international affairs, and that the Zionist 
movement was imposed on Palestine as a significant political force.
This marked a new phase for British imperialism in the Middle East. On the eve 
of the First World War, Britain abandoned its longstanding strategy of upholding the 
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire while building British influence within it. As Turkey 
moved to side with Germany, British officials looked to see its empire dissolved. Britain 
nullified Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt and declared the country a British 
protectorate; it took similar action in British-held Cyprus and Kuwayt.99 Palestine, on the
other hand, was not only under formal Ottoman sovereignty but under actual Ottoman 
control. During the war, it was the subject of contradictory pledges from British officials. 
Sir Henry McMahon, high commissioner for Egypt, was understood to have included 
Palestine in promises to Sharif Husayn of Mecca for regional Arab independence in 
return for an Arab revolt against Ottoman authorities.100 Sir Marks Sykes meanwhile 
signed off on an agreement with France to divide Arab territories into zones of foreign 
influence, with Palestine earmarked for ‘international administration.’101 The pledges 
from McMahon and Sykes were made in the early phase of the war. The most 
significant British declaration on Palestine came later. In November 1917, in an 
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extraordinary coup for British Zionism, British foreign secretary Lord Arthur Balfour 
declared his government’s support for ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people.’102 
British forces were already wresting Palestine from Ottoman control when the 
Balfour Declaration was first published. Within a year, the British military conquered the 
whole of the country and put Palestine under an Occupied Enemy Territory 
Administration.103 It took work for Britain to retain Palestine within its exclusive 
jurisdiction after the war. France had its own ambitions in Palestine, encompassed by 
visions of a Greater Syria and rationalized by a posture of guardianship over Christian 
sites in the Holy Land.104 Moreover, by this point in world history, the imperial right to 
rule native societies by force could no longer be asserted in quite the same way as it 
had been in the nineteeth century.
The formal Allied rationale for holding conquered territories was spelled out in the
Covenant of the League of Nations, finalized at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
Article 22 explained that those ‘advanced nations’ which had won the war would stay to 
help govern terrorities ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world.’105 In light of the Balfour Declaration, the 
Zionist movement did all it could to support Britain’s bid to be the ‘advanced nation’ to 
govern Palestine through the League’s mandate system. The WZO submission to the 
Paris Peace Conference praised Britain’s record, including what it identified as ‘the 
three consecutive acts which definitely associated Great Britain with Zionism in the 
minds of the Jews, viz. – the El Arish offer in 1901, the East African offer in 1903, and 
lastly the British Declaration in favour of a Jewish National Home in Palestine in 
1917.’106 Substituting Zionist for Palestinian opinion, the WZO even argued that British 
rule would therefore satisfy ‘the popular wish of the people concerned.’107 In an internal 
British memorandum, Balfour himself was more forthright on the question of democracy.
The Great Powers were agreeing to support Zionism, wrote the foreign secretary, for 
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reasons which were simply of ‘profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 
700,00 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.’108 
To a considerable extent, Balfour still spoke for Canada. Canada’s association 
with the Empire was, however, evolving. Canada and the other British settler states 
gained newfound status during the war. They made major contributions; Canada alone 
fielded some 400,000 troops for the British war effort.109 From ‘dependent’ colonies, 
Britain extracted funds and personnel by harsher means – including the imposition of 
martial law in much of Indian Punjab, culminating in the massacre of hundreds of 
demonstrators in early 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh.110 Support from British settler 
leaderships was maintained by more cooperative means (though in Québec, 
consciption for the war had to be imposed by force).111 In 1921, British prime minister 
David Lloyd George reflected on the efforts that had been undertaken over the 
preceding years to give self-governing colonies like Canada widened influence in the 
Empire: ‘The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when 
the burden of Empire has become so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of
these young giants under the burden to help us along.’ But the prime minister prefaced 
these words by reaffiming the basic reality: ‘The instrument of the foreign policy of the 
Empire is the British Foreign Office.’112 In fact, the settler states were coming to demand
not only decision-making input but a more autonomous association with the Empire. 
Canadian association with the British Empire’s eastward expansion would soon become
a flashpoint for imperial reform.
What is important to note for our purposes is not only that early Canadian 
external affairs policy involved assertion of a new status for the settler states within the 
British Empire. It is also that the tradition of loyalist settler colonialism which Canada 
helped to pioneer often framed proposals for Britain to support Jewish statehood in 
Palestine. This was the precedent emphasized by Henry Mond, for example, the 
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second Baron Melchett, when he asserted that ‘the British Empire alone is sufficiently 
liberal, sufficiently elastic, sufficiently broad and generous to comprise within itself a 
Jewish National Home.’113 Let us consider Zionist proposals and the status of settler 
states within the Empire in turn.
More than any other Zionist leader, it was Chaim Weizmann who articulated 
proposals to use Jewish settlement in order to produce ‘a great Palestine within the 
orbit of the British Empire,’ as he phrased it in 1921.114 The success of the Balfour 
Declaration had by this point propelled Weizmann to the presidency of the WZO. As a 
leading force in the British Zionist Federation, he had been promoting this vision for 
years. Weizmann summarized his case in 1915 in correspondence with C.P. Scott, the 
owner of the Manchester Guardian and an early supporter of Zionism. ‘If Great Britain 
does not wish anyone else to have Palestine,’ Weizmann reasoned, ‘it will have to 
watch it and stop any penetration of another power.’ Independently, the Zionist 
movement could be of little assistance in this effort. On other other hand, it would be 
difficult for Britain alone to rationalize a long-term protectorate over the country. 
Weizmann thus proposed ‘that the middle course could be adopted . . . viz; the Jews 
take over the country; the whole burden of organization falls on them, but for the next 
ten or fifteen years they work under a temporary British protectorate.’ In his 
autobiography, Weizmann presents this correspondence as ‘an anticipation of the 
mandate system.’115 
In the years ahead, British officials generally disavowed the call for Jewish 
statehood in Palestine in favour of the more ambiguous phrase, ‘Jewish national home.’
However, some politicians openly called for full Zionist authority over the country. 
Notable among them was the British Labour Party’s Josiah Wedgwood. His support was
not soon forgotten; in 1948 one of Israel’s naval vessels, a participant in the first Israeli 
bombardments of Gaza, was named the Wedgwood.116 Wedgwood’s reasoning 
deserves close attention. Several years into the British mandate, he wrote that since all 
British patriots ‘want capable and civilised friends for members of the British Union,’ it 
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should be ‘[taken] for granted that the British Government, whether Conservative or 
Labour, has as its object in Palestine the ultimate establishment there of a Jewish 
Dominion within the British Empire or Union.’117 There was nothing like a consensus on 
this in British circles. All the same, Wedgood enlisted leading public figures in Britain to 
press for this aim through an organization called the Seventh Dominion League.118 It is 
worth examining the resonance of this term, ‘Dominion.’
When ‘the federal Dominion of Canada’ was established by Confederation in 
1867, the term was not vested with much specific meaning. By the early twentieth 
century, however, other British settler governments, especially those of Australia and 
New Zealand, had joined the Canadian government in using the term as a means of 
differentiating settler states from other colonial possessions. The leadership of settler 
colonies were extremely conscious of what Du Bois called the ‘color-line.’ For them, the 
term ‘Dominion’ signalled a recognition that British settlers, however distant from the 
metropole, were to be positioned on the privileged side of the racial divide.
The Liberal premier of Ontario, George W. Ross, stressed the point during a visit 
to London in 1901. Canadians were then fighting under the British flag in South Africa. 
Ross, though an avid imperialist, impressed upon his hosts the principle that Canadian 
loyalty and support could best be given to central authorities respectful of settler rights 
to self-governance. Canadians would ‘bear their share in the burdens, in the battles, 
and in the struggle for imperial unity,’ but they were not inferior subjects; they were 
‘partners in the British Empire.’119 In 1907, the special status of the Dominions was 
signalled by the convening of their leaders in an Imperial Conference in London. ‘The 
distinctive character of their status was emphasized by excluding India from 
membership of the Conference,’ reflected a leading British constitutional theorist; ‘the 
Dominions were essentially self-governing territories in all internal matters and thus 
stood apart from India as well as from the Crown Colonies and protectorates.’120 New 
Zealand’s prime minister at the time, Richard Seddon, could not have identified the 
racial logic more clearly. He explained that the Empire ‘divided broadly into two parts, 
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one occupied wholly or mainly by a white ruling race, the other principally occupied by 
coloured races who are ruled. Australia and New Zealand are determined to keep their 
place in the first class.’121 Or as the Canadian Anglo-Saxonist Stephen Leacock 
exclaimed in 1907, ‘I am an imperialist because I will not be a colonial.’122
South Africa’s establishment as a Dominion, in the name of liberal self-
governance and an internationalism of whites, broadened the category that British 
Zionists would invoke. This was precisely the threat that worried Indigenous opinion 
following the Boer war of 1899-1902. The British had won, but the question of South 
Africa’s future political constitution took years to settle. The political rights accorded to 
Africans in the British Cape Colony had contrasted with the cruder white supremacy of 
the Boer republics. Surely, with the war over, it was time to extend the franchise. In 
1903 the South Africa Native Congress sent a formal address to this effect to British 
colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain, insisting that the ‘antagonism to the Natives’ 
that pervaded Boer-British negotiations needed to be overcome, and that Africans 
should be included ‘within the political family as true citizens of the Empire.’123 In 1906, 
the Congress added that outright denial of South African independence would be a 
lesser imperial offence than the handing of power to the settlers. Better to be ‘taken 
over by the Crown and governed from Downing Street,’ declared Congress, than to be 
subject to the ‘pernicious and retrogressive’ settler authority suggested by Natal and 
Transvaal.124
Yet settler authority was precisely what Britain imposed with the South African 
Union of 1910. Rosa Luxemburg’s biting commentary on the internationalism of Boer 
and Britain remains memorable:
One million white exploiters of both nations sealed their touching fraternal alliance within the 
Union with the civil and political disenfranchisement of five million coloured workers … this noble 
work, culminating under the imperialist policy of the Conservatives in open oppression, was 
actually to be finished by the Liberal Party itself, amid frenzied applause from the ‘liberal cretins of
Europe’ who with sentimental pride took as proof of the still continuing vigour and greatness of 
English liberalism the fact that Britain had granted complete self-government and freedom to a 
handful of whites in South Africa.125 
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Africans were denied the franchise and Boers admitted into the self-governing family. 
As Lake and Reynolds write, ‘the Union was celebrated as a monument to liberal 
statecraft – the creation of another self-governing Dominion to join Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, which were increasingly seen as a crucial supplement to Britain’s 
strategic strength at a time of growing international tension in Europe.’126
It is against this backdrop that Chaim Weizmann tirelessly insisted to British 
officials that ‘the Jews alone were capable of rebuilding Palestine, and of giving it a 
place in the modern family of nations.’127 Fittingly, one of Weizmann’s closest allies in 
the Empire was Jan Smuts, a South African politician and veteran of the Boer fight for 
Transvaal. The British Labour Party’s Wedgood, for his part, was frank in arguing that 
the British government should replicate the South African experience in Palestine: ‘We 
made friends with the Boers, helped them with cash and sympathy, even danced with 
them to our mutual satisfaction. We welcomed them in, showed them an Englishman’s 
best side, and now they are usefully within, and nobody doubts but that we did right.’128 
Why not similarly put Palestine’s natives in their place?
From early on, the assimilation of Weizmann’s proposals into British strategic 
thinking placed them on this well worn settler path. The military correspondent for C.P. 
Scott’s Manchester Guardian, for example, Herbert Sidebotham, was already writing 
along these lines in the period leading up to the Balfour Declaration. In 1917 
Sidebotham argued that for the sake of India and for the sake of Egypt, for the 
contingencies of war and for the long-term interests of Empire, it was necessary to 
extend Britain’s presence on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. He stressed the 
split between the Dominions, ‘inhabited by people at the same stage of political 
development as ourselves,’ and ‘those parts of the Empire like India which are 
governed and do not govern themselves.’ In a racially sanitized echo of James Bryce, 
Sidebotham insisted that only the former were truly effective. But Britain’s options were 
limited; ‘if Palestine became part of the British Empire it would never be colonized in 
any real sense by the sort of Englishmen who have made Canada and Australia.’ And 
so his analysis boiled down to its essential message: ‘The only possible colonists of 
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Palestine are the Jews. Only they can build up in the Mediterranean a new Dominion 
associated with this country from the outset in Imperial work, at once a protection 
against the alien East and a mediator between it and us ….’129 
For Sidebotham, much was to be gained by predicating British policy in the 
Middle East on an ‘ideal so grand in its scope and so wide in its appeal’ as the 
channelling of Jews into Palestine, with all the liberal and biblical resonance of the 
project. But in Sidebotham’s writing, Kenneth Good’s analysis of the place accorded to 
self-propelling settlement colonies in British thinking also bears itself out: ‘Having found 
it necessary to interest ourselves in Judæa for the sake of Egypt, we are compelled, in 
order to raise a vigorous self-supporting colony capable of rendering real help to Britain 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, to go beyond the bare idea of Egyptian defence.’ Only by 
establishing a Jewish state on a sizeable territory in the Arab east could Britain give rise
to ‘a modern State such as could ultimately, after a period of pupillage, form a self-
sufficing State as a British Dominion, and not only become responsible for its own 
government and its own local defence but even, like other Dominions, tender voluntary 
help to the Empire in its trials.’130
This line of thinking was persistent, and by the nature of things had its advocates
in Canada. From 1935-1940, for example, a prominent British supporter of Zionism – 
John Buchan, the first Baron Tweedsmuir – served as Canadian governor general. In 
this capacity, he was nothing less than Canada’s resident head of state. In 1937 
Tweedsmuir received a letter from his friend Lord Melchett. Melchett was pushing for 
Britain to break Arab resistance and establish full Zionist authority over Palestine. He 
had recently written a book emphasizing the strategic importance of the region, and 
arguing that a Jewish Palestine could be a sturdier base of Empire than Egypt, which 
was ‘populated by only a handful of British among millions of Egyptians, who from time 
to time demonstrate their hostility to British occupation.’131 Palestine, in contrast, could 
be garrisoned by Jewish settlers whose reliance on external support would guarantee a 
fighting loyalty: ‘If the Empire could rally an army of 500,000 Europeans at this point, 
whose very existence and that of their homes and families depended upon the 
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preservation of the Empire, what a change in the balance of power!’132 In his letter to the
Canadian governor general, Melchett wrote that ‘the Jewish state is destined to play the
role of Ulster in the Eastern Mediterranean’ and asked Tweedsmuir to prepare to 
exercise pro-Zionist influence from Canada. Responding from Ottawa, Tweedsmuir 
greeted the letter as a ‘ray of light.’ He responded that ‘if you and Weizmann think the 
scheme practicable it certainly has my assent.’133 
In the end, it was not within the framework of British imperial rule over Palestine 
but as its successor that the Israeli state was established. Without Britain’s interwar 
support, however, it would not have been possible. Canadian association with these 
developments should not be exaggerated. Canada did not end up being quite the 
partner in the Empire’s policing of its new Eastern possessions that the Lloyd George 
government initially hoped for. All the same, imperial patriotism provided a powerful 
framework for the continued development of Canadian Zionism.
Between Imperial Multilateralism and Autonomy
It was under the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier that Canadian overseas
contributions to the British Empire first expanded, with some eight thousand Canadian 
troops deploying to South Africa at the turn of the century. At the time, British colonial 
secretary Joseph Chamberlain sought to encourage the further involvement of settler 
states in overseas interventions by offering increased decision-making influence. ‘If you 
are prepared at any time to take any share, any proportionate share, in the Burdens of 
Empire,’ Chamberlain explained to Laurier and other settler state leaders convening in 
1902 London, ‘we are prepared to meet you with any proposal for giving you a 
corresponding voice in the policy of the Empire.’134 Through the Imperial Conferences of
1907 and 1911, the Laurier government remained suspicious of centralizing moves that 
could undercut Canadian self-governance. By comparison, the Conservative 
governments that held Canadian federal office over the subsequent decade were more 
open to global imperial multilateralism.
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This tendency found its fullest expression during the First World War. From 1912 
through 1914, representatives of Canada’s Conservative government under Sir Robert 
Borden had travelled to London to take part in the meetings of a Committee of Imperial 
Defence under the direction of the office of the British prime minister.135 The war raised 
the stakes. In 1915, the British government pledged to discuss the terms of the postwar 
settlement with the Dominions, and prime minister Borden attended a meeting of the 
British Cabinet.136 It seemed that a more formalized mechanism for Dominion 
representation was called for. On taking office in 1916, the Lloyd George government 
took this into account as it reorganized the British government to conduct the war. The 
Dominion prime ministers (and an Indian representative selected by Britain) were 
invited to take part in what became the Imperial War Cabinet. This was an 
unprecedented mechanism of Empire multilateralism. As Borden emphasized, it was a 
‘a cabinet of Governments rather than of Ministers.’137
The main constitutional recognition of these developments came in the form of 
the much-celebrated Resolution 9, passed by the Imperial War Conference of 1917. A 
joint effort of the Canadian and the South African delegates, namely of Sir Robert 
Borden and Jan Smuts, the resolution established ‘full recognition of the Dominions as 
autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth.’138 Thereafter, the Dominions had 
constitutional grounds to press for some combination of influence in the running of the 
Empire and autonomous partnership with it. This was the first of a series of landmarks 
in the reconstitution of the Dominions as distinct political actors on the world stage. It 
was followed by the Balfour Report of 1926, recognizing fuller control by the Dominions 
of their external affairs, and finally the Statute of Westminster of 1931, affirming the free
association of ‘self-governing Dominions’ within the British Empire.139 Of course, these 
phrases were elastic. In Canada, debates about the meaning of autonomous 
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partnership with the Empire were arguably not put to rest until the British House of 
Commons passed the Canada Act in 1982, patriating the Canadian constitution.140 
In the early period of these changes, Canadian external affairs policy evolved 
within the framework of the Empire’s new multilateral mechanisms. Notable among 
them was the Imperial War Cabinet during the war and, in its aftermath, the British 
Empire Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In these forums, Canadian 
representatives had opportunities to weigh in on the fate of Palestine. The Borden 
government ‘was generally considered firm in support of Zionism, which did no harm 
when the Balfour Declaration was under consideration.’141 But it is highly doubtful that 
this had any international influence. The Canadian leadership had its priorities. 
Paramount among them was the promotion of close British cooperation with the United 
States; at a 1918 meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, for example, Borden urged that 
the US ‘be invited to undertake world-wide responsibilities in respect of underdeveloped
territories and backward races.’142 Eventually, US estrangement from the League of 
Nations enforced the Canadian government’s impulse to limit its overseas 
commitments. At first, though, there was little in the British Empire’s eastward 
expansion that concerned the Canadian government. Borden represented the Empire in
some of the preliminary negotiations leading to the Treaty of Sèvres, which divided the 
former Ottoman Empire and parts of Turkey into zones of Allied influence.143 But 
generally speaking, the Middle East was not an area of Canadian involvement.
Within Canada, on the other hand, the expansion of the Empire brought new 
momentum behind proposals to support Zionist efforts in Palestine. In a recent study of 
Jewish politics in Britain, Stephan Wendehorst finds that one effect of the Balfour 
Declaration was to rally patriotic opinion behind ‘imperial-cum-Zionist objectives.’144 
British policy had a parallel impact in Canada. When the Canadian Zionist Federation 
met in 1917, it received a message of encouragement from Borden, while de Sola duly 
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‘glorified the fact of the entry of the British into the precincts of the Holy Land and 
gradually redeeming it from the hands of the Turks.’145 In the years ahead, the patriotic 
credentials of Canadian Zionists were confirmed as never before. ‘Even the country’s 
business and intellectual elite showed interest in the movement,’ writes Michael Brown. 
‘In 1919 a lecturer speaking in Toronto under the auspices of the Royal Society of 
Canada urged that Jews populate Palestine speedily, so that the more numerous Arabs 
would not gain permanent control.’146 Throughout the interwar period, Canadian prime 
ministers repeatedly lent Zionist proposals their symbolic support.
Pro-Zionist gestures from Canadian governments helped set the tone for 
Canadian civil society. They were not, however, accompanied by much diplomatic 
action. Borden’s first successor as prime minister, his former solicitor general Arthur 
Meighen, briefly continued along the path of imperial multilateralism charted during the 
war years. In 1921 Meighen met in London with other prime ministers of the rebaptized 
Imperial Commonwealth, and suggested a balance of decision-making that would afford
to Dominions primary authority in matters of local concern (for example, Canadian 
authority over Canada-US relations) and steady updates about imperial affairs 
elsewhere (for example, in Palestine, which Meighen specifically mentioned).147 In this 
context, Meighen did make representations to the Lloyd George government to facilitate
increased Jewish immigration to Palestine.148 However, the vision of global imperial 
partnership that emerged from the prime ministers conference of 1921 was soon 
circumscribed.
Notwithstanding relative Canadian indifference to the Middle East – or, perhaps, 
owing to it – it was in regards to British expansion into former Ottoman territory that the 
Canadian government first asserted its autonomy in external affairs. In the immediate 
postwar period, the European Allies pushed forward with demands to control not only 
territories of the former Ottoman Empire, but also much of Turkey itself. The Sultan 
signed off an Allied terms. But the extent of this capitulation provoked a backlash from 
Turkish republicans. By autumn 1922, the British government had yet to ratify the Treaty
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of Sèvres and was contemplating renewed intervention. In this context, Lloyd George 
publicly called on the Dominions to send troops in order to enforce Turkish 
capitulation.149 This was the episode known as the ‘Chanak Crisis,’ a celebrated turning-
point in Canadian external affairs.
It was the Liberal prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King who received 
Lloyd George’s appeal – not first by official channels, it is said, but when he read 
coverage of it in the press.150 Recent elections had consigned Meighen’s Conservatives 
to the opposition benches. Strictly speaking, King did not refuse. But in what amounted 
to a refusal, he protested Britain’s lack of prior consultation and sent a cable to Lloyd 
George insisting that ‘public opinion in Canada would demand the authorization of 
Parliament as the necessary preliminary to the dispatching of a contingent to participate
in the conflict in the Near East.’151 Meighen’s Conservatives protested King’s decision 
as disloyal. It nonetheless became an enduring precedent for the primacy of Canadian 
parliament in determining the scope of Dominion participation in Empire affairs.
Writing several years later from an Italian prison, Antonio Gramsci summarized 
the upshot of these developments: ‘The Dominions participate in world politics and are 
world powers through the Empire; but England’s European and global foreign policy is 
so complicated that the Dominions are reluctant to be dragged into issues which are of 
no direct interest to them.’152 In Dominion Autonomy in Practice, published in 1929, the 
British constitutional theorist Arthur Keith insisted that these developments not be 
overstated: ‘the British Government still can make treaties which confer benefits on the 
Dominions without their participation, and again when, as in the treaty with Iraq in 1927,
it concedes recognition in the name of the King Emperor, that recognition would bind 
the Dominions though not expressly applied to them.’153 Canada’s international status 
was changing. All the same, it remained very much part of the British Empire. 
Through all of this, the Canadian government continued to offer symbolic support
for Zionism. King, like Borden and Meighen before him, addressed Canadian Zionist 
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gatherings with encouraging words.154 And Canada’s patriotic Zionist tradition continued
to develop, uninterrupted. The association of the British Empire with Zionism was now 
undeniable. And prominent Canadians were more concerned than ever with excluding 
Jewish immigrants. Zionism thus benefited from the familiar confluence of factors. 
The enduring exclusionist element of Canadian support for Zionism was 
suggested in a speech delivered by Meighen in 1924 as head of the Conservative 
opposition. Praising Britain’s ‘reconquest of Palestine and the rededication of that 
country to the Jewish people,’ Meighen added: ‘I do hope the Jews in Canada take a 
proper pride in this great event and that the sons of generations to come may go back 
to the land of their destiny.’155 This was a recurring interwar theme. A minor but telling 
anecdote comes from the history of Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, a school 
reputed as something of an Anglo-Saxon preserve. In the early 1930s, a group of 
Jewish students who had taken to gathering in an undergraduate lounge returned one 
day to find a sign posted, spelling out Meighen’s subtext: ‘We gave you Palestine; now 
give us back this lounge.’156
Though such suggestions always troubled Jewish audiences, Zionism 
encountered scarce opposition from the Canadian Jewish establishment. This is a 
remarkable fact. Michael Berkowitz has examined how Zionist politics took a similar 
form throughout the West: the Zionist movement sought to enlist the financial and 
political support of respectable Jewish organizations based on an understanding that 
the actual settlers would come mostly from Central and Eastern Europe. Zionist and 
local patriotic politics were fused to the greatest extent possible. Berkowitz is right to 
analyze ‘Zionism in the Western nations as a distinct entity, as part of an interwoven 
whole.’157 Its reception nonetheless varied. At the core of the main Allied empires, 
support was quite uneven. In interwar France, Zionism was rejected by the most 
prestigious Jewish organizations; in both the US and Britain itself, major sections of the 
Jewish establishment were vocally anti-Zionist until the 1940s. On the grassroots and 
labour left, Canada had as strong a Jewish anti-Zionist camp as these other countries. 
154 Tulchinsky, Canada’s Jews, 330.
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Its Jewish establishment, on the other hand, was extremely Zionist by comparative 
standards. 
In 1927, the World Zionist Organization’s Shmaryahu Levin remarked on the 
results in a letter to an important Zionist official, Menachem Ussishkin: ‘There are two 
small countries . . . which stand in our front ranks: Canada and South Africa. Would that
God had been more merciful, and … scattered us in more countries like these two.’158 
Indeed, it was with unusual uniformity that Zionism took hold of the organized Jewish 
establishment in Canada, as in South Africa. The pro-Zionist climate in Canada and 
South Africa to some extent contrasts with the situation in the leading Western states. In
these settler states in the orbit of the British Empire, Zionism thrived. A sharper contrast 
still is with those parts of the Empire on the other side of the colour line.
Consider the central component of the British Empire that, in Sidebotham’s 
formulation, was governed rather than governing itself: India. The Indian political 
leadership opposed Zionism’s friendship to Empire in almost the same measure that it 
was praised in the Dominions. Even with British selection of Indian representatives to 
imperial forums in the interwar years, this dissent came through. At the Imperial 
Conference of 1937, for example, South African efforts to encourage British support for 
Zionism were denounced by Zafrullah Khan, the future prime minister of Pakistan.159 
Meanwhile, spokespeople for the Indian National Congress including Nehru and Gandhi
voiced their own anti-Zionism. On the eve of World War II, Congress amplified this 
message. It not only passed resolutions condemning Nazi antisemitism and offering 
refuge in India to Jewish refugees. It matched these resolutions with criticism of the 
Zionist movement and of its leaders’ fundamental choice: Congress declared that they 
‘had relied on British armed forces to advance their special privileges in Palestine and 
thus aligned themselves on the side of British Imperialism.’160 
For the interwar leadership of Canada, Tory and Liberal alike, it was the 
opposite. As immigrants to Canada, Jews were now rejected. As settlers in Palestine, 
they were less of a bother, and might even be put to good use. In a volume of the 
Survey of Commonwealth Affairs published in 1937, William K. Hancock summarized 
158 Brown, ‘Americanization of Canadian Zionism,’ 131.
159 Arthur B. Keith, Dominion Autonomy in Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 723.
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the vision for Zionist statehood in the British Empire being promoted by the likes of Lord
Melchett: ‘It will, in short, be an Ulster in the Near East; it will be an imperial mission like
that of the European settlers in Kenya; it will be like “that body of English loyalty” placed
after the American revolution in Canada.’161 The Canadian government came to 
distance itself from direct involvement in the Empire’s eastern expanses. But token 
support for Zionist efforts to realize this vision came easily enough.
Confronting Palestinian Society
It was the prevailing colonial attitude towards societies on the imperial periphery 
– in short, racism – that made it possible to treat Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs as
part of a wider expanse of ‘underdeveloped territories and backward races,’ to borrow 
Borden’s phrasing. But the relationship between the exercise of power and its 
ideological rationale is complex. We are well rid of that brand of economistic Marxism 
which reduced questions of racism, like questions of gender, state authority, and most 
every aspect of political culture, to issues of superstructure merely reflecting an 
authentic base of private accumulation and class relations. As Edward Said has 
emphasized, ideas and political culture have influence in their own right.162 In a critical 
review of Said’s writings, Aijaz Ahmad argues that, on the other hand, a focus on the 
cultural aspect of imperialism can go too far. Historical thinking can be limited by a 
fixation on discourse; thinking about contemporary political action can be all the more 
severely skewed.163 In any event, racism and the forms of socio-economic oppression 
that it rationalizes cannot accurately be discussed in terms of one-way causation. The 
nature of ideological hostility against particular peoples and the modes of socio-
economic oppression with which those peoples are targeted should be considered 
alongside one another.
Within the British sphere, the most prominent strain of anti-Arab hostility in the 
first half of the twentieth century targeted not Palestinians but Egyptians. One of the 
161 William K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 1: Problems of Nationality, 1918-
1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 482.
162 See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
163 Aijaz Ahmad, ‘Orientalism and After: Ambivalence and Cosmopolitan Location in the Work of Edward 
Said,’ Economic and Political Weekly 27, no. 30 (July 1992), 98-116.
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sharpest domestic critics of British policy in the postwar Middle East would be Erskine 
B. Childers, who reviewed the situation in a book published in 1962, The Road to Suez:
A Study of Western-Arab Relations. Childers noted that while the legacy of early 
conflicts between Western Christendom and the Muslim Orient lent a peculiar 
resonance to modern colonial attitudes towards the region as a whole, hostility towards 
Egyptians stood out. Concerning Arab societies to the east, there had developed a 
certain romanticization of desert peoples under British tutelage, built up in large part 
around the celebrated exploits of T.E. Lawrence. But even British hypocrisy could not 
cast the military occupation of Egypt as ‘a labour of love or liberal colonial altruism. The 
basic, power-political expedience of British policy in Egypt itself set up psychological 
stresses.’164 
Egyptians, unlike Palestinians, had an established place in the imperial order. 
Since 1882, Britain had imposed Lord Cromer’s judgement that ‘Egypt is by nature an 
agricultural country’ as a fact.165 Anouar Abdel-Malek details the measures taken by 
Britain to reverse early Egyptian industrial development and to impose export-oriented 
agriculture for British industry. This was the basis, he explains, for a social order whose 
miserable outcome ‘for city and country was countered by the enrichment of the large 
landed proprietors, who had finally found a regular customer in the occupying power. It 
was able to guarantee them incessantly growing wealth, since Egypt had become from 
end to end a gigantic cotton plantation for the factories of Lanchashire.’166 From the late 
nineteenth century through World War II, Britain propped up Egypt’s landholding class 
while repeatedly suppressing popular rebellions. In British opinion, there meanwhile set 
in what Childers describes as a ‘profound Egyptophobia’: ‘In mass British opinion,’ 
wrote Childers, ‘there is probably no other epithet for a foreign, non-white people that 
carries such antipathy and distrust as the word “gyppo.”’167
Concerning Palestine, in contrast, few commentators joined Childers in noting 
that the settler-colonial aspect of British policy was a Western imperial affront ‘unique in 
all of Asia.’168 And while an official like Balfour might quietly deride the rights of ‘the 
164 Erskine Childers, The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 
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700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land,’ the Indigenous population was more 
frequently written out of the picture. The ideological assault on Palestinians that 
paralleled Zionist colonization was marked not by loudly declared hostility so much as 
by minimization of the native presence. Palestine was imagined, in the famous Zionist 
slogan, as ‘a land without a people for a people without a land.’ The precursor to 
vilification of the Palestinians was the suggestion that they did not exist. In this 
discourse, aspiration poses as description. The late Naseer Aruri put it plainly, writing in 
the aftermath of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon: ‘The absurd and indefensible 
allegation that there were virtually no Arabs in Palestine prior to the Zionist influx seems
intended to provide a veneer of legitimacy for Israel’s increasingly violent efforts to 
make the myth that there is “no such thing as a Palestinian” a chilling reality.’169
Unfortunately, this theme remains largely uncorrected in the record of Canadian 
politics. The reality of the Palestinian Arab presence is not a matter of any serious 
dispute. It is significant that the British Zionist who coined the slogan ‘a land without a 
people for a people without a land,’ Israel Zangwill, was also a blunt advocate of 
removing the Indigenous presence that his slogan obscured. In a talk delivered in 1905 
Manchester, for example, Zangwill argued that the Zionist movement ‘must be prepared
either to drive out by the sword the tribes in possession as our forefathers did or to 
grapple with the problem of a large alien population, mostly Mohammedan and 
accustomed for centuries to despise us.’170 However, since the objective was coercive 
exclusion rather than inclusive exploitation, it was often more expedient to deal with the 
Indigenous presence by denial than by disparagement.
From the early years of the twentieth century, these were the politics in which 
Canadian Zionism was implicated. For British officials in Egypt, large landholders were 
allies and dutiful agricultural labourers assets. For Zionist officials in Palestine, the very 
presence of Arab workers in Jewish enterprises was considered, in the words of 
Menachem Ussishkin, a ‘painful leprosy.’171 Ussishkin was the pre-eminent leader of the
169 Preface to Livia Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diary 
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Jewish National Fund (JNF), the WZO’s main instrument of land acqusition.172 His 
perspective on land acquisition indicates the place of Canadian and other overseas 
Zionists in the movement’s early colonization efforts.
In 1904 Ussishkin considered the options open to the Zionist movement:
In order to establish autonomous Jewish community life – or, to be more precise, a Jewish state, 
in Eretz Israel, it is necessary, first of all, that all, or at least most, of Eretz Israel’s lands will be 
the property of the Jewish people. … But, as the ways of the world go, how does one acquire 
landed property? By one of the following three methods: by force – that is, by conquest in war, or 
in other words, by robbing land of its owner; by forceful acquisition, that is, by expropriation via 
governmental authority; and by purchase with the owner’s consent.173 
Making a virtue of necessity, Ussishkin dismissed the first method as ‘totally ungodly’ – 
adding significantly, ‘We are too weak for it’ – and the second as unrealistic. He 
concluded that ‘the only method to acquire Eretz Israel, at any time and under whatever
political conditions, is but purchase with money.’174 Here virtue would not outlive 
necessity. The Zionist movement ended up setting purchase aside just as soon as it 
had the coercive capacity to pursue the first two methods that Ussishkin listed. 
Meanwhile, purchase could have a similar effect. Once the Zionist movement gained 
land titles, it could enlist state authorities to evict Arab inhabitants in the name of private
property. Controversy over these politics of incremental displacement emerged as early 
as 1910, when Palestinian tenant cultivators in the Lower Galilee were arrested and 
jailed by the Ottomans for defying an eviction order.175 
Providing funds for such purchases was the task to which the Canadian Zionist 
movement applied itself. In 1910, Clarence de Sola proposed that the Canadian Zionist 
movement raise $10,000 over the following two years to contribute to land purchase, 
and saw to it that this was accomplished. In the early years of the Zionist movement this
was enough to win the praise of Otto Warburg, the German Zionist leader who 
preceded Chaim Weizmann as president of the WZO. In 1912 Warburg ‘praised the 
Canadian organization as being the leading Zionist Federation in per capita 
172 For details, see Walter Lehn, in association with Uri Davis, The Jewish National Fund (London: Kegan 
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contributions and added that other countries were beginning to emulate Canada in her 
Land Fund scheme.’176 
Even before Palestine came under British control, the changing structure of land 
ownership offered the Zionist movement opportunities. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, challenged by the Western powers, had 
introduced new forms of land ownership and worked to shift the burden of public debt 
onto the population. The impact on Palestine is discussed in detail by Mahmoud 
Yazbak.177 The more than two-thirds of Palestine’s population who worked as peasant 
farmers or fellahin were reoriented from production for subsistence to production for the
market, and increasingly came to rely on loans. Anticipated agricultural yields or land 
titles were often put up as collateral. In the process, many Palestinians did lose legal 
title to their lands. As Yazbak writes: ‘It is important to note, however, that this did not 
entail the dispossession of the fellahin from their land. On the contrary: for the new 
landowners the fellahin formed the only agricultural labour force available and keeping 
them on the land guaranteed uninterrupted production.’178 Indeed, since interaction with 
Ottoman authorities was associated with the threat of military conscription as well as 
taxation, it was common for Palestinian cultivators to voluntarily ‘register their land in 
the name of a local notable or an influential trader who in return for part of their yield 
took care of the tax.’179 
Zionist organizations in Palestine, buoyed by overseas fundraising, pursued land
ownership of an entirely different sort. Where institutions like the JNF gained legal 
ownership, the fellahin, reduced to status as tenant cultivators, would be issued with 
eviction orders. They were then even denied waged agricultural labour, which it was 
Zionist policy to reserve exclusively for Jews in keeping with the doctrine of ‘the 
conquest of labour.’ The impact of exclusionist Zionist settlement was thus immediately 
felt. Yazbak writes that this incremental displacement eventually helped trigger the 
Palestinian Arab rebellion of 1936-9. Hannah Arendt, writing for the Menorah Journal in 
1944, also insisted that it was the Zionist struggle against Palestinian labour that ‘more 
176 Figler, ‘History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada,’ 89.
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than anything else, up to 1936, poisoned the Palestine atmosphere.’180 In all of the 
literature, these Zionist land policies are identified with the role of ‘national capital,’ that 
is to say of WZO funds channeled from overseas. Unfortunately, the record of Canadian
fundraising for these processes remains buried in old myths. The impact on 
Palestinians is brushed aside by an effective denial that there was any Indigenous 
Palestinian presence to begin with.
Consider the most significant project undertaken by Canadian Zionism during the
interwar period: fundraising for purchase by the Jewish National Fund of a large tract of 
land on the central Palestinian coast. This case is discussed in almost every detailed 
history of Canadian Zionism. The most obvious sources on Canadian interwar Zionism 
suggest the controversy that resulted.
Take, for example, the biography of Archie Freiman. In 1919, the Canadian 
Zionist Federation was reconstituted as the Zionist Organization of Canada (ZOC), and 
Freiman, an Ottawa department store owner, succeeded de Sola as its president; 
Freiman held the ZOC presidency throughout the interwar period. His official biography 
was written by the Zionist historian Bernard Figler and published in 1962. The text cites 
Freiman’s presidential address to the ZOC conference of 1930.
No less an imperial patriot than de Sola, Freiman stressed to delegates that 
support for colonization efforts in Palestine was a British duty that could fulfill Jewish 
needs while ‘at the same time fostering the interests of our Empire.’181 On the main 
Canadian Zionist fundraising campaign of the era, he had this to say: ‘It is now evident 
that the acquisition of Emek Hasharon is of even greater import than we ourselves 
realized at the time we launched our campaign at Mr. Ussishkin’s urgent request. 
Judging by the evidence placed before the English Parliamentary Commission, the 
Arabs are stressing our purchase. They continually point out that the Jews are acquiring
the best land in Palestine, and in every case cite the Emek Hasharon as a typical 
example.’182 Figler provides readers with some more details. The territory in question 
‘was better known in Biblical days as Emek Hepher and the Plain of Sharon,’ he recalls,
but is ‘known now by the Arab name of Wadi Hawareth.’183
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This is not an obscure case. As Freiman suggested, it was addressed in the 
Hope Simpson Report, a study commissioned by the British government and published 
in 1930.184 The Palestinian scholar Walid Khalidi has discussed the facts, as has the 
Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling.185 The case was given detailed treatment in an 
article published in 1988 by the International Journal of Middle East Studies, and in 
another article published the following year in the American Ethnologist.186 The 
continued refusal of Canadian scholars to acknowledge the place of Palestinians in this 
history is nothing short of anachronistic.
Wadi al-Hawarith was home to a Bedouin community of more than a thousand 
people. By the time the British took over Palestine, it was, like many Palestinian lands, 
owned by absentee landlords. Raya Adler (Cohen) explains that the land was first 
registered with Ottoman authorities in the name of a Lebanese Maronite living in Jaffa, 
Anton Bishara Tayan, who mortgaged the lands to an investor in Marseille, who in turn 
passed the title on to a third party. When Tayan’s heirs were forced by the courts to 
recognize his debts in 1926, the JNF leadership seized on the opportunity. Adler 
(Cohen) details the combination of lobbying and bribery employed by JNF 
representatives to ensure the land was put up to public auction.187 The JNF’s Yosef 
Weitz explains where the organization found funds for the purchase: ‘the President of 
the Jewish National Fund, M. Ussishkin, packed his bags and sailed off to Canada to 
arouse the dispersed Jews and encourage them to contribute to the redemption of this 
valley.’188 During a two-week visit to Ottawa in 1927, Ussishkin met with Freiman and 
secured the support of the ZOC leadership to raise a million Canadian dollars for this 
purchase.189
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The community of Wadi al-Hawarith was not easily dislodged. As Walid Khalidi 
explains, community members insisted ‘that the land belonged to them by virtue of their 
having lived on it for 350 years. For them, ownership of the land was an abstraction that
at most signified the landlords’ right to a share of the crop.’190 The community met the 
first effort by British authorities to evict them, in 1929, with a resistance of sticks and 
stones. Some British officials, unable to deny the Indigenous presence, dismissed it by 
means of racial disparagement: ‘this pocket of primitive Semi-negroid Beduin,’ wrote the
assistant district commissioner in Nablus, ‘is a nuisance and only serves to impede the 
proper development of a very valuable area.’191 The community organized and resisted 
for years. In 1933, the struggle peaked. On the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, 
the tenants marched to join demonstrations in Tulkarem. Their feeder march was 
blocked and then dispersed through coordinated action by British police units and low-
flying RAF planes. In Nablus, a general strike was called in solidarity with the tenants’ 
struggle. In this context, a local anti-eviction struggle was transformed ‘into an event of 
national importance that resonated beyond the borders of Palestine.’192 
It took a decade, spanning the worst years of the Great Depression, for 
Canadian Zionists to pay off Freiman’s pledge to finance this displacement. It is not 
surprising that the ZOC president’s official biographer stresses all the good that came 
from it. Figler contends that before its redemption by the JNF, Wadi al-Hawarith was 
nothing but ‘a desolate sand-dune’; Canadian donors helped to transform this empty 
territory into ‘Emek Hasharon, a landscape of unusual loveliness, with the blue sea 
beyond. Its white sand-dunes became dotted with homesteads filled with human life 
and human labours.’193 As to why its Arab inhabitants were incapable of ‘human life and 
human labours,’ Figler addresses this not by racial disparagement but by denial of the 
native presence – little wonder from an author that seems to credit JNF ownership for 
the land’s proximity to the Mediterannean. What is more troubling is that contemporary 
Canadian scholars continue to follow Figler’s example.
Neither the struggle of the tenants of Wadi al-Hawarith, nor even the bare fact of 
their displacement, is addressed in any of the Canadian scholarship to date. The most 
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detailed studies of Canadian Jewish politics during this period have been produced by 
Gerald Tulchinsky, who is also the most politically progressive of the main scholars of 
Canadian Jewish politics. Published in 2008, his latest collection, Canada’s Jews: A 
People’s History, provides a troubling echo of Israel Zangwill. Tulchinsky contends that 
Wadi al-Hawarith was nothing but ‘a large tract of uninhabited sand and swamp’ before 
Zionist settlers and their Canadian sponsors came around.194 In Canadian intellectual 
treatment of Zionism and Palestine, this is, alas, typical.
It was Canadian Zionists who anchored fundraising for this purchase. But, as 
ever, they operated with government blessings. Just after the anti-eviction struggle in 
Wadi al-Hawarith peaked, Archie Freiman was joined in a nationwide radio broadcast by
the leading figurehead of Depression-era austerity politics in Canada, Conservative 
prime minister Richard Bennett. Bennett joined in calling on Canadians to give funds to 
the ZOC’s umbrella fundraising campaign, the United Palestine Appeal (UPA). Invoking 
‘the promises of God, speaking through His prophets,’ he lent the weight of the prime 
minister’s office to the appeal: ‘Scriptural prophecy is being fulfilled,’ said Bennett. ‘The 
restoration of Zion has begun.’195 A gesture of long-distance friendship to the Jews from 
a prime minister who excluded them as immigrants to Canada, and who is on record as 
having associated with the self-proclaimed ‘Canadian führer,’ Adrien Arcand.196 
In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand how prevailing ideas about empire, 
colonial settlement, and civilizational hierarchy once made Zionist proposals seem 
convenient and attractive. The history cannot be changed. The same cannot be said of 
the liberal intellectual refusal to address its legacy. Changing this is a challenge that 
falls not only on the Jewish community, but on Canadian society as a whole.
Conclusion
The idea that Zionist settlement in Palestine could produce, in Herzl’s words, ‘an 
outpost of civilization against barbarism’ suggested the association of European Jewish 
settlement in Palestine with a transnational Western identity in which the predominant 
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elements of Canadian society shared. For its part, the Canadian leadership built up its 
power power and privileges in relation to a racialized division between advanced 
‘Western’ and supposed lesser peoples; local structures of racial power initially centred 
on the assertion of Anglo-Saxon superiority, then broadened to make development of a 
‘white Canada’ viable. Early Canadian Zionism was shaped in part by the ambiguous 
position of Jews within this ethno-cultural hierarchy: the perceived utility of Zionism as a
means of deflecting Jewish immigrants away from Canadian urban centres combined 
with the general identification of European Jews as superior in their civilization to Arab 
as to local Indigenous peoples. The case for Canadian Zionism was enforced as 
respectable Canadian society came to oppose Jewish immigration from Europe. It 
became all the more attractive as Palestine was brought into the sphere of the British 
Empire and the international Zionist leadership aligned itself with imperial authorities.
Well into the period of British rule in Palestine, after all, the Canadian state’s 
approach to the Middle East was defined by its status as a British Dominion. On the one
hand, patriotic British argumentation in favour of Zionist aspirations in Palestine 
repeatedly came to invoke the settler tradition that Canada had helped to pioneer. On 
the other, the Canadian government’s approach to Palestine, as to external affairs more
generally, involved both practical and juridical association with the Zionist movement’s 
principal Great Power sponsor. At the level of state leadership, Canadian policy 
involvement in the region was, nonetheless, limited, especially once the King 
government took it upon itself to more fully assert Dominion autonomy in global Empire 
affairs. Still, although Canadian imperial identification with British power in the Middle 
East was often little more than vicarious, it reverberated in Canadian civil society, 
facilitating organized support for Zionist efforts in Palestine. This support cannot fairly 
be separated from its impact on Palestinian society. It is necessary to give the 
documented effects upon Palestine the place in Canadian history that they have, to 
date, too often been denied.
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2
Canadian Zionism and the War of 1948
‘Have you not heard that the Zionists of America and Canada, precisely now, have adopted a political 
Zionist program demanding “the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth”? Apparently the
program that I am proposing is not so alien to the minds and hopes of American Zionists. I authored the 
formula accepted in America and Canada.’1 
-David Ben-Gurion, speaking with the 
Jewish Agency Executive (1941)
‘A kilometer south of the observation post, several Arabs openly were leading their camels across the 
durra field. “Thrice I warned them. Will they never learn?” Zvi lifted the rifle, his eyes steely. As the shots 
rang out into the stillness, the Arabs hastily deserted their camels and disappeared beyond the vivid 
crimson red of poppies. “I don’t get it,” Joe said. “Don’t they know the truce is over? That they’re in Israel 
territory now?”’2 
-Lester Gorn, The Anglo-Saxons: A Novel 
of Israel’s War of Independence (1958)
* * *
More directly than anything else, it was the Canadian Zionist movement’s 
support for the war effort that established the Israeli state that connected Canadian civil 
society with the erasure of Palestine from the political map. Given the singular 
significance of 1948, this deserves special attention.
Palestinians refer to the events of 1948 as the Catastrophe, the Nakba. In the 
introduction to their co-edited volume Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of 
Memory, Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa’di argue that this trauma remains ‘the focal 
point for what might be called Palestinian time. The Nakba is the point of reference for 
other events, past and future. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 gains its significance 
from being followed by the Nakba. Landmark events in Palestinian history such as 
Black September (Jordan, 1970), the massacre at Sabra and Shatila (Lebanon, 1982), 
Land Day (Israel, 1976) and the first and second intifadas (1987-1993; 2000-present) 
1 Allon Gal, David Ben-Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State (Jerusalem: The Magnes 
Press, 1991), 193.
2 Lester Gorn, The Anglo-Saxons: A Novel of Israel’s War of Independence (New York: Sagamore Press, 
1958), 337.
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would not have occurred if they had not been preceded by the Nakba, to which they 
refer back.’3
In Israeli discourse, 1948 occupies a parallel position, including in defining 
contemporary policy towards the Palestinians. Amidst the Israeli campaign against the 
Palestinian uprising in late 2000, for example, Ha’aretz commentator Amir Oren 
reported that Moshe Ya’alon, then deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defence Forces 
(IDF), ‘told his colleagues that this operation was Israel’s most critical campaign against
the Palestinians, including Israel’s Arab population, since the 1948 war – for him, in fact,
it is the second half of 1948.’4 A few years later, then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon 
extended this theme to a discussion of international politics. Sharon was addressing the
Knesset after a spring 2004 visit to Washington in which the George W. Bush 
administration had declared its support for Israel to retain major Jewish settlements in 
the occupied West Bank. With a visible satisfaction, or so the Israeli press reported, 
Sharon boasted that the Palestinians were experiencing this diplomacy as ‘the heaviest 
blow inflicted on them since the War of Independence.’5
In considering Canada’s engagement with the Palestine question, 1948 carries a
corresponding significance. It came during a period of transition for Canadian Zionism. 
The movement had taken shape within the orbit of British power. And rhetorically, it 
retained a patriotic Zionism identified with the British Empire. Organizationally, however,
it was increasingly continental in orientation, closely coordinating with US Zionist 
organizations and effectively aligning with US power. Canadian Zionism’s increasingly 
American orientation reflected a number of simultaneous shifts: in the international 
Zionist leadership, in Canadian society, and indeed in the global balance of power. The 
early sections of this chapter explore these shifting alignments. What demands the 
closest attention, however, is the direct support that Canadians provided as the Zionist 
movement in Palestine moved to take state power.
In 1948, as the central Zionist organizations were transformed into institutions of 
the new Israeli state, they continued to benefit from overseas support – and this 
3 Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad H. Sa’di, eds., Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 5.
4 Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 
107.
5 Michele K. Esposito, ‘Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 
4 (summer 2004), 146.
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includes the militias that formed the foundation of the Israel Defence Forces. The 
Canadian Zionist movement not only helped to supply these militias with funding and 
weaponry. It also recruited, dispatched, and funded Canadian military veterans who 
agreed to travel to Palestine to join the fight directly. The IDF designated such Western 
volunteers Mahal, from the Hebrew Mitnadvay Hutz La’aretz, ‘volunteers from abroad’. 
Approximately three hundred Canadians were among an estimated total of 3,500 Mahal
recruits who fought for the IDF in 1948.6 Their numbers were hardly decisive; by the end
of 1948, Israel had nearly 100,000 troops in total.7 Their presence was, however, much 
more than symbolic. In the words of Israel’s founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion, 
‘Mahal’s special contribution was qualitative.’8 Though some of these recruits fought as 
infantrymen, Ben-Gurion prioritized the recruitment of World War II veterans with more 
specialized skills. Mahal recruits were disproportionately involved in deploying heavy 
weaponry, as part of artillery units, the armoured corps, the navy, and the air force.
The Zionist movements of the English-speaking West thus made a defining 
contribution to various branches of the Israeli armed forces. Israeli military historian 
Netanel Lorch describes the impact of the early arrival of recruits from Canada, Britain, 
and South Africa amidst the establishment of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the spring of 
1948: ‘English was soon to become the language of command,’ writes Lorch, ‘indeed 
almost the exclusive language of engineering and operational units of the force.’9 The 
Seventh (Armoured) Brigade, to take another important example, had enough recruits 
from the English-speaking West to prompt Palestinian historian Nafez Nazzal to decribe
it as ‘the Anglo-Saxon Brigade’.10 During the summer and autumn of 1948, this Brigade 
fought under the command of Canadian Ben Dunkelman, a veteran of the Queen’s Own
6 Yaacov Markovitzky, Mahal: Overseas Volunteers in Israel’s War of Independence (Tel Aviv: Ministry of 
Education Israel Information Centre, 2007), 7.
7 Avi Shlaim suggests ‘a peak of 96,441’ Israeli troops in December 1948; ‘Israel and the Arab Coalition in
1948,’ in eds. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81. Amitzur Ilan records an Israeli ‘Formal Order of 
Battle’ in October 1948 of 88,000; see The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms, Embargo, Military 
Power and Decision in the 1948 Palestine War (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 67. This 
source is cited in David Tal, War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2004), 
5.
8 David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History (New York: Funk & Wagnalls with Sabra Books, 1971), 
267. 
9 Netanel Lorch, Israel’s War of Independence, 1947-1949 (Hartford: Hartmore House, 1968), 265-266.
10 Nafez Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978),
22.
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Rifles of Canada and the son of the founder of Ontario retail giant Tip Top Tailors. Other 
Canadian recruits were peppered throughout the Israeli armed forces.
The Canadian literature concerning this history, as in the case of interwar 
fundraising for the JNF, shows a studied indifference to its impact on Palestinian 
society. In 1976, then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin summarized the standard 
rendition of Mahal combat in his foreword to Ben Dunkelman’s autobiography: ‘The 
contribution of this small band of men and women is a glorious chapter in the story of 
Israel’s struggle for freedom.’11 In fairness, Dunkelman’s Dual Allegiance is not a 
historical study but a declaration of patriotic Zionism. In its first five pages, the author 
moves from a first-person description of a fight he had picked with a Palestinian 
(‘Kneeling astride him, I began hitting him again and again, until his body went limp’) to 
boyhood reminences that feature a young Dunkelman in Toronto, soon to enroll in 
Upper Canada College, ‘waving a little Union Jack’.12 This needs to be read alongside 
other sources. Two years after Dunkelman’s autobiography was published, Nafez 
Nazzal’s The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948 provided easy English-language 
access to details about the emptying of Palestinian villages by units under Dunkelman’s
command. That Dunkelman himself did not delve into this aspect of his combat record 
is hardly surprising.
Unfortunately, Canadian scholarship on the topic has tended to echo Yitzhak 
Rabin’s judgement. The main study to date is the The Secret Army, written by the 
University of Calgary’s David Bercuson and published in 1983. Bercuson would have 
been writing during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, at a time when many in the 
world, including in the academic world, were expressing concern for the fate of 
Palestinian refugees from the Galilee. Yet he, too, ignores Palestinian claims while 
concluding that the story of the Mahal is a story of ‘forgotten heroism’.13 In a 2008 article
about the Mahal marking the sixtieth anniversary of Israel’s establishment, Bercuson 
continues to write along precisely the same lines.14 Those adhering to what Avi Shlaim 
calls the ‘heroic version’ of Israel’s establishment15 should at least try to meet the claims
11 Yitzak Rabin, foreword to Ben Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), xii.
12 Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, 1-5.
13 Bercuson, The Secret Army (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, 1983), 233. 
14 David Bercuson, ‘They fought for the nascent Jewish state,’ Canadian Jewish News (21 February 
2008).
15 Shlaim, ‘Israel and the Arab Coalition,’ 79.
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of its critics. As concerns the record of the Mahal, Canada’s intellectual community had 
done little of the sort. Here the journalistic and the academic records align. The Globe 
and Mail has remembered Dunkelman as ‘a Canadan and Israeli war hero,’ while the 
Toronto Star has credited him with ‘the liberation of northern Israel’; major Canadian 
media outlets discuss this history without ever acknowledging the expulsion of 
Palestinians by Canadian personnel.16 The presumption of Canadian innocence in the 
problems of the Global South, as identified by Sherene Razack, holds in this case 
despite all evidence to the contrary. 
Even in a country durably aligned with Israel, this constitutes a kind of political 
and scholarly anachronism. There was a time when the Palestinian assertion that 
Zionist militias had carried out widespread expulsions throughout the country was 
vehemently denied by liberal scholars in Israel and the West. In recent decades, 
however, the accumulation of incontrovertible evidence and widely publicized research 
has shifted the terms of discussion.
Even the major Zionist polemicists have had to adjust. For example, we can now 
read Anita Shapira, one of the world’s leading intellectual partisans of Zionism, arguing 
that the basic facts were never really in doubt. ‘The question of expulsion has never 
been a secret,’ Shapira insists in a well-known piece first published in 2000.17 Shapira 
writes that frank internal Israeli discussions about the expulsions date back to the 
immediate aftermath of the 1948 war. She concedes that eventually, as Israeli 
discussions ‘gravitated from the sparring ring of internal debate to the arena of 
international politics,’ diplomacy required a blurring of the facts; ‘the expulsion, an 
acknowledged fact of war in the early 1950s, became almost a state secret – albeit, 
shared by many.’18 From Shapira’s perspective, this record of internal Israeli 
discussions demonstrates the layered moral complexity of Israeli liberalism. One can 
draw other conclusions. So far, in the fields of Canadian history and Jewish political 
studies, we have not even reached the level of these discussions; the reigning 
approach remains denial by ommission. Whatever conclusions one draws, 
16 Elizabeth Nickson, ‘Poor little rich boy grows up,’ Globe and Mail (25 September 1999); Alan Barnes, 
‘Cloverdale builder Ben Dunkelman honored by Israel,’ Toronto Star (12 June 1997); see also Mitch 
Potter, ‘The man who saved Nazareth,’ Toronto Star (19 December 2015).
17 Anita Shapira, ‘Hirbet Hizah: Between Remembrance and Forgetting,’ Jewish Social Studies 7, no. 1 
(autumn 2000), 117.
18 Shapira, ‘Hirbet Hizah,’ 96.
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acknowledgment of Canadian Zionism’s direct association with the expulsion of 
Palestinians is a first and necessary step.
This may be an embarrassing truth. To date, it has been possible for Canadian 
intellectuals to celebrate the record of Mahal recruits in liberal or progressive terms. 
Consider the second instalment of Gerald Tulchinky’s standard history of Canadian 
Jewish politics, Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community.
It opens with the following dedication: 
This book offers a tribute to the Canadians who took up arms against the Fascists, in the 
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and other units of the International Brigades in Spain 1936-38, in 
the Allied armies throughout the world 1939-1945, and in the forces defending Israel 1947-48. 
The Mahal recruits were simply ‘defending Israel’ from ‘the Fascists,’ unnamed and 
without any further elaboration. Zionist recruitment for the 1948 war is then accurately 
discussed in the book, but without any mention of Palestinian existence.19 This account 
is reproduced in a more recent volume bringing together Tulchinsky’s main studies.20 
Tulchinsky remains perhaps the most able and progressive historian of Canadian 
Jewish politics. His work suggests how, for Canadian progressives, Palestine has been 
considered an acceptable blind spot. Especially given the significance of Palestine in 
contemporary world politics, this is a legacy that needs to be reconsidered.
There is a wealth of material to ground a fresh approach to this topic. The 
studies adhering to conventional Zionist political narrration remain useful for tracing the 
record of early Israeli units. Alongside the standard military histories of the 1948 war, 
there have been focused studies of the early Israeli air force and armoured corps21 and 
personalized accounts by combatants like Dunkelman – development of Israeli air 
power, for example, is treated at length in autobiographical works written by Chaim 
Weizmann’s son, Ezer, and by Mahal recruits from the United States, South Africa, and 
France.22 For its part, Bercuson’s The Secret Army supplements the Israeli military 
19 Gerald Tulchinsky, Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community (Toronto: 
Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1998), 254-6.
20 Gerald Tulchinsky, Canada’s Jews: A People’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 
363-4.
21 See, for example, Brian Cull and Shlomo Aloni, with David Nicolle, Spitfires over Israel: The First 
Authoritative Account of Air Conflict During the Israeli War of Independence, 1948-1949 (Boston, MA: 
Grub Street, 1994); Bill Norton, Air War on the Edge: A History of the Israel Air Force and its Aircraft 
Since 1947 (Leicestershire, UK: Midland Publishing, 2002); and David Eshel, Chariots of the Desert: The 
Story of the Israeli Armored Corps (London: Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1989).
22 Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air 
Force (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976); Harold Livingston, No Trophy, No Sword: An American 
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narrrative, as established by memoirists and IDF figures like Netanel Lorch and Yigal 
Allon, with the results of interviews with Canadian and other Mahal recruits. The basic 
character of Mahal involvement is by now well established; what is necessary is to 
overlay this record with the details of expulsion of the Palestinians by the units for which
these recruits fought. This aspect of Zionist and Israeli operations has also been well 
documented. The recorded testimony of Palestinian refugees can be checked against 
official Israeli materials; Israel declassified a range of documents concerning the 1948 
war in 1978, and made additional files available to researchers beginning in 1998. 
Researchers can draw upon a range of studies based on these sources.23
Overlaid upon one another, these two sets of literature – the one detailing the 
history of early IDF units, the other the dislocation of Palestinian society – form a lens 
through which the record of Canadian recruits appears in an altogether different light. 
This chapter reviews the record through this perspective. First, however, it is worth 
looking at how Canada’s patriotic Zionist tradition fed into a colonization process in 
Palestine that was completed at the expense of Britain’s regional standing.
Volunteer in the Israeli Air Force During the 1948 War of Independence (Chicago: Edition Q, Inc., 1994); 
Boris Senior, New Heavens: My Life as a Fighter Pilot and a Founder of the Israeli Air Force (Washington:
Potomac Books, 2005); Benjamin Kagan, Combat secret pour Israël (Paris: Hachette, 1963).
23 An early landmark of Palestinian scholarship based on the testimony of refugees was ‘Arif al-‘Arif’s six-
volume The Nakba: The Catastrophe of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise, 1947-1951, widely cited in the 
literature and internationally available, though only in Arabic (Al-Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis Wal-
Firdaws al-Mafqud, 1947-1952). As Saleh Abdel Jawad writes, whereas al-‘Arif interviewed refugees in 
the West Bank and detailed developments in the centre of the country, Nafez Nazzal’s English-language 
study of 1978 concerned the north, and was based on interviews conducted in Lebanon; see Saleh Abdel
Jawad, ‘La guerre de 1948, Entre archives et sources orales,’ Revue d’études Palestiniennes 96 (2005), 
75. As concerns the declassified Israeli archives, the Israeli historian Benny Morris has provided the most
detailed reviews of the material they contain, notably in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 
1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); ‘Operation Hiram Revisited,’ Journal of 
Palestine Studies 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999), 68-76; and The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Israeli historian Ilan Pappé has shed new light
on key Israeli documents, while supplementing them with Palestinian oral history, in his The Ethnic 
Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006). Another invaluable source synthesizing 
the available information up to the date of its publication is Walid Khalidi’s encyclopedic, 636-page All 
That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).
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The Scope and Limits of British Sponsorship
It has been suggested that Israel was established in 1948 through nothing less 
than ‘an anti-British war of liberation.’24 This phrasing comes from the work of the 
influential French Zionist Robert Misrahi; the logic is much more widespread. It was 
powerfully built up from the US through the story of Exodus, the Leon Uris novel first 
published in 1958 and then produced by Hollywood as a blockbuster film. This work of 
historical fiction had an enormous international impact. Israel’s Yossi Beilin is among 
many who have expressed amazement at the resonance of ‘this superficial and naïve 
film,’ and at how the ‘Exodus image of Israel persists in the eyes of so many.’25 In this 
version of Israel’s establishment, the pre-state Zionist settlement in Palestine, the 
Yishuv, is cast in the role of a subjugated colony struggling for independence against 
foreign rule. ‘This narrative,’ notes Amy Kaplan, ‘made Jewish resistance the prototype 
of modern anticolonial rebellion, even as it erased the history of Zionist settlement 
under the aegis of the British Empire.’26
It is against this backdrop that Michael Brown, one of Canada’s most prominent 
Zionist intellectuals, analyzes Canadian Zionism as part of a global range of 
‘revolutionary movements.’ 1948 thus factors into Brown’s analysis as the moment 
when ‘the revolution [was] won.’27 This analysis has the effect of undermining the 
credibility of Palestinian and other regional struggles against colonialism; Arab 
opposition to Zionism can be presented either as an imperial ploy, as reactionary 
ignorance, or as antisemitic malice. At the same time, it skews understanding of the 
place of Zionism in Western imperial politics. How is it in Canada, for example, that a 
movement owing so much of its momentum to official encouragement was in turn 
transformed into a ‘revolutionary’ struggle? Critical analysis of this history needs to take 
24 See Robert Misrahi, ‘La coexistence ou la guerre,’ in Les Temps Modernes no. 253 (1967), 545; and 
Samir Kassir and Farouk Mardam-Bey, Itinéraires de Paris à Jérusalem – II: 1958-1991 (Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), 129.
25 Yossi Beilin, His Brother’s Keeper: Israel and Diaspora Jewry in the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Schocken Books, 2000), 132.
26 Amy Kaplan, ‘Zionism as Anticolonialism: The Case of Exodus,’ American Literary History 25, no. 4 
(winter 2013), 879.
27 Michael Brown, ‘The Americanization of Canadian Zionism,’ in ed. Geoffrey Wigoder, Contemporary 
Jewry: Studies in Honour of Moshe Davis (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry, 1984), 157.
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the political Zionist movement’s revolutionary pretensions not with a grain, but with a 
bucket full of salt.
In his study Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences 
of International Relations, Miles Kahler discusses how the power imbalance 
characteristic of settler-native conflicts, though felt above all on the periphery, is 
enforced in the metropole. Kahler explains that the main settler colonies associated with
Britain and France, in Kenya and Algeria, respectively, were able to oppose 
decolonization by political action near the centre of imperial power: ‘Disparity of access 
to metropolitan society set them apart from their Arab or African adversaries and 
ensured that the pace of disengagement was slowed.’28 In his 1937 volume of the 
Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, Hancock notes that a similar dynamic affected the 
Palestine problem. Whereas the Zionist movement was positioned to press its case in 
the metropole, Palestinian protests got no similar hearing: ‘The Arabs were far away, 
too far away, too poor, and too unskilled to appeal persistently and effectively to the 
democracy of Great Britain.’29 This allowed Zionists to press claims not only to 
civilizational superiority over the Arabs, but also and at the same time to indigenous 
status. ‘They proclaim,’ observed Hancock, ‘both that they are Europeans in their 
civilization, and that they are natives of Palestine returning to their own home.’30 The 
versatility of political Zionism’s case in the West – as an agent of progress, as an ally to 
Empire, or as a native struggle for freedom, depending on circumstances and audience 
– permitted the mobilization of especially diverse forms of metropolitan support.
The narrative of Zionism as anti-colonialism does more than obscure 
understanding of Palestinian history. It also distorts the character and status of Zionist 
politics, both in Palestine and in the West. It is a truism, but one too often ignored in the 
study of Palestine, that conflict between settlers and metropolitan authorities does not 
negate the realities of settler-native conflict. In Kenya, to take one of many examples, 
British settlers aiming to reconstitute the country as another white Dominion in the 
1920s went so far as to kidnap the British governor, protesting what seemed to them 
28 Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 9.
29 William K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. 1: Problems of Nationality, 1918-
1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 463. 
30 Hancock, Survey, 440.
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insufficient support for settler claims.31 Such ‘resistance’ does not remove settler politics
from the history of imperialism. 
In order to consider the history of Canadian Zionism towards the end of the 
British mandate, some further details are thus in order concerning how the main Zionist 
currents approached the question of empire. The doctrine of Zionist alignment with 
British power was most fully embodied in the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, the 
president of the WZO for most of the period of British rule in Palestine. This orientation 
was, however, by no means limited to Weizmann’s faction. Yosef Gorny has supplied 
some of the most detailed analysis of Zionist debates in the decades leading up to 
1948. He finds that ‘there was consensus,’ at least for the first twenty years of British 
rule in Palestine, ‘on the vital importance of ties between Zionism and Great Britain.’32
Eventually, it was the Revisionist wing of the Zionist movement that most publicly
clashed with the British – the 1944 assassination of Lord Moyne, British minister of 
state in the Middle East, was its doing, as was the 1946 bombing of Palestine’s King 
David Hotel.33 Although Revisionism made only modest headway in Canada,34 it should 
be emphasized just how odd it is that its right-wing militancy has ever been framed as 
anti-colonial. The founding icon of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky, did 
not mince words. His exaltation of Western power extended to the point of internalized 
antisemitism. ‘We Jews have nothing in common with what is denoted “the East” and 
thank God for that,’ he wrote in 1926, the year of his first visit to Canada. ‘To the extent 
that our uneducated masses have traditions and spiritual prejudices which are 
reminescent of the East, they must be weaned away from them.’35 As for the idea of 
realizing Jewish statehood within the framework of the British Empire, no Zionist leader 
greeted the idea with greater enthusiasm than Jabotinsky. He did all he could to echo 
calls from Britain for the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish Dominion. In 1928 
31 Kenneth Good, ‘Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation,’ The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 14, no. 4 (1976), 611; and Bethwell A. Ogot, ‘The Settler Dream for a White 
Dominion,’ in eds. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng, Kenya: The Making of a Nation (Maseno: Maseno University 
Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies, 2000), 49-69.
32 Yosef Gorny, trans. Chaya Galai, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948: A Study of Ideology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 176. 
33 Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 54.
34 Tulchinsky, Canada’s Jews, 348.
35 Gorny, Zionism, 160.
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Jabotinsky exclaimed that ‘the invisible tie binding Britain and the Dominions is the most
remarkable achievement in the world’s political history,’ and pledged to put Revisionist 
militancy in service of the Empire: ‘Had we today even a 99 per cent [Jewish] majority in
Palestine, I, the extremist, would still fight every idea of independence and would insist 
on keeping within the British Empire.’36 
Even for Zionists closely aligned with British power, it was possible to express 
loyalist opposition with an imperial framework. In Britain, writes Stephan Wendehorst, 
the Balfour Declaration was responsible not only ‘for bestowing imperial legitimacy on 
British Zionism,’ but also ‘for justifying the intervention of British Zionists in British 
politics against the policies of the British government’ whenever British support for 
Zionism seemed to wane.37 Likewise in Canada. Consider how the Canadian Zionist 
movement’s main publication, The Canadian Zionist, editorialized against perceived 
British moves to circumscribe Zionist claims in 1934: ‘British Jewry, who have given 
ample proof of their loyalty and devotion to the cause of Empire, whether in the mother 
country or in the Dominions, have now the right to appeal to the conscience and good 
sense of those responsible for British policy in Palestine and to ask the Government not
to make their task more difficult by putting an unbearable strain on their faith in the 
integrity of the leaders of the Empire, of which they form an essential part.’38 A similar 
approach extended across Zionist factions. Even as Revisionists in Palestine clashed 
with British authorities in the 1940s, the British branch of Revisionist Zionism continued 
to invoke the old imperial proposals: Revisionists in Britain pressed for Jewish 
statehood through a formation called the ‘Jewish Dominion of Palestine League.’39
The most significant challenge to Weizmann’s leadership did not come from the 
Revisionist right, however, but rather from Labour Zionism – and more specifically, from 
the leadership of David Ben-Gurion. Here too, the Zionist record is buried in layers of 
mythology. Where it has seemed expedient, Ben-Gurion has been presented as a 
progressive leader of a fighting workers’ movement. Notably, his authorized biography 
first appeared in postwar France with a title borrowed from Isaac Deutscher’s biography
36 N.A. Rose, The Gentile Zionists: A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy, 1929-1930 (London: Frank Cass, 
1973), 77.
37 Stephan Wendehorst, British Jewry, Zionism, and the Jewish State, 1936-1956 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 360.
38 Michael Brown, ‘Americanization of Canadian Zionism,’ 148. 
39 Wendehorst, British Jewry, 160.
88
Canadian Zionism and the War of 1948
of Trotsky, The Prophet Armed.40 Ben-Gurion’s biographer, Michael Bar Zohar, notes 
with cool understatement how his ‘socialist ideas became increasingly elastic in order to
serve the nationalist movement.’41 For Ben-Gurion, national segregation was the priority
for Zionist labour; and just as labour organization was an instrument of national power, 
friendship to empire was to be recognized for its value. At the opening session of the 
Conference for Labour Palestine in 1930, Ben-Gurion declared simply that ‘if someone 
were to come and say to us: just lift a finger and England will leave Palestine and the 
League of Nations will give up supervising it and the fate of Palestine will be left to the 
population now residing there and they will do as they choose, I would not lift that 
finger.’42 In short, a commitment to strategic cooperation with Britain extended across 
the main Zionist factions.
The Canadian Zionist leadership was not especially active in intra-Zionist 
struggles. To the greatest extent possible, however, it adhered to Chaim Weizmann’s 
line. It had been Weizmannn who consecrated Zionism’s place in the British Empire, 
and who controlled the fundraising instruments which channeled most Canadian Zionist
funds, notably the Keren Hayesod (the Foundation Fund). Weizmann and his close 
colleagues tended to direct interwar Canadian Zionism from a distance. Zionist leaders 
since Herzl had spoken of what was called ‘the conquest of the communities’ – the task,
as Michael Berkowitz summarizes it, ‘of Zionists wresting control of Jewish 
organizations to enlist them in the cause.’43 The JNF’s Menachem Ussishkin drew on 
this rhetoric to describe a visit to Palestine by Archie Freiman, the interwar president of 
the Zionist Organization of Canada. Ussishkin tried his hand at wit: ‘He came, he saw 
and was conquered.’44 Freiman, of course, had long since been committed to Zionism. 
Nonetheless, this visit may have solidified his alignment with the political party lead by 
40 See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1979-1921 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1954); and Michael Bar Zohar, Ben Gourion, le prophète armé (Paris: Fayard, 1966). 
41 Michael Bar Zohar, trans. Len Ortzen, Ben-Gurion: The Armed Prophet (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1967), 19. 
42 Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs, 217.
43 Michael Berkowitz, Western Jewry and the Zionist Project, 1914-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997),  91.
44 Bernard Figler, Lillian and Archie Freiman: Biographies (Montreal: Northern Print and Lithographing 
Co., 1962), 242.
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Weizmann and Ussishkin, the General Zionists. Freiman became a committed General 
Zionist and remained so throughout his tenure as the ZOC’s president.45 
Not until 1946 was Chaim Weizmann formally unseated from the presidency of 
the World Zionist Organization. Over the preceding decade, though, the centre of power
within the Zionist movement steadily shifted towards Ben-Gurion. This organizational 
rivalry took shape within a WZO that had gained new status thanks to Britain. Article 4 
of the British mandate provided for recognition of ‘[a]n appropriate Jewish agency’ to 
represent Zionist interests in Palestine. This provision went on to name the beneficiary: 
‘The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion 
of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency.’46 In principle, this 
status was conferred upon the WZO as a whole. More specifically, it came to refer to 
the status of the WZO within Palestine. In the early years of British rule, the main 
instrument of Zionist leadership in Palestine was the Palestine Zionist Executive. In 
1935, this body enforced its position and reconstituted itself as the Executive of the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine.47 Weizmann retained the WZO presidency; but beginning 
in 1935, Ben-Gurion chaired the Jewish Agency Executive. Hannah Arendt writes that 
when Ben-Gurion assumed this new leadership role, he was still being ‘violently 
denounced’ by many Palestine-based Labour Zionists for his ‘Revisionist leanings.’48 
Nonetheless, he quickly became the most important Zionist official in the country.
Rivalry between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion began to build up during the 
Palestinian Arab rebellion of 1936-1939. Britain responded to Palestinian resistance 
aggressively. It outlawed the leading Palestinian political organizations, including the 
Arab Higher Committee and the National Committee, and its troops moved to crush 
Palestinian organizational capacities.49 In Palestine as elsewhere in the Empire, British 
policy rested on force. Edmund Burke once wrote, ‘you may call your Constitution what 
you will, in effect it will consist of three parts, (orders, if you please), cavalry infantry, 
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and artillery.’50 Hancock’s Survey of Commonwealth Affairs picks up on this theme: ‘In 
the summer of 1936, 23,000 British soldiers were administering the medicine of the 
constitution . . . to the struggling Arab majority of Palestine.’51 In Canada, left-wing 
Jewish organizations anchored in the Montreal textiles sector protested in 1937 the 
‘poison of chauvinist propaganda’ that spread during this conflict, and called for a 
commitment to Arab-Jewish cooperation as the necessary antidote.52 Canada’s 
mainstream Zionist leadership, meanwhile, took its cues from the WZO.
At the outset of the rebellion, Ben-Gurion remained scarcely less committed than
Weizmann to alignment with British power. Under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, the Jewish 
Agency was even able to field units of its underground militia, the Haganah, to strike at 
Palestinian targets alongside British troops. Though formally illegal, Haganah forces 
were armed, organized, and trained under the command of a British commander 
extremely supportive of Zionism, major-general Charles Orde Wingate. They were 
attached as Supernumerary Police units to Wingate’s Special Night Squads, and 
learned aggressive British counter-insurgency tactics. Ben-Gurion was enthusiastic 
about what he described as ‘a practical step towards the establishment of a Jewish 
military force within the framework of the British Army.’53 By the end of the rebellion, 
however, Ben-Gurion was preparing his own challenge to British authorities.
On the one hand, Britain’s latest campaign in Palestine had further tipped the 
balance of power against the Palestinian Arabs and in favour of the Yishuv. On the 
other, British officials were moving to back away from support for Zionist aspirations. 
Britain was concerned with its wider regional interests. From Egypt through to the 
Persian Gulf, the sway of the British Empire in the Arab world was contentious enough 
without the imposition of outright settler rule on Palestine. During the First World War, 
British planners had leveraged Arab desires for independence to their advantage 
against the Ottoman Empire; with another European war looming, British authorities 
were loathe to drive their new subjects into the enemy camp. The British reversal on 
Palestine was laid out a White Paper published in May 1939, repudiating proposals for 
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Jewish statehood. The document argued that, since the Yishuv had been built up under 
British rule to the point where nearly a third of Palestine’s population was Jewish, 
Britain’s commitment to establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine had been 
fulfilled; it insisted that the architects of the mandate ‘could not have intended that 
Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab 
population of the country.’54 The White Paper went on to call for a transition to self-
government in Palestine on the basis of existing demographics. 
In June 1939, the ZOC joined with smaller Zionist factions in Canada to issue a 
joint protest letter against the White Paper.55 Internationally, while Weizmann acted in 
Britain to restore official support, Ben-Gurion put his weight behind public campaigning 
in the United States. Ben-Gurion explained his logic in a discussion in early 1939 with 
the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA): ‘This is the only country in the world on 
which England is very dependent, in case of war’; mobilization of Jewish and wider 
American opinion was therefore the best available means for the Zionist movement to 
bring pressure to bear on Britain.56 Over the coming period, Ben-Gurion became the 
driving force behind what Walid Khalidi describes as ‘the transfer by the Zionists of their
main metropolitan base from London to Washington.’57
Ben-Gurion’s international strategy was in the first instance focused on winning 
American Zionist organizations over to the cause of Jewish statehood. Even in Zionist 
circles, the notion that the Jewish national home in Palestine should take the form of a 
Jewish state had over the preceding years come to be considered a Revisionist 
program, illiberal and somewhat extreme.58 Against the backdrop of World War II, Ben-
Gurion worked to change the terms of discussion. His efforts culminated in a landmark 
1942 conference held at New York’s Biltmore Hotel. There, US and world Zionist 
leaders came together to issue a declaration demanding ‘that Palestine be established 
as a Jewish Commonwealth’ following the war.59 To British officials, the meaning was 
clear. Ben-Gurion was pushing for full Zionist authority over Palestine and breaking the 
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movement out of the confines of the British Empire. A memorandum from the British 
Colonial Office observed that ‘the Zionist aim is nothing less than the forcible seizure of 
Palestine after the war, relying on American influence to keep us quiet.’60
In terms of international Zionist leadership, this process saw Weizmann, with his 
enduring British fixations, lose ground to Ben-Gurion. In Canada as in the US, the main 
WZO affiliates were drawn into an effort that challenged Britain’s position. Michael 
Brown explains that this made it more difficult than before for Canadian supporters of 
the movement ‘to blend Zionism and British-Empire nationalism.’61 It is not that 
Canadian Zionists made a point of breaking with Weizmann’s leadership. To the 
contrary, as late as September 1947, well after Weizmann’s influence had collapsed, 
Canada’s umbrella Zionist coalition publicly declared that ‘Canadian Zionists have 
always supported his leadership and we shall continue to press for his return to the 
presidence of the World Zionist Organization.’62 Nonetheless, Canadian Zionists were 
part of a movement whose centre of gravity was moving elsewhere.
The dissident initiative required of Canadian Zionists in this context should not, 
however, be exaggerated. Ben-Gurion challenged British policy with a measure of 
declared respect. The leadership of the Zionist Organization of America, like the Zionist 
Organization of Canada, had for years been aligned with Weizmann and his General 
Zionists. This alone ensured the local stature of the British orientation. Moreover, at few 
moments in history was Britain’s standing in American opinion more sensitive than in 
this early phase of World War II. Until the end of 1941, US support for the British fight 
with Nazi Germany was tempered by official US neutrality. The Soviet Union, too, was 
removed from the war until the summer of that year. Allon Gal writes that by 1940 Ben-
Gurion had completed his ‘shift from an English-oriented to an Anglo-American policy 
(with the accent on “American”).’63 Britain’s standing in the US was precisely the 
pressure point that Ben-Gurion was targeting. All the same, any impression that this 
would undercut wartime support for Britain was likely to prompt a Jewish public 
backlash. Zionist campaigning in these circumstances required considerable tact.
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In Canada, the adaptation of Ben-Gurion’s efforts to the local context was eased 
by the fact that one of his closest allies had local roots. Bernard Joseph (later Dov 
Yosef) was born in Montreal and attended university at McGill and Laval before settling 
in Palestine soon after the British occupation of the country. He would go on to hold a 
range of significant posts in the Yishuv, including as a member of a Population Transfer 
Committee established by the Jewish Agency in 1937 and as Israeli military governor in 
Jerusalem in 1948.64 He was also a prominent participant in the Yishuv’s American 
campaign. It was during the winter of 1940-1 that Ben-Gurion’s efforts began to yield 
results. Ben-Gurion himself spent much of that winter in the US and returned to 
Palestine only after arranging for his replacement by the former Montrealer. ‘I would not 
have left the United States confident that the decisions and promises would be carried 
out,’ Ben-Gurion explained to the Jewish Agency Executive in February 1941, ‘had it not
been for Dr. Joseph’s arrival.’65 The most important resolutions over which Joseph 
presided were those passed in New York at the January 1941 convention of the United 
Palestine Appeal. This convention was ‘a turning point in the history of American 
Zionism,’ producing the first-ever UPA call for Jewish statehood.66
Before traveling to New York for the UPA convention, Joseph returned to 
Montreal to participate in the twenty-sixth conference of the Zionist Organization of 
Canada. There he saw to it that the ZOC made its own contribution to the sequence of 
pro-statehood declarations reshaping North American Zionism. ‘The Canadian 
convention’s resolutions partly mirrored the spirit of Dov Joseph’s remarks,’ writes Gal. 
‘They included an unequivocal demand for the nullification of the White Paper and a call
for the establishment of a Jewish army. The demand for political independence, 
however, was British oriented as it called for “the establishment of Palestine as a 
Jewish Commonwealth within the British Commonwealth of Nations in order that it shall 
be able speedily to absorb the masses of Jewry from Europe and from all countries 
where Jews are in distress.”’67 In its substance, this was a Canadian contribution to the 
Zionist rupture with Britain. In its form, this aspect of the new policy was carefully 
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softened. Canadian Zionists continued to invoke the British connection. Throughout 
World War II, writes Michael Brown, the country’s leading Zionists ‘seized every 
opportunity to stress to others the value to Britain and the Allies of the bases in 
Palestine and the loyal Jewish settlers there.’68
Over the coming period, the US came to occupy the position in Canadian Zionist 
thinking that Britain had previously. The Canadian Zionist association with a movement 
that eventually sought to eject the British from Palestine was at times uncomfortable, 
especially in the context of direct Zionist attacks on British installations (most notably, 
the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946). But in a wider perspective, the Canadian 
shift from a British to a more continental orientation generalized. ‘At the same time that 
the ties to Britain of Canada’s Zionists were being strained,’ observes Brown, ‘those of 
other Anglo-Canadians were also slackening.’69 The Canadian state’s evolving position 
between the two great powers centres of the English-speaking West, London and 
Washington, is explored in greater depth in Chapter 3. For now, suffice it to note that 
both the Zionist and the Canadian leadership were durably Anglo-American in their 
international orientation. They did not place ‘the accent on “American”’ at precisely the 
same time, much less in the same way. But while the parallel between their shifting 
global alignments is inexact, it is also unmistakable. And it goes a considerable way 
towards explaining the long-term respectability of support for Zionism within Canadian 
civil society.
Canada’s Place in Zionist Military Preparations
Sam Zacks, a Toronto stockbroker whose name today marks a prestigious chair 
in Jewish history at the University of Toronto, was president of the Zionist Organization 
of Canada as Ben-Gurion moved to translate North American declarations in support of 
Jewish statehood into tangible military assistance. If external support for Zionist military 
capacities was no longer to come from Britain, it would have to come from elsewhere. 
Ben-Gurion explained as much in discussions within his own faction at the outset of his 
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American campaign: ‘Certainly we cannot win new positions without a great deal of 
outside help; and right now there is no outside other than America. The vast amount of 
help needed to set up an army, redeem the land, settle, and maintain our position can 
only come from North America. In constituting a Jewish army, too, America will have to 
play a major role.’70 By ‘North America’ Ben-Gurion meant above all the US; but 
Canadian Zionists were indeed drawn into a continental system.
North American support for the Zionist war effort was divided between public, 
tax-deductible fundraising and a parallel system for more controversial forms of military 
assistance. Public fundraising in Canada as in the US was conducted through the 
United Palestine Appeal. In the decade from 1940 to 1950, Canadian Zionists raised 
more than eighteen million dollars for the Yishuv.71 The major portion of these funds was
channelled through the Keren Hayesod to the Jewish Agency, which in turn was able to 
pour resources into military preparations. In 1948, for example, the Jewish Agency 
programs grouped under the heading ‘National Organization and Security’ amounted to 
twenty-eight million dollars.72 In order to initiate a system for more clandestine military 
assistance, Ben-Gurion enlisted his allies in the American Zionist movement. As US 
executive director of the UPA, Henry Montor had worked closely with Ben-Gurion. In 
1945 he was tasked with bringing together a group of Zionist notables who could act 
with discretion. The classic if wholly laudatory work on this moment in Zionist history is 
Leonard Slater’s The Pledge.
The group assembled by Montor first met with Ben-Gurion in July 1945 at a New 
York residence of a wealthy US supporter named Rudolph Sonneborn. Canada would 
be integrated into this effort no less than the different regions of the US, and Sam Zacks
was there to represent the Canadian movement.73 ‘On that memorable day,’ Sonneborn 
later wrote, ‘we were asked to form ourselves into an … American arm of the 
Haganah.’74 This section of North American Zionist leadership, thereafter referred to as 
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the ‘Sonneborn Institute,’ was the nucleus of a large-scale military procurement and 
recruitment operation. Ben-Gurion dispatched Yishuv representatives to guide the 
effort. The Haganah established its North American headquarters in New York. From 
there it coordinated efforts across the US and Canada, while encouraging the 
development of a Canadian Haganah steering committee, comprising representatives 
of the Zionist leadership in Montreal and Toronto.75
The Canadian Zionist movement was in this way drawn into military preparations
for a campaign that involved the widespread expulsion of Palestinians. The practical 
relationship between developing Zionist military capacities and translating the aim of 
‘transferring’ Palestinians into a reality is relatively straightforward. To what extent the 
Canadian Zionist leadership was aware of this is an open question. On the one hand, 
Michael Berkowitz notes that Zionism’s interwar propaganda in the West had ‘tended to 
stress the evidence of Arab-Jewish cooperation, rather than using Arabs as an enemy 
to unify the fragmented movement’.76 Organizing for war against Palestinian Arabs was 
not the public rallying cry. Moreover, by World War II the horrors of Nazi antisemitism 
gave calls for Jewish self-defence immense moral force – one can lament how this was 
warped in its application to the realities of Palestine, but many Jews and others were 
rallied by it without knowing much about local conditions. On the other hand, prominent 
Canadian Zionists had contact with well-informed leaders like Dov Joseph; and the 
published record shows that at least some Western Zionist leaders were attuned to the 
prospect of expulsions. This was certainly the case in Britain, where as early as 
November 1942 a leading Zionist figure, Harry Sacher, explained that he ‘was prepared 
to proceed on the basis of compulsory transfer of – say – half a million people.’77 
Further research into Canadian knowledge and opinion on this would be required to 
credibly address the question of intent.
In any event, the military organizations in Palestine that Canadians organized to 
enforce would apply the politics of transfer systematically and with devastating effect. In
this as in most sensitive areas of Zionist policy, control was centralized under Ben-
Gurion. In 1946 Ben-Gurion assumed personal control of the Yishuv’s defence portfolio 
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and developed a well-organized military hierarchy under his command.78 By late 1947 
the essential structure of the Zionist armed forces was in place. The principal Haganah 
combat force, the Field Corps, was initially organized into six brigades: the Golani, 
Carmeli, Alexandroni, Kiryati, Giv‘ati, and Etzioni. The Palmach, a force associated 
specifically with Labour Zionism, retained distinct headquarters while operating under 
overall Haganah command. The Revisionist militias, the Etzel (Irgun) and Lehi (Stern 
Gang), operated autonomously but in recurring coordination with the Haganah. In 
November 1947, the Haganah also established an ‘Air Service,’ formally constituted as 
the Israeli Air Force in May 1948; and soon after a Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Brigade 
were subsequently to the Field Corps. It was in some of these latter units that 
Canadians factored most prominently. In June 1948 all Zionist armed forces would be 
brought under unified command with the establishment of the IDF.
It bears emphasis that by 1948, less than seven per cent of the land in Palestine 
was under Jewish ownership.79 The most important sections of the Zionist leadership 
were by this point looking to the force of arms as a means of land acquisition more 
rapid and thorough than purchase. At a February 1948 meeting of the Mapai party 
council, Ben-Gurion spelled out the new approach: ‘The war will give us the land. The 
concepts of “ours” and “not ours” are peace concepts only, and in war they lose their 
whole meaning.’80 Notably, JNF funds were themselves channeled into military 
expenditures in the Negev. In 1949 Yosef Weitz wrote that the ‘£1,500,000’ which the 
JNF itself put into the military budget for the south ‘will be found to have been one of its 
soundest and most productive investments.’81
The Revisionists launched their own international support network.82 The funds, 
weaponry, and recruits provided by the larger Western Zionist organizations went 
towards the forces directly under Ben-Gurion’s command. Perhaps the most detailed 
study of the Haganah’s Western Zionist support system, and certainly the most detailed 
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study of Canada’s part in it, is David Bercuson’s The Secret Army. Bercuson writes that 
he began the study intending to focus solely on the role of Canadian recruits in 1948 
Palestine, but broadened his research to include all Mahal recruits since Canadian 
Zionism was embedded in a broader Western Zionist effort. On the Canadian details, 
Bercuson’s work is valuable. His political approach, however, greatly decreases his 
study’s contribution to understanding of this history.
Since all history, as Croce insisted, is contemporary history, it is worth 
considering the message of Bercuson’s study in the context in which it was written. 
Bercuson’s book was framed as a polemic honouring Zionist self-reliance at a time 
when the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the extent of Reagan administration support for
Israel were making Western support for Israel the object of controversy. In June 1982, 
US secretary of state Alexander Haig inadvertently suggested the extent of US support 
for Israel. This was the first day of Israel’s campaign in Lebanon. ‘We not only lost an 
aircraft and a helicopter yesterday,’ Haig explained, ‘there is a claim that a second 
aircraft has been shot down.’83 These were Israeli aircraft; but for the leading 
spokesperson for US foreign policy, they merited the first person. And for good reason: 
at this time the US was both supplying and urging on the Israeli military, Haig having 
personally given a ‘green light’ for the invasion.84 No other state in the world was 
receiving economic and military support from a Western (or any other) power on the 
scale that Israel was receiving US aid. It is against this backdrop that Bercuson, in The 
Secret Army, provides this odd commentary: ‘the democratic and self-governing nations
of western Europe and North America have progressively abandoned Israel in their 
pursuit of Arab markets and to slake their thirst for Arab oil.’85 That criticism of Israel was
getting any hearing in the West was too much for Bercuson. Justice demanded sharp 
and unwavering Western alignment with Israel. Thus Bercuson wrote in praise of Zionist
self-reliance as well as of its product, the State of Israel, ‘a beacon to people around the
world who care about the survival of democratic institutions in an increasingly hostile 
environment.’86 Similar polemics define the study’s historical narration.
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Consider the title of the book’s opening chapter: ‘We Shall Drink Jewish Blood.’ 
The quotation marks are part of the chapter title; someone, we are lead to believe, is 
being cited. Not an individual, we learn in the text, but a group. Bercuson attributes the 
phrase to a Palestinian crowd rampaging against Jews in the aftermath of the First 
World War. The reader is thereby introduced to the Palestinian Arab presence that 
Bercuson’s ‘heroic’ recruits will reduce by the force of arms. Bercuson segues from this 
anecdote to an insistence that independent Zionist force was indispensable for ‘the re-
creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine two thousand years after the last Jewish 
state had been destroyed by the Roman Empire. It was clear almost from the start that 
this re-creation would be done against the wishes of the vast majority of the inhabitants 
of Palestine – the Arabs.’87
In this way, readers are introduced to the relevant actors in Palestine. The British
could not be relied upon to protect the Jews while the Palestinians, for their part, 
screamed ‘we shall drink Jewish blood.’ If this allegation were inverted and levelled 
against Jews, only bulletproof sourcing could save an author from being charged with 
‘blood libel’ – and on reasonable grounds. In using this inflammatory anecdote to 
introduce readers to Palestinians, one would hope that Bercuson would at least show 
concern for demonstrating its factual basis. But the sole source he cites for this account
is Yigal Allon’s Shield of David: The Story of Israel’s Armed Forces. Allon was a 
founding leader of the Palmach and a leading IDF commander during the 1948 war. 
There is every reason to read and consider his account of his combat record. Allon’s 
self-serving anecdote about enemy drepavity is, however, not backed up by a single 
citation; readers of the Shield of David are asked to accept the accuracy of this Israeli 
military commander’s history on faith.88 Bercuson, by reproducing this anecdote 
wholesale, presented as fact and prominently positioned in his study, reveals more 
about his own polemical project than about the historical details in question.  
For all of these shortcomings, however, Bercuson’s study is a valuable source. 
His interviews with Canadian Zionist activists and veterans allow him to sketch a 
detailed picture of their support for the Haganah. It is worth looking past his spirited 
polemics for these details. The US military supply organization operated by the 
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Haganah is discussed in a range of sources, and centred on an organization called 
Materials for Palestine.89 Bercuson explains that a separate set of companies was 
established in Canada, operating under the public coalition headed by Sam Zacks. The 
Canadian Zionist movement did seek to hide its military procurement and recruitment 
activities from government scrutiny. But encounters with the law were not particularly 
damaging. Bercuson notes that although Canadian authorities discovered weapons 
being prepared for shipment, no charges for illegal arms export were ever laid.90 The 
Zionist movement could from time to time even rely on cooperative officials.
At least one Canadian official, Alex Skelton, was directly involved in the arms 
smuggling. Ben-Gurion himself had for years been fixated on the importance of 
developing Haganah air power.91 Canadian supporters of the Haganah were satisfied 
when they managed to acquire some local war-surplus aircraft, but were at a loss 
concerning how to bypass Canadian and British restrictions on the export of weaponry 
to Palestine. Bercuson describes the scene at an Ottawa meeting in which Skelton, 
assistant deputy minister in the Canadian department of trade and commerce, 
brainstormed smuggling options with the Zionist Organization of Canada’s Moe Appel.
In the midst of his doodling, Skelton suddenly exclaimed: ‘I’ve got it, goddamnit.’ He looked up: 
‘Do you guys have a spring fair in Tel Aviv?’ ‘No,’ Appel said, ‘but we can create one.’ Skelton 
seemed satisfied. ‘You draw a plan. We’ll dismantle the goddamn things, put them in crates, and
send them to the Tel Aviv Spring Fair.’ Not long after, several large crates painted red, white, and 
blue and addressed to the Tel Aviv Spring Fair left Canada. In Israel the contents of the crates 
were put back together, equipped with bomb racks, and pressed into service as dive bombers.92
By mid-1948 Canadian Zionists had established a steady supply line to the Yishuv. 
Bercuson writes that the materials being sent ranged from food and clothing to 
‘machine guns, flame throwers, and thousands of Mark 19 radio sets that had been built
in Canada for Canadian and Allied use during the war.’ Legal and illegal goods were 
interspersed for shipment: ‘Only the military goods were mislabelled. “Technical 
equipment”, “wire”, “ingots”, and so on were stencilled on crates containing radios, 
radar, and other military goods. Flame throwers became “insecticide sprayers”.’93 While 
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some equipment was sent in small quantities, ‘Canadian radio sets and other radio 
equipment became the backbone of Israel’s military communications network.’94
Beyond supplies, the Haganah looked to the West for experienced military 
recruits. The issue was not numbers so much as training and specialization. In 
December 1947 Ben-Gurion issued a mobilization order to the Yishuv and locally 
imposed conscription.95 The dispatching of large numbers of recruits from the West was
neither practical nor necessary. At the level of command and military specialization, 
though, Ben-Gurion remained committed to Western tutelage. Towards the end of 1947,
Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), then head of the WZO’s political department and soon to
become Israel’s first foreign minister, was dispatched to ask the US government for 
assistance. Shertok approached assistant US secretary of state General John Hilldring, 
requesting that the US officially supply the Zionist movement with weaponry as well as 
sending ‘two or three competent American officers who would be prepared to proceed 
to Palestine and advise on defence arrangements.’96 Hilldring offered more limited 
support. He put Shertok in contact with former US army Colonel David Marcus, who 
had served under Hilldring’s command in Europe. Marcus agreed to travel to Palestine 
to work with the Haganah. He became the first officer in the Haganah to attain the rank 
of General. In May 1948, Marcus briefly assumed command of the Jerusalem front 
before falling to friendly fire.97
Soon Haganah recruitment in the West became widespread and structured. 
From Canada, it was the chair of the local Haganah steering committee,98 Ben 
Dunkelman, who would go on to become the highest-ranking officer. His father David 
Dunkelman had founded a significant textiles company, Tip Top Tailors, and buoyed by 
the family’s wealth, both David and his wife Rose were leading figures in Ontario 
Zionism. Ben Dunkelman had briefly settled in Palestine in the early 1930s before 
returning to Canada and then enlisting to fight in World War II. In the course of the war, 
he received intensive officer’s combat training in Britain for the use of artillery. His family
name and his combat record in Europe guaranteed him a certain prominence. In 
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December 1944, the Toronto Daily Star referred to him as ‘Mr. Mortar of the Canadian 
Army’.99 He was well placed to anchor recruitment for the Haganah. He wrote that he 
was first approached to contribute to the Zionist war effort by Lady Lorna Wingate, the 
widow of ‘the legendary Major-General.’100
Dunkelman initially understood his task to be the recruitment of one thousand 
Canadian veterans, but his final instructions were scaled down to a more realistic three 
hundred. This recruitment was not exactly illegal in Canada. Nor, on the other hand, 
could it be conducted publicly. Bercuson details the ‘off-the-books’ fundraising that was 
undertaken to send, equip, and pay these recruits, in a quiet effort supplementing the 
legal work of the United Palestine Appeal. Canadian fundraising for the country’s Mahal 
recruits brought in $300,000 from Montreal, $100,000 from Toronto, and $175,000 from 
smaller Canadian cities.101 
The fact that the record of Canadian recruitment for the Haganah has not been 
the subject of much critical commentary should not be taken to suggest that it was 
scrupulously secretive. One of the recruits was Canada’s most celebrated fighter pilot, 
George F. Beurling, and his recruitment was openly reported by the press. A newspaper
article cited a Haganah source as indicating that Beurling was to be paid two hundred 
dollars per month.102 The Canadian government became well aware that, in the words 
of external affairs minister Louis Saint-Laurent, ‘Canadian citizens in considerable 
numbers are, in fact, leaving Canada to join the Jewish forces.’103 The Canadian recruits
began arriving in Palestine in April, and came in greater numbers over the summer.
Weaponry came in parallel by way of Zatec, Czechoslovakia, where a largely 
American group of volunteers operated a Haganah supply hub under the supervision of 
Czech authorities, an interesting episode in the early Cold War.104 The first major 
shipment arrived on the night of April 4. As the shipment arrived, an assault force three 
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times larger than any used in previous Haganah operations was assembled.105 The 
following day, the Haganah command initiated Operation Nachshon.
This inaugurated a new wave of Haganah offensives, amidst which the first 
Canadian recruits began arriving in Palestine.
‘The Question of Expulsion’
Canadian historians like Bercuson do not bother to engage with Palestinian 
political or academic claims. Concerning the Galilee, for example, Nafez Nazzal’s 1978 
study asserted a direct connection between declared Zionist aims of transfer and the 
operations detailed by the testimony of Palestinian refugees. He concluded that the 
mass displacement of Palestinians was a result of ‘conscious and wilful Zionist 
policy.’106 ‘In practice,’ Nazzal wrote, ‘this involved an organized campaign of exemplary 
terror; the spreading of rumours and psychological warfare; lethal attacks on the civilian
population of Galilee, sieges of the larger towns, and the physical expulsion of large 
numbers of people after the military occupation of their towns and villages.’107 These 
conclusions bear directly on the record of Mahal recruits. The Seventh Brigade, which 
Nazzal identifies as the ‘Anglo-Saxon Brigade,’ had an especially large concentration of 
English-speaking recruits from the West, and was one of the principal units involved in 
the expulsions described by Nazzal. Bercuson, for his part, all but skips over the record 
of atrocities in his otherwise detailed account of how ‘Seventh Brigade successes 
literally filled out the map of north-central Israel.’108 There are various angles from which
to reconsider this record.
A more sophisticated Zionist approach than blanket denial is provided by Anita 
Shapira in the article ‘Hirbet Hizah: Between Remembrance and Forgetting.’ Shapira 
uses a classic work of Israeli fiction, written by S. Yizhar, first published in Hebrew in 
1949, and now translated into English as Khirbet Khizeh, to downplay the novelty of 
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scholarship concerning the expulsion of Palestinians.109 For Shapira, it is impossible to 
avoid the fact that the expulsion of Palestinians was widespread. It is accordingly 
important to avoid a rigid approach to denial that would imply that ‘if it is acknowledged 
that the Arabs were evicted during the War of Independence, this means that Zionism 
as a whole, from its very inception, is illegitimate.’110 Shapira does not entirely abandon 
discredited denials. In favourably citing Moshe Carmel, for example, under whose 
overall command the Seventh Brigade and other units in the Upper Galilee operated, 
she asserts that ‘the northern area under his command did not pursue a policy of 
expelling Arabs’.111 In fact, in 1998 the Israeli government declassified a specific order 
from Carmel to Dunkelman and other Brigade commanders to expel the Palestinian 
population of conquered areas, orders whose execution is well documented.112 At the 
same time, Shapira provides an erudite review of the Hebrew-language literature to 
demonstrate that Israeli discussion of the expulsions began almost immediately. 
Contemporary controversy over 1948, she suggests, is therefore neither new nor 
ground-breaking: ‘a society, like Israel’s, that has included “The Story of Hirbet Hizah” in
its high school syllabi for several decades cannot be accused of trying to jettison and 
submerge the traumas of 1948 – at least, not on the level of conscious recognition.’113
The kernel of truth in Shapira’s argumentation – that S. Yizhar’s story did indeed 
engage with the ‘question of expulsion’ well before Israeli scholarship did, and that it 
remains a useful historical document – is buried in a good deal of dubious polemic. 
This, for example, is how she explains the story’s treatment of themes that Zionist 
academics would not touch for decades: ‘the archives were still sealed, and aside from 
general statements by eyewitnesses, members of the generation of 1948, it is doubtful 
whether historians could have contributed anything substantial. In this sense, 
imaginative literature had one up on professional historians.’114 This is an interesting 
argument. It uses a fixation on Israel’s official archives, the declassified evidence from 
109 See S. Yizhar, trans. Nicholas de Lange and Yaacob Dweck, Khirbet Khizeh (Jerusalem: Ibbis 
Editions, 2008).
110 Shapira, ‘Hirbet Hizah,’ 39.
111 Shapira, ‘Hirbet Hizah,’ 43.
112 See Benny Morris, ‘Operation Hiram Revisited,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999), 
68-76.
113 Nazzal, Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 55. 
114 Shapira, ‘Hirbet Hizah,’ 47. 
105
Canadian Zionism and the War of 1948
which Shapira now ignores or denies, as a means of brushing aside the earlier efforts of
Palestinians and other researchers working with available sources. Still the kernel 
remains. One need not accept Shapira’s baggage in order to agree that Zionist works of
historical fiction can be useful reference points in the study of 1948 Palestine.
For its part, S. Yizhar’s Khirbet Khizeh explores the destruction of a fictionalized 
Palestinian village through the eyes of a conflicted participant in the operation. Through 
its narrator, the story provides commentary on expulsions more frank than anything that
could be found for many years in the Israeli non-fiction record.
Why hadn’t I realized it from the outset? Our very own Khirbet Khizeh. Questions of housing, and 
problems of absorption. And hooray, we’d house and absorb – and how! We’d open a 
cooperative store, establish a school, maybe even a synagogue. There would be political parties 
here. They’d debate all sorts of things. They would plow fields, and sow, and reap, and do great 
things. Long live Hebrew Khizeh! Who, then, would ever imagine that once there had been some 
Khirbet Khizeh that we emptied out and took for ourselves. We came, we shot, we burned; we 
blew up, expelled, drove off, and sent into exile.
What in God’s name were we doing in this place!115
The misgivings of participants in the expulsion of Palestinians were less studiously 
repressed in the realm of historical fiction than in professional scholarship, in Israel or in
the West. This also applies to the record of Mahal recruits. 
Lester Gorn was no S. Yizhar. A US recruit to the Haganah, Gorn, like Yizhar, 
was attached to the Haganah’s Giv‘ati Brigade. Unlike Yizhar, he was neither a political 
nor a literary giant. His book concerning the Mahal experience, The Anglo-Saxons: A 
Novel of Israel’s War of Independence, is nonetheless an interesting text. The title itself 
provides another reminder that while many of the recruits from countries like Canada 
identified as Jews in the West, in the Middle East, they were as often identified as 
Western recruits. A text like this is not especially useful as a stand-alone source. The 
actual details of Canadian participation in the expulsion of Palestinians are more 
credibly established by reviewing two kinds of non-fiction literature alongside one 
another: the laudatory Zionist accounts of where and in which units Canadians fought; 
and the studies of expulsions in these areas and by these units, produced by 
researchers interviewing Palestinian refugees and working in the Israeli archives. But 
for all its limitations, The Anglo-Saxons provides some telling commentary.
115 Yizhar, Khirbet Khizeh, 108.
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Gorn tends to use fictional names for people while retaining original names for 
places. His writing frequently lines up with the historical record. The foreign recruits that
the narrator describes are thus mostly interspersed throughout different Zionist units, 
with one predominantly ‘Anglo-Saxon’ unit, ‘the best-clothed, best-equipped unit in 
Israel,’ fighting under the command of a recruit from Canada.116 The unit approximating 
this description was of course the Seventh Brigade, under Dunkelman’s command 
through the summer and autumn of 1948. The Seventh Brigade operated in the north 
during this period, expelling Palestinians into Lebanon (‘Anglo-Saxon knowhow was 
needed most on the northern front,’ asserts one of Gorn’s characters)117; Gorn’s Giv‘ati 
Brigade was active further south – where engagement with the Egyptian army spurs no 
end of commentary in the novel about ‘the gyppos.’ But Gorn’s recurring focus on this 
external enemy does not entirely bury the place of the Palestinians. For example, the 
narrator accurately cites by name a Palestinian village in the Gaza district that the 
Giv‘ati Brigade occupied and destroyed: ‘The inhabitants of Hatta had fled Jewish guns 
and the terrifying rumour of a Jewish atom bomb.’118 And aside from Gorn’s nuclear 
flourish, the fate of Hatta is not depicted as in the least bit exceptional. For a North 
American author the following parallel naturally emerges: ‘The Indians of pioneer 
America and the Arabs of pioneering Israel: a native people being driven from their 
country by a tide of men and guns and determination and what Aaron used to call the 
dynamics of history.’119 Gorn even presents readers with persistent arguments from 
veteran Haganah soldiers that Arab civilians are to be treated as enemy targets.120 
Gorn’s historical fiction about the Mahal allows for contradictory commentary 
voiced by different characters and in this way incorporates more critical reflection about 
the expulsions than the non-fiction record produced by the likes of Dunkelman and 
Bercuson. Bercuson’s account of the Canadian and broader Mahal record is in a certain
sense the most detailed study on record. But he sets the stage for the arrival of these 
recruits in the spring of 1948 with recourse to the orthodox Zionist narrative: Palestinian
villages were occupied in a defensive manoeuvre against impending Arab attack, with 
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Jewish pleas for Arab civilians to stay overshadowing Haganah expulsions.121 It remains
to combine the celebratory accounts of Mahal combat with the reality of expulsions in 
1948 Palestine.
This reality is explored in detail in Israeli dissident Ilan Pappé’s The Ethnic 
Cleansing of Palestine, as in the work of a wide range of Palestinian scholars from 
Walid Khalidi to Rosemary Sayigh. Outright denial of the mass expulsion of Palestinians
by Zionist forces is not a credible position by any honest intellectual standard. Denial 
can only be sheltered by an ‘edifice of deceit,’ as one researcher observed, that has 
stood not on any grounded controversy over the historical record but through a 
concerted effort ‘to prop it up,’ undertaken by propagandists operating ‘with all the 
perversity of flat-earthers but none of their innocent eccentricity.’122 There are, however, 
some plausible disputes over research methodology.
For some historians, an encompassing focus on official documents is the only 
basis for credible research. Israeli historian Benny Morris has produced the best-known 
work in this tradition – work that deserves attention despite the author’s expression of 
extreme hostility towards the Palestinians since 2004 (e.g., ‘Something like a cage 
needs to be built for them’).123 National hostility of the sort that Morris has expressed 
rarely leaves a person’s research unaffected. And over the past decade Morris has 
moved to align his scholarship with a more aggressive intellectual patriotism. His 
studies beginning with The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 
nonetheless remain the main academic reference point for research about the 
expulsions fixated on declassified documentation. They reveal much about both the 
official documentary record and the limits of exclusive reliance upon it.
The year that Nazzal published his The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948, 
Isael began declassifying documents concerning the 1948 war (pursuant to the thirty-
year rule), permitting access to researchers and providing the basis for Morris’s later 
work on the topic. Morris challenged Israel’s established diplomatic mythology. But he 
was loathe to look beyond the declassified archives. Consider the implications for the 
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study of Operation Hiram, during which Dunkelman’s Seventh Brigade and other units 
under Moshe Carmel’s command pushed tens of thousands of Palestinians into 
Lebanon. Contradicting Nazzal, Morris claimed in the 1987 edition of Birth that 
expulsions were not ordered from above. Official Israeli sources available to that date 
suggested that the process was ‘haphazard.’ Accordingly, so did Morris. In 1998, Israel 
declassified Moshe Carmel’s expulsion order, sent to all units operating on the northern 
front. And so in Morris corrected himself – on the order for these expulsions. But 
significantly, he suggested that archival conditions were still not ripe for judgement of 
the record of atrocities in 1948 Palestine as a whole: ‘adequate treatment of that subject
will have to wait until IDFA [the Israel Defence Forces Archives] declassify all the 
relevant documents (at present, IDFA keeps classified almost all documents relating to 
IDF expulsions or massacres of Arab civilians or prisoners of war, from 1948 on).’124   
For Palestinians, awaiting the pace of Israeli declassification to address 
questions of history that are inseparable from contemporary political struggle has never 
been an option. Moreover, researchers like Nazzal and Sayigh have led by example in 
showing the possible strength of research based on Palestinian oral sources.125 Saleh 
Abdel Jawad argues that incorporation of oral history is an essential matter of political 
and intellectual principle. These questions of methodology concern both what 
Palestinian experiences are represented in print and the analysis of Zionist policy itself. 
In 2004 Morris, even as he turned towards harsh public rhetoric against the 
Palestinians, went some way towards incorporating critiques of his earlier work, giving 
more attention to the politics of transfer in an updated volume of Birth. Ilan Pappé, 
rupturing with Israeli political and academic norms, combines Palestinian oral with 
archival history. Pappé also joins Nazzal, Walid Khalidi, and Nur Masalha in describing 
the expulsions of 1948 as the outcome of the Zionist leadership’s objective of cleansing 
Palestine of Palestinians in order to pave the way for a Jewish state.
However one balances sources, the availability of declassified Haganah 
documents explicitly calling for the expulsion of Palestinians is now a compelling fact. 
The Haganah plans for how Zionist units would conduct themselves once British forces 
124 Benny Morris, ‘Operation Hiram,’ 75.
125 See, for example, Nazzal, Palestinian Exodus from Galilee; and Rosemary Sayigh, ‘Women’s Nakba 
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relinquished control of Palestine are especially notable. The first Haganah plan for this 
eventuality (Plan Avnir) dates to 1937.126 The operative plan as Canadian recruits 
arrived was Plan Dalet (Plan D), finalized in March 1948 and put into practice beginning
in April. Military rule was to be imposed on Palestinian communities within territory 
occupied for the Jewish state. ‘In the event of resistance,’ the document states, ‘the 
armed force must be destroyed and the population must be expelled outside the 
borders of the state.’ The text of Plan Dalet also explicitly outlines means of giving such 
expulsion the air of permanence, including ‘[d]estruction of villages (setting fire to, 
blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centres which
are difficult to control continuously.’127 In the early months of 1948, British forces in 
Palestine gradually relinquished their authority in preparation for the announced end of 
the mandate on 15 May. In April, as the Haganah put Plan Dalet into effect, expulsion of
the Palestinians became systematic across the country. This set the context in which 
Canadian recruits began to arrive. 
Early Canadian Participation in Transfer Operations
The diplomatic cover for the Zionist movement’s seizure of Palestinian territory 
was in part provided by a United Nations resolution passed in November 1947, 
recommending the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. The UN 
partition plan and the Canadian government’s role in its adoption are discussed in 
Chapter 3. The political effect of this resolution was to bestow a semblance of 
international legitimacy upon Zionist war aims. In practice Ben-Gurion’s leadership 
exploited the circumstances to undertake a policy more extreme than any of the 
international partition schemes approved by friendly states.
Two striking differences between Ben-Gurion’s war aims and the partition 
recommendations concern control of Jerusalem and the place of Palestinians in Zionist-
held territory. In none of the partition plans discussed in 1946-7 was Jerusalem slated 
126 Walid Khalidi, ‘Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,’ in ed. Ilan Pappé, The Israel/Palestine 
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for inclusion in the Jewish state.128 The UN partition plan of November 1947, for 
example, Resolution 181, recommended that Jerusalem be governed separately from 
the proposed Jewish and Arab states, under a form of international administration. On 
the second issue, population transfer was surely not authorized. It was generally 
understood that the Zionist leadership would wish to build up Jewish demographic 
predominance in areas under its control. But the idea, however skewed, was that this 
would be accomplished by Zionist authority over immigration policy, not by the 
expulsion of the Palestinian population.
In the actual implementation of Plan Dalet, the Zionist leadership’s commitment 
to incorporating as much of Jerusalem as possible into the Jewish state immediately 
converged with the policy of transfer. The elements came together in the first offensive 
launched under the plan, Operation Nachshon. The aim of the attack was to connect 
the Yishuv’s coastal strongholds with the Jewish sector of Jerusalem, which, 
incidentally, was then governed on behalf of the Jewish Agency by Montreal’s Dov 
Joseph. Widespread ethnic cleansing defined the effort. 
One of the most valuable records of the 1948 catastrophe is a large and 
meticulous volume entitled All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and 
Depopulated by Israel in 1948. A collective research project anchored by Walid Khalidi, 
All That Remains reviews the record of destruction from district to district, from village to
village. The district map for Jerusalem shows the implications of the Zionist push to 
clear the path from the Yishuv’s main centres on the central Palestinian coast through 
to Jerusalem. Thirty-eight Palestinian villages towards the west of the Jerusalem district
would be emptied by the Zionist advance.129 Yigal Allon suggests that the Zionist 
leadership was seeking only to loosen ‘the Arab noose choking the city.’130 On 5 April, 
aiming at a Palestinian presence which Allon likened to suffocation, the Haganah 
launched Operation Nachshon.
In mid-March, the first recruits to have left Canada had met at one of the 
Haganah’s main bases in Europe, Grand Arénas, just north of Marseilles, before 
continuing on to Palestine. Most of them had come by sea to Le Havre. Dunkelman flew
128 For maps of the Jewish Agency proposal endorsed by US president Harry Truman in 1946 and by the 
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from Toronto. After a brief meeting the Canadians again parted ways, the greater 
number of them remaining in France for Hebrew lessons and Zionist political education,
while Dunkelman travelled to Haifa with false British identification.131 The reception of 
these early recruits suggests the two main ways in which Mahal personnel were 
incorporated into Zionist operations: many, like Dunkelman, were posted as individuals 
to units where it seemed their experience would be useful; and others, like the rest of 
the Canadians at Grand Arénas, remained grouped together in clusters.
Dunkelman arrived in Palestine in early April. From the organizational periphery 
of units carrying out Operation Nachshon, he observed their use of artillery. He was a 
critical admirer of the mortars that the Haganah had developed. One element of the 
Haganah’s arsenal that made an impression on Dunkelman was the ‘Davidka,’ an 
artillery piece that lobbed inaccurate, notoriously loud 40-kilo shells full of shrapnel. 
‘The Davidka was one of the wonders of the 1948 war,’ writes Dunkelman. ‘Although its 
range was short and it did not always cause any real damage, it made an enormously 
loud explosion, and its psychological effect on the Arabs was incalculable.’132 He hoped 
to put his own artillery expertise to use. After a period of service with the Palmach’s 
Harel Brigade, Dunkelman approached Ben-Gurion with a proposal to introduce new 
equipment and techniques through a specialized artillery unit. In his autobiography he 
insists that Ben-Gurion gave him ‘full and complete authority over all phases of the 
operation: production, distribution, and training of crews.’133 Ben-Gurion confirms that he
authorized Dunkelman ‘to deal with the production of 6-inch mortars.’134
Dunkelman also claims to have made a mark in his work with the Harel Brigade, 
helping to plan an attack on the village of Bayt Mahsir. The effort to capture Bayt Mahsir
was part of the campaign, initiated with Operation Nachshon, to establish a ‘Jerusalem 
corridor’ cleared of Palestinian villages and Arab irregulars. Located in the hills south of 
the main road to Jerusalem, the village was home to approximately two thousand 
people. In the second week of May the Harel Brigade set out to remove this perceived 
threat to control of the road. Dunkelman writes that he proposed an overnight assault to
be launched in the early hours of 11 May. ‘Before first light,’ he writes, ‘the Davidka 
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opened up on the village, making the usual ear-splitting bang, and the assault force 
went in. The Davidka had done its morale-shattering work well; our troops met 
practically no opposition.’135 Pappé cites the Harel Brigade report to the Haganah’s chief
of operations, sent hours after Bayt Mahsir was taken: ‘we are currently blowing up the 
houses. We have already blown up 60-70 houses.’136 The entire village was soon 
destroyed.
The other Canadians that Dunkelman had met with in France were grouped 
together under the leadership of Lionel Druker, a Canadian recruit from Halifax. The 
dispersal of recruits tends to subsume their record within the broader record of the 
Zionist militias. Where clusters of recruits stayed together, it is easier to trace their 
involvement. More significant cases arise in the summer and autumn of 1948, when the
clusters of Mahal recruits grew. But these early cases also deserve attention. The 
Canadians grouped around Druker were on 3 May posted to the Giv‘ati Brigade, where 
they soon constituted approximately half a company in the 52nd Battalion.137 The day 
after the Canadian recruits arrived, their Brigade launched an attack on the village of 
`Aqir, an attack which according to the New York Times resulted in the flight of three 
thousand Palestinians.138 
The Giv‘ati Brigade occupies a prominent place in the Haganah’s turn towards 
systematic ethnic cleansing. This was the brigade that anchored Operation Nachshon. 
It was also the brigade to which the Israeli writer S. Yizhar was attached as an 
intelligence officer. Here it is instructive to sample from Yizhar’s literary work. Consider 
the following passage from his 1992 novel Mikdamot (Preliminaries). Yizhar grew up in 
Palestine, and this novel projects knowledge of what would happen in 1948 onto 
recollections of the past. In so doing it ascribes to a Jewish child in mandatory Palestine
the premonition that Palestinian communities would be cleansed from their lands – that,
in the narrator’s words, ‘these Arabs will not remain, the men and the women, and that 
Zarnuga will not remain and Qubeibeh will not remain and Yibne will not remain, they 
will all go away and start to live in Gaza, woe for them … ’.139 In these lines the 
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expulsions of 1948 are represented more specifically than in the case of Yizhar’s 
fictionalized village of Khirbet Hizeh. All three villages he cites were Palestinian 
communities destroyed by the Giv‘ati Brigade in May and June of 1948. Yizhar’s words 
have a clear contemporary resonance; it was for good reason that Gabriel Piterberg 
read these lines in a March 2009 symposium reflecting on the previous winter’s Israeli 
assault on the Gaza Strip.140 It was this destruction to which Lionel Druker’s ‘Canadian 
platoon’ contributed.
On 9 May the Giv‘ati Brigade launched the offensive that would destroy Zarnuqa,
al-Qubayba, and Yibna (Operation Barak).141 Morris writes that the Brigade’s 
commander, Shim’on Avidan, ‘wanted only empty villages,’ and ethnic cleansing by the 
forces under his command is well established.142 Eqbal Ahmad once remarked that 
those colonial advances that go smoothly often receive the least attention. Colonial 
campaigns are impossible to forget, suggests Ahmad, ‘only when resistance has a 
semblance of costing, of exacting a price. When a Custer is killed or a Gordon is 
besieged. That’s when you know there were Indians fighting, Arabs fighting and 
dying.’143 In the Canadian intellectual record this dynamic is surely at work. Thus we 
know from Bercuson that Canadian recruits in the 52nd Battalion helped spearhead the 
occupation and depopulation of the village of Bashshit. We have a very detailed 
account of this, since there they are said to have come under heavy fire; one of the 
Canadian recruits lost a leg to wounds suffered in the course of this attack.144 The 
conduct of these recruits in less costly Giv‘ati Brigade conquests is not so well 
represented in print.
Further research into international participation in expulsions and other atrocities 
in 1948 Palestine is required, and not to satisfy the requirements of disinterested 
curiosity or morbid accuracy. The legacy of 1948 and its political distortion are not only 
historical problems. They bear directly on the present. As Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad 
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(Cambridge: MIT/Harvard Gaza Symposium), <http://video.mit.edu/watch/mitharvard-gaza-symposium-
panel-1-4077>.
141 Khalidi, All That Remains, 408, 421-25.
142 As cited in Khalidi, All That Remains, 408.
143 Eqbal Ahmad, eds. Carollee Bengelsoorf et al., The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 260.
144 Bercuson, Secret Army, 102-6.
114
Canadian Zionism and the War of 1948
Sa’di argue, ‘the Nakba is not over yet; after almost sixty years neither the Palestinians 
nor Israelis have yet achieved a state of normality; the violence and uprooting of 
Palestinians continues.’145 The intellectual justification of past atrocities – in the 
Canadian case, through disciplined omission – worsens their reverberation into the 
present. Abu-Lughod and Sa’di suggest that historical distortion undercuts the basis for 
contemporary political sympathy. ‘How many people in the West know why Palestinians 
feel such different emotions from Israelis on their “Independence Day” on 15 May? Why
they continue to struggle, sometimes violently?’146 
The date of 15 May 1948 is heavy with symbolism. On this date the British 
mandate over Palestine formally ended and, with Zionist militias moving to seize much 
of the country, neighbouring Arab states deployed expeditionary forces into Palestine. 
This was the beginning of what is conventionally understood as the Arab-Israeli war of 
1948. It lasted from the end of the mandate through to 1949, when Israel and the Arab 
states signed the series of armistice agreements that delineated Israel’s de facto 
borders until 1967. The symbolic significance of 15 May is undeniable. But focus on the 
ensuing conflict between state forces has often been used to bury the history of the war
against the Palestinians. Therefore, as the Palestinian scholar Sadrine Mansour-Mérien
insists, it is important to stress that this date marked the beginning of inter-state warfare
– not of the expulsions. These two realities existed in parallel. Mansour-Mérien 
emphasizes this by means of an especially broad periodization of the Nakba proper. 
She argues that the 1948 wave of transfer formed part of a phase of Zionist operations 
that should be dated from the immediate aftermath of the UN partition vote, in 
December 1947, up to the Qibya massacre of October 1953.147 Without framing the 
time-line quite so broadly, Pappé argues along similar lines: ‘There had been ethnic 
cleansing on the day before 15 May 1948, and the same ethnic cleansing operations 
took place the day after. Israel had enough troops both to handle the Arab armies and 
to continue cleansing the land.’148
145 Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, Nakba, 10. 
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On 11 June 1948, after less than a month of regular military engagements that 
did little to slow the dispossession of the Palestinians, the first truce between Israel and 
the Arab states went into effect. It lasted until 8 July. Despite an official arms embargo, 
Israel’s military procurement networks poured weaponry and recruits into Palestine 
throughout the truce. The units of the newly-established IDF were considerably 
enforced. Aerial units were equipped with advanced fighter planes and heavy bombers, 
and joined by a further influx of experienced air crew from the English-speaking West. 
Bercuson’s conclusion is corroborated by most military histories of air power in 1948 
Palestine: ‘The volunteers did not aid the Israeli Air Force; they were the Israeli Air 
Force.’149 The IDF’s armoured corps, too, was expanded. A new unit was established, 
the Eighth (Armoured) Brigade, and the Seventh Brigade was enforced with heavier 
equipment. In these units increasingly large clusters of Canadian recruits were grouped 
together. Their role in subsequent cleansing operations is an important chapter in 
Canadian Zionist history.
Identifying Canadian Responsibility for Atrocities
The Israeli Air Force was not entirely staffed by Mahal recruits. These did, 
however, predominate. Among the aircrew that served in the IAF of 1948, more than 
two thirds were Mahalniks.150 Lon Nordeen summarizes a consensus in the literature: 
‘Volunteers from the United States, Canada, South Africa, Great Britain and other 
countries … formed the backbone of the air force during the War of Independence.’151 
The celebratory record of Mahal combat is full of anecdotes of Canadian participation in
aerial operations throughout Palestine and beyond.
Months before the end of the British mandate, the IAF, known until late May 1948
as the Sherut Avir (‘air service’), was already flying missions in coordination with 
Haganah ground forces. Zionist military historiography makes much of the improvised 
nature of Sherut Avir equipment. In a book on Israeli air power whose title, Israel’s Best 
Defence, pays homage to the politics of force, the IAF veteran and rightist Israeli 
149 Bercuson, Secret Army, 230.
150 Norton, Air War on the Edge, 12-13.
151 Nordeen, Fighters over Israel, 14.
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politician Eliezer Cohen stresses the ingenuity of the Sherut Avir’s early hand-thrown 
explosives. Its first locally-made bomb, ‘Model 1,’ was deployed beginning in March. ‘An
elongated cast-iron box filled with a mixture of explosives, screws, and pieces of metal, 
this type of device had a tail strengthened by two poles to assure a vertical fall.’152 World
War II had set standards that such equipment did not meet. But in a less partisan 
history of air power in Palestine than Cohen’s, Brian Cull and Shlomo Aloni point out the
obvious: until 15 May Arab Palestine was without any air defences. Under-armed 
Palestinian militias faced constant attacks from the Sherut Avir with no prospect of air 
support unless the Arab states intervened. ‘They also saw RAF aircraft sharing the 
same skies with their enemies, further fuelling a Palestinian belief that the British were 
acting in collusion with the Zionist settlers.’153
When the Arab states intervened after 15 May, Israeli forces briefly lost their 
aerial advantage. The Royal Egyptian Air Force brought down a number of the Sherut 
Avir’s improvised bombers, and Israeli bombers were for a time forced to operate only 
at night.154 Egypt even deployed improvised bombers of its own. On 18 May an 
Egyptian bomber struck the central bus station in Tel Aviv, killing an estimated forty-two 
people.155 But the influx of weaponry and personnel soon restored Israeli aerial 
superiority. By the end of May, the IAF was in a position to bomb not only Palestinian 
population centres (e.g. Isdud, Lydda, Ramla, and Ramallah) and Arab state forces in 
Palestine, but also the Jordanian capital of Amman; on the eve of the first truce, 10-11 
June, IAF bombers dropped two tons of explosives on Damascus.156 The IAF naturally 
became active in regular military engagements. But it also participated in the parallel 
process of ethnic cleansing. Abdel Jawad finds that beginning in July, the IAF was one 
of Israel’s ‘deadliest’ means of population transfer.157
It is difficult to establish verifiable links between Palestinian casualties and 
particular operations involving Canadian aircrew. In his Age of Extremes, Eric 
Hobsbawm remarks upon the twentieth-century onset of a ‘new impersonality of 
152 Eliezer Cohen, trans. Jonathan Cordis, Israel’s Best Defence: The First Full Story of the Israeli Air 
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warfare, which turned killing and maiming into the remote consequences of pushing a 
button or moving a lever. Technology made its victims invisible, as people eviscerated 
by bayonets, or seen through the sights of firearms could not be.’158 The Zionist armed 
forces were not without their firearms nor even, as we will see, their bayonets. But the 
impact of aerial massacres cannot be brushed aside simply because those responsible 
kept some distance from those targeted. Suffice it here to highlight the connection 
between the IAF record and the dispossession of the Palestinians. The IAF was most 
active in the southwest, especially during Operation Yoav, which hammered the Gaza 
Strip into more or less its current dimensions.159 Various Palestinian communities that 
were ultimately conquered (e.g. Majdal) were in large part depopulated by aerial 
(alongside naval) attacks.160 It was partly owing to the IAF, and the 151 tons of 
explosives that it dropped during Operation Yoav, that the population of the Gaza Strip 
tripled in the face of Israeli advances.161 The IAF was also deployed with lesser intensity
throughout the country. As we will see, this included the Galilee, where Palestinian 
communities had no air defences of any kind.
The other branch of the Israeli armed forces in which Mahal recruits were heavily
clustered was the armoured corps. The new armoured unit established during the first 
truce, the Eighth Brigade, consisted of one tank battalion and one commando battalion 
(the 82nd and 89th, respectively). One of the 82nd Battalion’s two companies was 
known as the ‘English company,’ and was staffed mostly by recruits from Canada, 
Britain, and South Africa.162 Then there was the Seventh Brigade, established earlier in 
the year and now enforced with heavier equipment. This was the unit in which 
Canadian recruits were most prominent. In June Ben-Gurion gave command of this unit
to Dunkelman. During the summer, it included an estimated 170 English-speaking 
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Mahal personnel, a number that grew to approximately 300 in the fall.163 These were 
most concentrated in the brigade’s 72nd Battalion. Command of its 79th Battalion, 
meanwhile, was in the hands of the Canadian veteran Joe Weiner.164 The Seventh is 
the unit which Nafez Nazzal refers to as the ‘Anglo-Saxon Brigade.’ It occupies a 
prominent place in Israeli military history. IDF officer turned military historian David 
Eshel remarks that it ‘was to become the IDF’s foremost armoured formation in later 
wars.’165 
A week and a half after the collapse of the first truce, a second truce between 
Israel and the Arab states went into effect. As already emphasized, ethnic cleansing 
continued during the truces. But the fiercest cleansing operations were undertaken in 
conjunction with open warfare, as the IDF brought additional territory under Israeli 
control. Thus the first major offensives involving the Eighth Brigade and the reinforced 
Seventh were carried out in the period between the first and the second truce. This 
phase of the war, from 9-18 July, is known in Israeli historiography as ‘the Ten Days.’ It 
witnessed rapid Israeli advances extending well beyond the boundaries of the Jewish 
state recommended by the UN partition resolution. The Eighth Brigade was deployed in 
the centre of the country, in what the IDF called Operation Dani. The Seventh was 
deployed in the north, in Operation Dekel.
Operation Dani hammered the emerging boundary of the West Bank inland from 
the coast, targeting the Palestinian towns of Lydda and Ramla, and many villages in 
their vicinity, with expulsion to the east. The Eighth Brigade was attached to a large 
composite force assembled for the operation under the command of Yigal Allon. It 
formed part of the northern arm of a pincer movement aimed at encircling Lydda and 
Ramla, severing them from the West Bank and bringing their territory under Israeli 
control. The 82nd Tank Battalion, with its ‘English company,’ was supposed to lead the 
way. As it happened, Moshe Dayan’s 89th Commando Battalion made quicker progress.
On 11 July the 89th punched through Lydda’s defences to carry out one of the most 
infamous raids of the 1948 war.166 By 12 July both Lydda and Ramla were under IDF 
control. The inhabitants of both towns were expelled eastward, and columns of tens of 
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thousands of refugees made their way into the West Bank. The historian ‘Arif al-‘Arif 
estimates that 350 died from heat and thirst during the forced march.167 The worst 
atrocities of this campaign were carried out by the 89th Battalion. But the 82nd played a
role, including in the occupation of the villages of Dayr Tarif and Barfiliya, and in the 
destruction of al-Tira and ‘Inabba.168 It was then instructed by Yitzhak Rabin to block the
return of any villagers from the West Bank, including by means of live fire.169 
Dunkelman’s Seventh Brigade, meanwhile, operated in the north, on the front 
commanded by Moshe Carmel. It is an irony of 1948 historiography that Dunkelman is 
identified less with the ethnic cleansing of Palestinian villages and more with his 
hesitation in destroying one Palestinian centre in particular, Nazareth. Through to the 
end of his participation in the 1948 war, Dunkelman was uncomfortable with the 
expulsion of Christians.170 Even Jabotinsky had made distinctions. ‘The Islamic soul 
must be broomed out of Eretz-Yisrael,’ the founding Revisionist leader had declared.171 
What of the Palestinian Christians? During Operation Dekel, Dunkelman had to grapple 
with the Palestinian Christian question in one of its more dramatic settings. His Seventh
Brigade was the main force tasked with capturing Nazareth. On 16 July Nazareth fell, 
and Dunkelman became the town’s military governor. But for this Canadian brigade 
commander, Nazareth was not only a Palestinian town; it was also ‘one of the most 
sanctified shrines of the Christian world.’172 A tense exchange resulted. Dunkelman was 
issued an order ‘to uproot all the inhabitants at Nazareth’ – there is some dispute as to 
whether this came from Moshe Carmel, commander of the northern front, or Haim 
Laskov, officer commanding for Operation Dekel.173 In any case, Dunkelman hesitated, 
fearing ‘severe international repercussions.’174 Laskov appealed to the IDF general staff 
for a ruling: ‘Tell me immediately, urgently, whether to expel the inhabitants from the city
167 Spiro Munayyer, with an introduction by Walid Khalidi, ‘The Fall of Lydda,’ Journal of Palestine Studies
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of Nazareth. In my view all, save for clerics, should be expelled.’175 Ben-Gurion decided 
against expulsion.
This is an interesting counterpoint to the practice of expulsion. But it should not 
overshadow the broader record established by Dunkelman and his Anglo-Saxon 
Brigade. This was not an especially moderate unit. To the contrary, Palestinian oral 
history and declassified Israeli archives align in attributing to this unit some of the worst 
atrocities of the 1948 war. The most large-scale Seventh Brigade killings came in late 
October. But even sticking for the moment to the Ten Days, the sparing of Nazareth was
not representative of Operation Dekel as a whole. Consider the case of Kuwaykat. A 
village of more than one thousand people, Kuwaykat was occupied in an overnight 
assault on 9-10 July by Seventh Brigade units supported by the Carmeli Brigade’s 21st 
Battalion. Nazzal records Hassan Ahmad `Abdullatif’s recollections of this operation: 
We were awakened by the loudest noise we had ever heard, shells exploding and artillery fire... 
the whole village was in panic... women were screaming, children were crying... Most of the 
villagers began to flee with their pajamas on... When [the wife of Qassim Ahmad Sa’id] realized 
that her son was missing, she screamed louder and begged her husband to return to the house 
and bring the child. Between five and ten elderly people remained in the village with less than 30 
armed men.176
The Toronto Daily Star’s ‘Mr. Mortar of the Canadian Army’ missed few opportunities to 
apply his expertise. ‘I don’t know whether the artillery softening up of the village caused 
casualties,’ a company commander from the 21st Battalion later reflected, ‘but the 
psychological effect was achieved and the village’s non-combatants fled before we 
began the assault.’177
It was also during Operation Dekel that Seventh Brigade units occupied 
Saffuriyya. By the time this village of four thousand people was attacked, it was 
sheltering an additional twenty-five hundred refugees from earlier Seventh Brigade 
conquests (mostly from Shafa `Amr).178 Still its defenders were unprepared for the 
combination of artillery strikes, aerial bombardment, and heavy ground forces which 
they encountered. Here as throughout the Galilee, village militias received little 
assistance from the Arab states. They faced the IDF supported only by the all-volunteer 
Arab Liberation Army (ALA). Still this was a chapter not only of ethnic cleansing but also
175 Morris, Birth Revisited, 419. 
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of determined Palestinian resistance. Villages like Saffuriyya stood up against difficult 
odds. Although Dunkelman’s forces eventually overran the village, Morris writes that the
community ‘put up strong resistance to the IDF advance.’179 Nazzal also emphasizes 
the determination of Palestinians in Saffuriyya to resist. In the end, however, the military
imbalance was too severe. Nazzal quotes Salih Muhammad Nassir, a quartermaster for
the village militia: ‘We expected a war but not an air and tank war.’180 The village fell to 
Seventh Brigade units on 16 July. Israeli authorities made sure to block any villagers 
from returning to Saffuriyya once it was under Israeli control, a decision that Morris 
attributes in part to the fact that the villagers were all Muslim, and in part to the fact that 
‘neighbouring settlements coveted Saffuriya lands’.181
Discussions of Operation Dekel sometimes give the impression that Dunkelman 
was a relatively moderate commander; that the Seventh Brigade was only brought 
along with the politics of expulsion by commanders further up the IDF hierarchy. It is 
unclear exactly how much leeway Brigade commanders had in determining the fate of 
Palestinian communities. If anything, however, the Seventh Brigade distinguished itself 
not in its moderation but in its brutality. Pappé writes that in ‘the Palestinian oral 
histories that have now come to the fore, few brigade names appear. However, Brigade 
Seven is mentioned again and again, together with such adjectives as “terrorist” and 
“barbarous.”’182 While Pappé writes this in connection with Operation Dekel, the worst of
the brigade’s atrocities were to come in October, with Operation Hiram.
Seventh Brigade participation in Operation Hiram should be a central reference 
point for the record of Mahal recruits. The cluster of Canadian and other English-
speaking personnel in the Seventh Brigade had grown since the summer. Nowhere else
in the Israeli armed forces, with the exception of the IAF, was what Lester Gorn refers to
as ‘Anglo-Saxon knowhow’ ever more concentrated.183 This episode of the 1948 war 
can provide a final illustration of the Canadian Zionist contribution to the Nakba.
By early autumn most of northern Palestine was under Israeli control. There 
remained a significant pocket of resistance, however, in the Upper Galilee. Subduing 
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this resistance and incorporating the territory into Israel was the objective of Operation 
Hiram. The operation was focused on capturing the village of Sa`sa`, located at a 
strategic junction of Galilee roadways. ‘If you control these crossroads,’ Haganah 
planner Yohanan Ratner had earlier advised Dunkelman, ‘you control the whole of 
Galilee!’184 Units from four brigades were put at Moshe Carmel’s disposal to launch the 
attack. On 22 October the IAF began a week of heavy bombardment of villages in the 
area. Then, on 28-9 October, the ground offensive was launched.
The pattern of massacres in the days that followed is so severe that Benny 
Morris, even in the absence of specific documentation, has questioned whether there 
might not have been a ‘central order to commit the atrocities.’185 Since the publication in 
Nazzal’s The Palestinian Exodus From Galilee, anyone denying that massacres were 
committed during this campaign has stood on extremely shaky ground. The question of 
central orders can be debated. The fact that massacres and other abuses took place is 
now beyond any reasonable dispute. The responsibility for many of these massacres 
falls on the Seventh Brigade and its command.
The three battalions under Dunkelman’s command, the 71st, 72nd, and 79th, all 
participated in the operation. In the opening offensive of 28-9 October they moved 
together, pushing northwest from Safad and rapidly occupying the villages of Qaddita, 
Mirun, Safsaf, and Jish. Here as in Operation Dani, the IDF sought to conquer 
additional territory by means of a pincer movement. The Seventh Brigade offensive 
from Safad was its northeastern edge, aimed at conquering Sa`sa` and enclosing the 
major part of the resisting ‘pocket’ to its south.186 After its conquests from Qaddita 
through Jish, the Seventh Brigade’s units split. The 72nd and 79th battalions moved 
west to occupy Sa`sa` itself; the 71st shot northeast and occupied al-Ras al-Ahmar, 
Rihaniya, `Alma, and Dayshum.187 After taking Sa`sa`, the 72nd and 79th also moved 
north, occupying a series of villages along the border with Lebanon and making cross-
border incursions as far into Lebanon as the Litani River. Dunkelman claims that far 
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from worrying about the borders to the north, he urged Ben-Gurion to organize an 
assault on Damascus.188
Nazzal has recorded Palestinian accounts of these operations. This is a how a 
woman from Safsaf, Umm Shahadah al-Salih, described the aftermath of the 29-30 
October attack that brought her village under Seventh Brigade control. The villagers 
were ordered to assemble in file around two houses to the north of the village. 
As we lined up, a few Jewish soldiers ordered four girls to accompany them to carry water for the
soldiers. Instead, they took them to our empty houses and raped them. About 70 of our men were
blindfolded and shot to death, one after the other, in front of us. The soldiers took their bodies 
and threw them on the cement covering of the village’s spring and dumped sand on them.189
Morris cites corroborating details from an 11 November committee meeting held by the 
Israeli political party Mapam. In declassified notes covering the discussion of Safsaf, 
one participant ‘speaks of “52 adult males” tied together and dropped into a well and of 
three cases of rape, including of a 14-year-old girl.’190 
Other Israeli records of Seventh Brigade operations during these days paint a 
similar picture. The IDF intelligence officer for the northern front writes of ‘150-200’ 
Palestinians killed in the capture of Jish, ‘including a number of civilians.’191 Another IDF
report indicates another ‘150-200’ Palestinians from Jish captured, before a mysterious 
correction indicates that only a few prisoners remain.192 Seventh Brigade forces are 
held, by no less than a former head of the Haganah national staff, to have committed 
‘mass murder’ at Sa`sa`.193 And on its continues.
From Palestinian accounts there emerge the most horrifying details. One 
survivor of the occupation of Safsaf recounts witnessing the stabbing of a pregnant 
woman with a bayonet. The surviving witness lived out his life in the Ayn Al-Hilweh 
refugee camp in Lebanon. The recollection was kept alive by his nephew and cited in 
Pappé’s The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.194 Dunkelman’s account of these operations
does of course not address killings or abuses of this kind. But he does describe his 
troops’ attachment to bayonets. In the summer of 1948, he proudly recalls, an English-
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speaking company commander of the 72nd Battalion carried out ‘the first bayonet 
charge ever mounted by the Israeli Army.’ Facing an Arab position in the central Galilee,
the company commander ‘ordered his men to fix bayonets; then, yelling like banshees, 
they rushed the Arabs positions. When the astonished Arabs saw what was coming up 
the hill at them, they kicked off their boots and fled in terror.’195
Benny Morris suggests that the terror that Seventh Brigade units inspired 
facilitated the task of population transfer. ‘What happened at Safsaf and Jish no doubt 
reached the villagers of Ras al Ahmar, `Alma, Deishum and al Malikiya hours before the
Seventh Brigade’s columns. These villages, apart from `Alma, seem to have been 
completely or largely empty when the IDF arrived.’196 It was operations of this kind that 
drove the population of northern Palestine into Lebanon. Operation Hiram alone pushed
an estimated 50,000 Palestinians out of the country.197 It is worth circling back to review 
in this light the expressions of pride in this record. This was the process by which, to 
repeat Bercuson’s words, ‘Seventh Brigade successes literally filled out the map of 
north-central Israel,’ in what the Toronto Star dubbed ‘the liberation of northern Israel.’
The refusal of Canadian intellectuals to address this history suggests more than 
a gap in the literature. It was half a century after these atrocities took place that 
Canadian Mahal recruits still figured into a liberal Canadian study as those ‘who took up
arms against the Fascists’; that Dunkelman was memorialized by the country’s most 
prestigious national daily as ‘a Canadian and Israeli war hero.’ This is a problem of 
politics, not of sourcing, methodology, or reasoned disagreements over fact.
Abu-Lughod and Sa’di argue that ‘Palestinian memory is, by dint of its 
preservation and social production under the conditions of its silencing by the 
thundering story of Zionism, dissident memory, counter-memory.’198 In the Canadian 
context and across much of the West, on the other hand, most of what we hear is 
echoes from the stronger side. This does worse than adding insult to injury. The 
historiography of the victors undercuts any basis for respectful engagement with the 
Palestinian experience; resiliency in trauma and celebration in culpability cannot find 
reasonable common ground. Worse still, it tends to provide political cover for Israel as it
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pursues ‘the second half of 1948.’ International facilitation of Israeli warfare is by no 
means a thing of the past. It is necessary, then, to challenge the historical and the 
contemporary realities of colonization in much the same spirit.
Conclusion
The participation of Canadians in the Zionist war effort and in the expulsions that 
marked it may not have been the defining historical episode of the period, either in 
Canada or in Palestine. And its relatively limited scope goes some way towards 
explaining the striking weakness of the Canadian literature on the topic. However, this 
was not an insignificant episode, and its symbolic significance is wrapped up with the 
extraordinary importance of 1948 in all that concerns the Palestine question. A 
conventional Zionist mythology that is now discredited internationally, and even in 
Israel, continues to prevail in treatment of this aspect of Canadian history. In the 
interests both of historical accuracy and of contemporary political integrity, it is crucial 
that this this anachronism be seriously addressed.
The Canadian Zionist contribution to the 1948 war is not a story of dissident 
heroism. Once empowerment of the Zionist leadership by British authorities reached its 
limits, a conflict, eminently familiar to the history of settler colonialism, developed 
between the aims of settler leaders fixated on Palestine and their former imperial 
sponsors, whose wider strategic interests dictated relative moderation. Neither the 
build-up of this tension nor the eventual conflict between the new state of Israel and 
neighbouring government forces should obscure the core reality of the 1948 war: the 
effective disenfranchisement and wholesale dislocation of a majority of the native 
population in territory claimed by the new state. Canadian recruits to what became the 
IDF were not only associated with this in general terms, but were specifically implicated 
in the expulsions and other human rights abuses by means of which the political and 
demographic transformation of Palestine was effected. There is no factual basis for 
denying at least some measure of Canadian culpability in atrocities committed against 
the Palestinian population. The barriers to a reckoning with this history are not factual 
disputes but political taboos; they quite simply need to be dismantled.
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‘Thus, at the dawn of decolonization, we were returned to the earliest, most intense form of colonial 
menace – the exclusivist settler colonialism that had dealt genocidal blows to the great civilizations and 
peoples of the Americas . . . The tragedy occurred as a counterpoint to contemporary history, a reminder 
that all was not well with the era of decolonization.’1
-Eqbal Ahmad, ‘Pioneering in the Nuclear Age’ (1984)
‘The most dangerous element in the present situation is the breakdown in communications between the 
Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on the subject of Palestine.’2     
-Louis St.-Laurent, then Canadian minister of external 
affairs (February 1948)
* * *
In November 1950, Robert Bryce, Canada’s deputy minister of finance, 
expressed misgivings about Canadian support for the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA), the organization tasked with providing for the Palestinian refugees 
displaced during the 1948 war and excluded from the new state of Israel. Bryce, 
estimating the number of Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate at 900,000, 
questioned the strategic logic for Canada of a relief effort that seemed poised to be 
‘slow and costly business.’3 Bryce wrote, ‘While I recognize the strategic position of the 
Middle East, and that it would be a severe blow for the West if the area fell to the 
Communists, I suggest that many countries, particularly the US, UK, and possibly 
France, have deeper and more remunerative interests there than Canada.’4 The 
implication was that inasmuch as the Palestinian refugee crisis required Western 
attention, it should be addressed by the leading powers – those whose commercial 
investments in the region warranted close involvement.
In the Canadian record, Bryce’s memorandum is accompanied by an unsigned 
note in the margin, written in by way of rebuttal: ‘We took a leading role in creating the 
1 Eqbal Ahmad, in eds. Carollee Bengelsoorf et al., The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 301. 
2 Hector Mackenzie, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [henceforth DCER] Vol. 14 (Ottawa:
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994), 256.
3 Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER Vol. 16 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
1996), 581.
4 DCER Vol. 16, 582.
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problem.’5 This was a pointed reference not to the role of the Canadian Zionist 
movement, but to the Canadian government’s own support for the partition of Palestine.
Bryce’s suggestion that such a direct connection should be maintained between 
Canadian foreign policy and profits for the Canadian private sector was made out of 
turn. In the first instance, the finance ministry was not charged with making political 
decisions of this kind. Moreover, officials at Canadian external affairs had come to 
accept that their government was taking on widened global responsibilities, both as a 
Western ally and as a member of the UN. A response from the UN division at Canadian 
external affairs was quick in coming: ‘It is unthinkable that we should turn our back on 
an effort which United Nations representatives on the spot have told us is necessary in 
order to rectify the dislocations caused by the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine.’6 As it happened, Canadian funding for UNRWA continued uninterrupted until 
its cancellation in 2010.
Canada was by no means alone in supporting, in turn, the partition of Palestine 
and then the relief effort to address the dislocations that it triggered. Pairing support for 
Israel with development assistance for the Palestinian refugees produced obvious 
contradictions. Some officials at external affairs observed as much. In 1953, for 
example, Charles Ritchie noted to his colleagues that Arab mistrust of Western relief 
efforts was not without grounds. ‘The United Nations,’ he explained, ‘has been paying 
through UNRWA the cost of keeping the Arab refugees out of Israel while Jewish 
communities in the Western world, and particularly the United States, have been 
bearing the cost of replacing the former Arab population with Jewish immigrants from 
abroad.’7 In Canada as in the US, fundraising for Israeli settlement programs was even 
designated as charitable and tax-exempt.8 This would be an enduring contradiction in 
Canadian engagement with the Middle East. For postwar Canada, however, Arab 
opinion was rarely a serious concern.
The 1940s did witness a transformation of Canada’s approach to external affairs.
During the interwar years, the influence of US power as an immediate reference point 
5 DCER Vol. 16, 582.
6 DCER Vol. 16, 588. 
7 Donald Barry, ed., DCER Vol. 19 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991), 510.
8 Daniel J. Elazar and Alysa M. Dortort, Understanding the Jewish Agency: A Handbook (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 1985), 66.
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for Canadian officials contributed to limiting Canada’s overseas commitments; pursuing 
Canadian autonomy within the British Empire and avoiding possible tension with the US
both seemed to dictate caution about distant entanglements. During World War II, the 
Allied balance of power swung further towards the US, and Canada’s external 
orientation shifted accordingly. However, as the US assumed an unprecedented global 
role, North American continental arrangements now encouraged more global Canadian 
involvement. The new approach was promoted by a rising layer of Liberal leadership, 
headed up by Lester B. Pearson and Louis St.-Laurent. Mackenzie King, prime minister
until his retirement in 1948, viewed this self-styled internationalism with concern. ‘The 
truth,’ King reflected in his diary in 1948, ‘is our country has no business trying to play a 
world role in the affairs of nations, the very location of some of which our people know 
little or nothing about.’9 Officials like Pearson and St.-Laurent were meanwhile moving 
to involve Canada’s department of external affairs in conflicts from Korea to Palestine. 
Notwithstanding King’s concerns, Canada was entering a new stage of global 
involvement.
This chapter emphasizes the element of continuity amidst these changes. 
Canadian external affairs policy underwent a major transition during the 1940s. But this 
did not involve anything like a clean break from Canada’s imperial past. It had been 
during the peak years of the Third British Empire that Gramsci highlighted one of the 
constraints on British primacy in the Anglosphere, namely ‘the power of the United 
States which is also Anglo-Saxon and exerts influence on some dominions.’10 For 
Canada, the only Dominion in the western hemisphere, an immediate neighbour to the 
rising superpower, this influence was especially compelling. Nicholas Mansergh writes 
that between the world wars, the Canadian fixation on relations with the US had 
sometimes irritated the British government. After World War II, it was less controversial 
in Britain, and ‘Canada’s insistence that Anglo-American co-operation should be the 
supreme objective of the Commonwealth was warmly endorsed by many who were 
most critical of her pre-war insistence on it.’11 This insistence had long been a core 
9 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds., The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, 1947-1948 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970), 140.
10 Antonio Gramsci, ed./trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg, Prison Notebooks Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 291.
11 Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-1939 
(London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1952), 105.
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Canadian priority in external affairs. It remained so throughout the classic era of liberal 
Canadian internationalism.
From Britain, the IR scholar Timothy Dunne has recently argued that there exists 
a ‘fundamental incompatibility between Atlanticism and internationalism.’12 The point 
bears directly on postwar Canadian foreign policy. In short, it is necessary to look past 
the pretensions of an ‘internationalist’ foreign policy so stably aligned with Anglo-
American power. It is true that after World War II, the Canadian government operated in
wider multilateral forums than it had in earlier decades. The Imperial War Cabinet had 
been a narrower body than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was; the 
League of Nations, to which Canada was in any event only weakly committed, was 
never nearly as inclusive as the UN would become. On the other hand, one should not 
exaggerate the scope of Canada’s postwar internationalism. The Canadian leadership 
retained an overriding commitment to, as a leading Canadian civil servant later 
described it, ‘the Western alliance of which the Anglo-American partnership was the 
essence.’13 Throughout the postwar period, Canada’s internationalists demonstratively 
lined themselves up on the privileged side of the colour line.
In the early phase of World War II, King described his government’s increasing 
attachment to the US as part and parcel of a global deepening of Anglo-American 
friendship. A new international reality was expected to rise from the war. ‘In the 
furtherance of this new world order,’ King declared, ‘Canada, in liaison between the 
British Commonwealth and the United States, is fulfilling a manifest destiny.’14 There 
were questions of external affairs on which King and his internationalist successors 
disagreed. Durable Canadian alignment with Anglo-American power was not one of 
them.
It was against this backdrop that Canadian diplomats approached the Middle 
East. There was much in the Palestine problem to trouble genuine internationalists. The
spectre of sectarian statehood, the contradiction between Asian diplomacy and Euro-
American diplomacy towards Asia; any number of elements of the situation could have 
12 Cited in Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International 
Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 117.
13  Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER Vol. 22 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
2001), 280.
14 Nicolas Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. 1
(London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 548.
130
The Bounds of Postwar Internationalism
taken an internationalist observer aback. The focus of Canada’s liberal internationalists 
was elsewhere. This chapter explores Canada’s early postwar diplomacy on Palestine 
and the priorities that drove it. The chapter begins by reviewing the Canadian 
government’s enduring orientation towards the Great Powers of the English-speaking 
West. It then turns to discuss Canada’s diplomatic contribution to the establishment of 
Israel over most of the former Palestine mandate.
The Internationalism of an American Dominion
Postwar Canada’s international position, amidst the global trend towards 
decolonization, largely corresponded with its privileges in the era of formal colonialism. 
Before turning back to Canada, however, a moment’s attention is due to the postwar 
argumentation of the old Zionist leadership. The relationship of Jews organized by the 
Zionist project to the world’s racial dividing lines was never so clearcut as was the white
Dominions’. The case for supporting Zionism, however, was still put in familiar terms.
Chaim Weizmann’s autobiography, for example, published in 1949, invokes the 
same logic that in 1917 prompted the Guardian’s Sidebotham to place Jewish settlers 
above those colonial societies ‘which are governed and do not govern themselves.’ 
With no apparent misgivings, Weizmann recalls his presentation of Zionist claims to the 
Belgian politician Pierre Orts, who as a colonial administrator in the Congo helped 
preside over one of the most devastating racial regimes of the twentieth century. 
Weizmann writes:
this experience had taught him that there is a world of difference between the black Congo and 
white Palestine, and he understood the incongruity of British attempts to apply the methods of the
first to the problems of the second – attempts which, among a sensitive and sophisticated
population, often turned the machinery of administration into a sort of Procrustean bed. 
The depiction of a ‘white Palestine’ populated by ‘a sensitive and sophisticated 
population’ and rightly classed among ‘the modern family of nations’ – it is with this 
message that Weizmann addressed his English-language readers.15 Once again, rather 
than opposition to a racist division supposing superior and lesser peoples, we see a 
Zionist appeal to the West to shift the dividing line in a more inclusive direction.
15 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 376.
131
The Bounds of Postwar Internationalism
Canada, meanwhile, was emerging from World War II very much a ‘white man’s 
country.’ In 1947, prime minister King expressed his defence of racial discrimination in 
immigration policy in these terms: ‘a country should surely have the right to determine 
what strains of blood it wishes to have in its population and how its people coming from 
outside have to be selected.’16 Though overt racial rhetoric was becoming taboo, the 
political alignments that it suggested remained a force in Canadian external affairs. The 
continued promotion of what King referred to as the ‘gospel of unity between English-
speaking nations’ was more than a relic from Canada’s Anglo-Saxonist past.17 As Srdjan
Vucetic writes, the ‘processes that created the Anglosphere in the middle years of the 
twentieth century were no less racialized than those of the previous century.’18 
The wartime struggle against the Nazis, conducted in the name of liberalism, 
helped to discredit pseudo-scientific notions of race, and made it more difficult to deflect
popular challenges to policies based on the old biological racism. Alternative rationales 
for such policies nonetheless took shape. As Balibar writes, it was from the Anglo-
Saxon countries that a politics of ‘racism without races’ was quickest to develop.19 John 
Hunt discusses the place of development theory in particular as an heir to conventional 
racism: ‘It was instead now the attributes of modernity and tradition that fixed a people’s
or nation’s place on the hierarchy.’ Conveniently, notes Hunt, the revision of the criteria 
of racial hierarchy did not upend the hierarchy itself: ‘Americans could still remain 
secure in the superiority of their own kind. Anglo-Americans were still on top, followed 
by the various European peoples. Then came the “Third World.”’20 Within the British 
Empire, the Canadian leadership’s claim to a share in metropolitan superiority found a 
receptive audience in the home country. To a considerable extent, this would carry over 
into the era of US hegemony.
16 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds., The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, 1947-1948 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970), 33.
17 J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds., The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 3, 1945-1946 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1970), 244.
18 Vucetic, Anglosphere, 71
19  Étienne Balibar, ‘Racism and Nationalism,’ in eds. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, trans. 
Chris Turner, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1991), 21.
20 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 161-2. 
Source cited in John Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 2011), 314.
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The Canadian state’s effective reorientation from London to Washington found 
increased institutional expression during World War II. Prime minister King’s comments 
concerning Canadian ‘manifest destiny,’ cited above, were made in November 1940, 
when he presented the Canadian House of Commons with the Ogdensburg Agreement.
The agreement established a new bilateral mechanism, the Canada-US Permanent 
Joint Board on Defence, and marked a new phase in the development of strategic ties 
with the US. King’s speech to the House of Commons expressed appreciation for the 
US president’s pledge two years before, when he declared that Canada, as ‘part of the 
sisterhood of the British Empire,’ could count on US assistance if ever ‘domination of 
Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.’ King went on to express his hope that
Canada’s link with the US had been contributing to widened Anglo-American 
cooperation: ‘Any part which our country may have had in bringing about a harmony of 
sentiment between the British Empire and the United States may well be a legitimate 
source of pride to all Canadians.’21 Early the next year, Canada stepped further into a 
continental security arrangement through the Hyde Park Agreement, which committed 
both countries to ‘the coordination and rational integration of the war industries of 
Canada and the United States.’22
Emerging from the war, Canada retained many formal links with Britain; in its 
local defence arrangements, however, and in many areas of its political economy, its 
integration into a continental power system had become an established fact. In 1946 
the US ambassador to Canada, Ray Atherton, conveyed his impression of how 
Canadian officials were balancing these shifts. ‘In matters of defence as in other fields,’ 
Atherton wrote to his superiors, ‘the Canadian Government hopes desperately that it 
will not have to choose between the United States and the British Commonwealth.’ But 
despite Canadian hopes that Britain could be associated with US-Canadian strategic 
ties, the ambassador concluded that ‘there is no present tendency to make that a sine 
qua non to integration with the United States.’23 Little, in this setting, was more 
21 Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. 1, 547-8.
22 David R. Murray, ed., DCER Vol. 8 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1976), 
280-1.
23 S. Everett Gleason et al., eds., Foreign Relations of the United States [henceforth FRUS] 1946, Vol. 5 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 54.
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important to Canadian officials than the internally harmonious development of the 
Anglo-American alliance.
King was thus enthusiastic when Winston Churchill, in his judgement ‘the 
greatest man of our times,’24 delivered his famous March 1946 speech in Fulton, 
Missouri. It was in this speech that Churchill rallied Cold War support for ‘a special 
relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of 
America.’ King had spoken to Churchill in the lead-up to the speech, offering his support
and relaying his notes from Ogdensburg.25 In Fulton, Churchill duly cited the North 
American pact as something on which the Anglo-American relationship should build. 
‘The United States,’ Churchill emphasized, ‘has already a Permanent Defence 
Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to the British 
Commonwealth and Empire.’26 Whatever Churchill’s strategic motives, his praise for ‘the
fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples’ fit with core Canadian 
government aspirations.
Judging from his diary entries, King did not part lightly with the era of supposed 
British primacy. When British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, meeting with King in 1947,
described the US as ‘the ruling country of the world,’ King claims to have been taken 
aback; ‘it sounded painfully to my ears to hear the Foreign Minister in London tell me 
that he had to admit that Britain had to take second place to the United States.’27 At the 
same time, the Canadian prime minister had for decades worked to see Canada’s 
status as an autonomous Dominion recognized. He thus approached external affairs 
sensitive to signs that Britain might try to buoy its position at Dominion expense.
The issue arose as Canada partnered with the US and Britain to develop military 
interoperability. Canadian officials had repeatedly expressed their interest in 
standardizing military training and equipment with the two allies. In October 1946 King 
met with US president Harry Truman and both were agreed that this should be carried 
out. British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, then chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
was anchoring the negotiations from the British side. In principle, Canadian officials 
24 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, 118.
25 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 3, 182. 
26 Winston Churchill, ‘The Sinews of Peace,’ speech delivered at Westminister College, Fulton, Missouri, 
5 March 1946. Accessed at <www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm>.
27 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 4, 114.
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were roundly enthusiastic about the effort. King was nonetheless troubled that some 
British officials seemed to be claiming authority for Canada in order to mitigate the 
power asymmetry with the US. In November, the US State Department’s James 
Parsons reported ‘the resentment of Canadian military authorities faced with a 
peremtory request from Field Marshal Montgomery to rubber stamp his alleged 
agreement with General Eisenhower on standardization of arms.’28 The same week this 
memorandum was written, King, resenting British gestures towards imperial 
centralization, fulminated that he could not tolerate London making ‘a demand on this 
country as if it were some Colonial possession of inferior races.’29 For King, it was a 
basic matter of principle that Great Power allies could not claim Canadian support 
without the Canadian government being afforded a seat at the table. Faced with these 
misgivings, US and British officials assured the Canadians they would formally be dealt 
with on an equal basis.
The power asymmetry between Britain and the US aside, the Canadian 
government’s participation in various three-power negotiations in the aftermath of the 
war found Canada conspicuous in its relative insignificance. It was, however, given a 
privileged seat. Alongside the military standardization programs that later expanded 
through NATO, the Canadian government also operated as third partner to the early 
negotiations leading to establishment of the Bretton Woods system and its lasting 
instruments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank).30 Thomas Keating writes that 
during the war, the challenge for the Canadian government had been to advocate for a 
Canadian seat at the Anglo-American table without suggesting that this privilege had to 
generalize: ‘It was necessary to press Canadian claims in such a way that other 
governments in support of the allied cause would not all press for similar acccess.’31 In 
different policy areas, this would become an enduring theme: the Canadian search for 
an internationalism widened beyond the Great Powers, but with a more varied hierarchy
of states still in place.
28 Gleason et al., FRUS 1946, Vol. 5, 64.
29 Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 3, 364.
30 Michael Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43.
31 Keating, Canada and World Order, 22.
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Australia’s Sir Percy Spender would be more blunt than the Canadian 
internationalists. In demanding suitable postwar treatment for his white Dominion, he 
asssumed a globalized division between metropole and colony and declared, ‘we in this
country are a metropolitan power in the Pacific.’32 The more popular Canadian self-
description was ‘middle power.’ It was advanced in a 1944 publication entitled A Greater
Canada Among Nations, in which author Lionel Gelber argued that Canada had gained 
‘new stature’ through the war and, though not a major power, could not be considered a 
minor power: ‘She stands in between as a Britannic Power of medium rank. Henceforth 
in world politics, Canada must figure as a Middle Power.’33 The Canadian diplomats, like
Pearson, most associated with the notion of ‘middle power’ diplomacy invested high 
hopes in the UN. For his part, Pearson argued that Churchill’s calls for an alliance of the
English-speaking peoples were too narrow, and that US and British leadership could 
and should be more broadly exercised through the UN machinery.34 But in the UN or 
outside of it, it was as a close ally to both the US and Britain that Canada sought to find 
its place in the postwar international system. The assertion of a special Canadian 
association with Anglo-American power was enforced by the Canadian insistence that 
there existed a crucial ‘North Atlantic triangle’ between the three states. 
In a speech delivered in January 1948, Pearson explained the most common 
official Canadian concern that therefore arose with regards to the Palestine problem. 
The explanation was embedded in a broader discussion of Canadian foreign policy. 
Pearson explained why postwar Canada, allied with the West in confrontation with a 
‘victoriously powerful Slav empire,’ was able to look to the UN in a way that interwar 
Canada had never looked to the League of Nations. A major Canadian problem with the
League, noted Pearson, was the distance that the US kept from it: ‘It will be 
remembered that the one great nightmare of prewar Canadian governments was a 
clash, or even a divergence, of policy between the two governments – American and 
British – with both of which Canada wished to keep in step.’ The UN, in contrast, had 
32 David Lowe, ‘Percy Spender, Minister and Ambassador,’ in eds. Joan Beaumont et al., Ministers, 
Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2003), 70; and Vucetic, Anglosphere, 58.
33 Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (Toronto: Between the 
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34 John A. Munroe and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson,
Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 39.
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developed as an arena ‘in which British and American policies now usually march side 
by side.’ This allowed for Canada to take on a more assertive international role in 
lockstep with its key allies. Pearson cited Palestine in this context as the problematic 
exception to the rule, a reminder of the contingent circumstances of Canada’s improved
position: ‘we stop playing the triangle in the international symphony when the British 
and American instruments are out of harmony.’35 
It was alignment with Anglo-American power that afforded to postwar Canada its 
position in international affairs, and it was with a fixation on allied power centres that 
Canadian planners approached seemingly far-off issues like the Palestine problem. It is 
important to emphasize, however, that these were a Canadian politics of partnership 
with empire, not of hapless subjection to it. An official sense of community with allies of 
like kind was paired with deliberate distance from others. The element of racism in 
Canadian external affairs can, in other words, not be written off as derivative of 
alignment with other and more politically aggressive partners. An early controversy in 
the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence is, in this connection, instructive.
The controversy concerned the deployment on Canadian territory of black US 
military personnel. It came up in 1949, months after St.-Laurent replaced King as prime 
minister and appointed Pearson to his own former position as secretary of state for 
external affairs. This was a government of the internationalists. But when it was 
informed by US representatives to the PJBD that the US Air Force wished to use ‘some 
of its coloured engineer troops’ in scheduled USAF work in Canada, it perceived a 
problem.36 For Canadian officials the proposal raised concerns of racial hygiene. 
Herbert Moran, Pearson’s under-secretary of state, conveyed the message that the 
USAF ‘had made a serious effort to find white troops for this work but had been 
unsuccessful as the great majority of its engineer troops are coloured and its small 
number of white engineer troops is already committed.’37 For years Canadian officials 
deliberated over how this issue could be approached in a way that upheld both alliance 
with the US and the politics of ‘white Canada.’ They were confident that the Pentagon 
35 Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions: An Anthology of Speeches and Articles (Toronto: University 
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36 Hector Mackenzie, ed., DCER Vol. 15 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
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37 DCER Vol. 15, 1606.
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understood that ‘prior approval would be required for postings in Canada of units of 
negro troops’; but they were troubled that ‘as a result of the US Government’s non-
segregation policy, varying numbers of negro personnel are nowadays being included in
all normal USAF units.’38
In 1952 the St.-Laurent government finalized a solution based on quiet but 
rigorous racism. Cabinet extracts for 28 November provide the following summary of 
the discussion item, ‘Admission of United States Troops Including Negro Personnel’: 
The Cabinet noted with approval the remarks of the Minister of National Defence on the 
admission for the manning of radar stations of US military units, which were predominantly white 
but which included integrated negro personnel, and the proposal that the United States 
authorities be asked informally to see that the proportion of negroes did not exceed ten percent.39
Lester B. Pearson celebrates what he refers to as ‘the broad and active internationalism
of our foreign policy in those years,’ and in this he is joined by most of Canada’s liberal 
intellectual community.40 The inclusive breadth of this internationalism, on Palestine as 
more generally, ought not to be exaggerated.
Canada and the Palestine Partition Plan
The writings of Elizabeth MacCallum form an interesting presence in the 
Canadian documentary record of the 1940s. MacCallum was, in the words of David 
Bercuson, the Canadian government’s ‘only bona-fide expert on the Middle East’ – and 
in this she felt her isolation.41 In MacCallum’s writings, King’s expressed concern over 
Canadian policy involvement in countries ‘the very location of some of which our people
know little or nothing about’ finds more detailed expression. ‘It is true,’ writes 
MacCallum in one memorandum, ‘that there is little knowledge on this continent of what
has actually happened in the Near and Middle East in the past 50 years, and that it is 
consequently easy to manipulate the record so as to encourage the view that Arab 
38 DCER Vol. 16, 1507.
39 Donald Barry, ed., DCER Vol. 18 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
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claims in the present controversy may be dismissed as all but irrelevant.’42 The North 
American policy proposals that emerged from this ignorance seemed to MacCallum 
wrong-headed. MacCallum was writing as a civil servant in the department of external 
affairs, not as a public critic. But in internal government discussions, she put criticism of 
Zionist claims on the record.
‘A fundamental element in the Arab position,’ she wrote in a 1944 memorandum 
concerning postwar policy in the Middle East, ‘is the belief that Asia is not the property 
of westerners, to be parcelled out among European interests as was done at the close 
of the last war.’43 Arab opposition to Zionism was, for MacCallum, a reasonable 
expression of this position. Suggestions that the European Jewish refugee crisis gave 
humanitarian weight to Zionist claims seemed to open the West to charges of hypocrisy.
To displace the consequences of Euro-American antisemitism and immigration 
restrictions onto Palestine would naturally trigger resentment; ‘it was not the Arabs who 
had been responsible for the existence of a Jewish problem in Europe.’44 From various 
angles, the idea that a Zionist Palestine policy could offer a responsible answer to the 
Jewish question seemed to her suspect.
The inclination to support Zionism as a means of deflecting Jewish immigration 
away from the West itself struck MacCallum as particularly distasteful. Prominent 
Canadians, she recalled, had proven ‘remarkably responsive’ to the old argument that 
Zionism should be supported as an alternative to Jewish immigration to Western 
countries. MacCallum emphasized that the crisis produced by Nazi atrocities only made
this more offensive to Jews. Here she suggested that officials look beyond the Jewish 
communal organizations that had fallen under Zionist influence: ‘Non-Zionist Jews, who 
though unorganized in Canada still form a large part of the Jewish population of this 
country, consider such an approach to be treacherous both toward European Jews and 
themselves – an extreme example of the lengths to which Zionist leaders are willing to 
go to establish quickly the desired numerical majority in Palestine.’45 Thanks to 
42 John F. Hilliker, ed., DCER Vol. 11 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1990), 
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MacCallum, such critiques made their way into some internal government discussions. 
But concerns such as these only came up rarely.
For the major figures of Canadian policy-making, a more serious consideration 
was the divergence between Britain and the US. Historically, the US leadership had 
acknowledged and supported Britain’s position as the paramount power in the Middle 
East. As early as 1910, Theodore Roosevelt expressed this posture in his own terms. 
The US had a shared interest in the ‘spread of civilization over the world’s waste 
spaces,’ he declared during a visit to London, and so supported Britain in ‘the task of 
subduing the savagery of wild man and wild nature.’ For Roosevelt, British imperialism 
in the Middle East, as throughout the colonial world, was fighting a fight in which the US
and all advanced peoples had a stake: ‘In Egypt, you are not only the guardians of your 
own interests; you are also the guardians of the interests of civilization.’46 Roosevelt was
especially outspoken. But US support for British imperialism was more than rhetorical. 
US involvement on behalf of the Allies in the First World War helped enforce British 
advances; and by World War II, while it was Britain that maintained the main military 
facilities in the Middle East, US economic and strategic support had become a central 
pillar of the British position. The US emerged from World War II effectively partnered 
with British power. Despite some rivalry between the allies, as William Roger Louis 
writes, the US was ‘underwriting the British Empire in the Middle East.’47
In key states around Palestine, Britain pursued a policy not unlike US 
imperialism in Latin America. The British imperial presence was to be ratified by 
bilateral treaties and made compatible with formalities of political independence for the 
Arab states. French efforts in the same direction were quickly blocked by Anglo-
American agreement. In pursuit of privileged treaty rights for France with Lebanon and 
Syria, de Gaulle went so far as to order bombardment of Syrian parliament in 
Damascus; the attack, as Kassir and Mardam-Bey observe, only hastened the French 
exit. In 1946, all French troops were evacuated from the Levant.48 Britain, on the other 
hand, dug in, and generally enjoyed US support in doing so. The transition went 
46 Theodore Roosevelt, with Lawrence F. Abbott, ed., African and European Addresses (New York: 
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especially smoothly in Transjordan, whose King Abdullah, his rule subsidized by Britain,
guaranteed Britain military basing rights as part of the 1946 treaty formalizing 
Transjordanian ‘independence.’49 Where local governments were not so pliable, as in 
Egypt, Britain maintained its troop presence as it pursued treaty negotiations. General 
Allenby had for his part been optimistic about the Egyptian basis for neocolonialism, 
remarking, ‘The English can evacuate Egypt with an easy mind: in effect they have 
created a class of large landowners on whom Great Britain can rely to assure her policy
in Egypt.’50 This was precisely the approach to which the US leadership was traditionally
disposed. And for the most part, it was supportive of Britain’s regional position.
Palestine was an exception. Here too Britain, strategically dependent upon the 
US and facing a Zionist bid for statehood, hoped for some kind of Anglo-American 
agreement. British planners were not disposed to extend support for the Zionist 
movement any further. The class and ultimately the colonial character of British policy in
the Middle East were grounds enough for Arab regional opposition. As prime minister 
Clement Attlee observed in 1947, ‘we shall constantly appear to be supporting vested 
interests and reaction against reform and revolution in the interests of the poor.’51 For 
Britain in the Middle East as for the US in Latin America, this perception was difficult to 
shake. The additional provocation of support for Zionism seemed to bring prohibitive 
strategic costs for little reward. 
On the other hand, confrontation with a Zionist movement so strongly supported 
in the US involved costs of another kind. In 1945 the Attlee government joined the US in
establishing an Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, hoping to develop a joint 
approach. In so doing, suggests Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, it ‘abdicated its sole 
responsibility for the future of the Palestine mandate.’52 With US support for Zionism 
building in parallel to the Zionist challenge to authorities in Palestine, Britain found itself 
in an untenable position. In October 1946 came what Walid Khalidi describes as ‘the 
most important event in Zionist history since the Balfour Declaration in 1917’: US 
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president Harry Truman publicly endorsed a Zionist proposal for the establishment of a 
Jewish state over most of the Palestine mandate.53 The British government moved to 
cut its losses. In early 1947, it turned the Palestine question over to the United Nations.
The United Nations was not so patently imperial an organization as the League 
of Nations had been. But nor was it removed from the politics of empire. From the 
founding UN conference in spring 1945, I.F. Stone had written that ‘action is proceeding
on two planes. On one, the formal and public plane, a final draft is being prepared for a 
world security organization. On the other, the informal and private plane, quite a 
different tendency is at work.’ The informal tendency, wrote Stone, was defined by a US 
effort to develop through the UN a new wartime alliance directed against the Soviet 
Union.54 In the years ahead Stone’s analysis was vindicated. Another striking aspect of 
politics in this world organization was the relatively marginal position allocated to 
humanity’s Third World majority. Of fifty delegations to the UN’s founding conference, 
only twelve were Afro-Asian.55 The informal imperial character of UN politics were 
apparent even before the US waged war in Korea under a UN umbrella. 
From Canada, King himself came to view the UN with suspicion. As the 
Canadian prime minister lost control of Canadian foreign policy to the rising leaders at 
external affairs, he worried that UN activities were attaching Canada too closely to US 
global power: ‘the State Department was simply using the United Nations as an arm of 
that office to further its own policies,’ he observed. King singled Pearson out for criticism
as ‘much too immature. Much too ready to be influenced by American opinion.’56 For 
King, it was a marker of Dominion autonomy to avoid far-flung interventions dominated 
by other powers. The internationalists at external affairs were more open to pursuing 
Canadian ‘middle power’ diplomacy on the world stage.
Palestine was an early focal point for Canada’s self-styled internationalism. The 
first UN deliberations on the Palestine question came in April 1947, when the UN 
General Assembly convened in special session to discuss the issue referred to it by 
Britain. Pearson headed the Canadian delegation, and was on the first day of UN 
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discussions elected to chair the First Committee on Palestine. This committee was 
tasked with developing the terms of reference for a UN investigations committee 
charged with developing proposals for the future governance of Palestine. Out of this 
process there emerged on 15 May 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP). All of the US State Department proposals concerning the 
composition of this committee had, since the early April preparations for the special 
session, included Canadian participation. At persistent US urging, the Canadian 
government agreed to appoint a member.57 So it was that a Canadian appointee found 
himself among UNSCOP’s eleven members, exercising an influence over the politics of 
Palestine in no way matched by experience. ‘It would seem,’ writes Ilan Pappé, ‘that 
most members were chosen in order to serve the interests of one or another of the 
superpowers. Their ignorance about the situation in Palestine, or for that matter the 
Middle East in general, became glaringly evident when the committee presented its final
conclusions, in which, for example, they suggested the establishment of a Jewish state 
where half the population would be Arab.’58
The Canadian member of UNSCOP was supreme court justice Ivan Rand. Rand 
owed his prominence in Canada to his role in brokering an element of the postwar 
compromise between Canadian labour and capital, what is known as the ‘Rand 
Formula.’ He had no background concerning the Middle East. He had an established 
affinity for the US jurist and Zionist leader Louis Brandeis, but no record of his own on 
Palestine.59 The Canadian government appointed Rand in an independent capacity in 
the hope that his recommendations would not bind Canadian foreign policy. But in an 
obvious sense, he operated on Canada’s behalf. And in committee discussions he lent 
his support to proposals to establish a Jewish state. The extent of his influence can be 
disputed. What influence he had was in any case exercised in support of the plan 
including Jewish statehood. Eliezer Tauber, for his part, insists that the consequences 
were decisive: ‘It was precisely Rand, representing a British dominion and not publicly 
identified as a pro-Zionist, although he definitely was, who was in a position to 
consolidate UNSCOP’s majority in favour of partition.’60 Elizabeth MacCallum remarked 
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that ‘Rand began with a Zionist bias.’61 He ended by helping to hand the Zionist 
movement a major diplomatic victory.
It is instructive to step back and consider the composition of UNSCOP. Like the 
UN at large, it reflected the relative disempowerment of the Afro-Asian world. In a tenth-
anniversary celebration of Israel’s establishment, Rand expressed his feeling that the 
Jews were uniquely positioned to develop in Palestine ‘an anchorage of all the best 
qualities of our Western civilization.’62 Fortunate, then, that UNSCOP’s deliberations 
had seen the West so well represented. G.H. Jansen reflects on the make-up of the 
committee:
Its membership was actually supposed to be representative of the world: Sweden and the 
Netherlands represented western Europe; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia eastern Europe; the 
British Commonwealth had two representatives, Canada and Australia; and Latin America three, 
Peru, Uruguay and Guatemala. To give 18% representation to the continent directly affected was 
evidently considered fair – in 1947. This would hardly be the case now.63
The ‘18%,’ namely India and Iran, were joined by Yugoslavia in endorsing a minority 
report opposing partition and calling for the establishment of Palestine as a federal 
state. It was, however, the UNSCOP majority’s recommendation for the partition of 
Palestine that was to be the focus of UN diplomacy through the autumn of 1947.
When in September the General Assembly met to address UNSCOP’s 
recommendations, the continental divide once again made itself felt. Meeting in Lake 
Success, New York, the Assembly established an ad hoc committee to discuss the 
Palestine question. David Horowitz, the main Zionist diplomat involved in the 
proceedings, reviews the delegations’ approach to partition. ‘The Asiatic bloc was 
solidly and unitedly negative,’ writes Horowitz.64 Horowitz identifies Canada, on the 
other hand, as a noteworthy supporter: ‘It may be said that Canada, more than any 
other country, played a decisive part in all stages of the UNO discussions on Palestine. 
The activities at Lake Success of Lester Pearson and his fellow delegates were a fitting 
climax to Justice Rand’s beneficent work on UNSCOP.’65 For example, the Canadian 
delegation joined in voting down a call from Arab delegations for an International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) ruling on whether the UN had the authority to partition a country against 
61 Tauber, Personal Policy Making, 70. 
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the wishes of a majority of its population.66 It was also closely involved in committee 
work concerning how to schedule and manage the transition from British rule. On 28 
November 1947 the UN passed a modified version of UNSCOP’s partition proposal, 
Resolution 181, with the necessary two-thirds majority. Pearson reflects in his memoirs:
‘Canada voted “for,” along with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, Brazil, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, the USA, and others. We were in
strong company.’67 
This UN diplomacy on Palestine did not feature classic Cold War conflict. 
Instead, this was one of the many episodes of postwar ‘bipolarity’ in which the interests 
of a people on the system’s periphery were sacrificed with the agreement of both 
superpowers. For all the Arab misgivings identified by MacCallum, a parcelling out of 
Palestine by foreign interests was precisely what was taking place. Resolution 181 
called for the establishment of a Jewish state on 55.5% of mandatory Palestine, 
including most of its best lands. At the time, less than a third of Palestine’s population 
was Jewish, and despite the JNF’s best efforts, less than seven per cent of its territory 
was under Jewish ownership.68 It bears emphasizing that this plan did not formally 
authorize anything like the establishment of the Israeli state. The partition plan excluded
Jerusalem from both the proposed Jewish and the proposed Arab states, calling for 
separate international administration of the Holy City. Moreover, no UN decision could 
be expected to authorize the wave of population transfer that would soon sweep the 
country. The resolution’s practical political effect was nonetheless to provide 
international cover for what was to come.
It was by this point a public fact, as Hannah Arendt observed, that ‘under the 
leadership of Ben-Gurion, whose Revisionist leanings were still violently denounced by 
Palestine labour in 1935, the Zionist Organization has adopted the Revisionist Jewish 
state program.’69 The exclusivist substance of this program, leading inexorably to 
population transfer and territorial expansion, was not spelled out in Resolution 181. But 
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the General Assembly vote for ‘Jewish statehood’ had the effect of legitimizing this 
program in its entirety. Thus, as forces under Ben-Gurion’s command prepared to 
militarily seize Palestine, they ‘also wrapped themselves in the sanctimonious garb of 
moral superiority as adherents, in a posture of self-defence, to the impartial will of the 
international community.’70 Effective Zionist diplomacy translated Arab rejection of the 
partition plan into alleged culpability for all that followed. This appearance could hardly 
have been more distorted. In Canada this was at least perceived by Elizabeth 
MacCallum who, after the experience of autumn 1947, concluded that her government 
could only have supported partition ‘because we didn’t give two hoots for democracy.’71 
Democracy for Arabs was not much of a Canadian concern. But the Canadian 
delegation’s pro-partition diplomacy was controversial for other reasons. Whereas the 
US had exerted great influence in favour of partition, Britain had met the UNSCOP 
majority’s recommendation with scepticism. Foreign secretary Bevin remarked that 
Britain would not take on ‘the responsibility for enforcing a plan which no minister was 
prepared to defend as either equitable or workable and which was certain to be rejected
by the Arabs.’72 The British government thus limited its role in the UN diplomacy of 
autumn 1947 and indicated that it would not be responsible for imposing a settlement 
against the wishes of any party to the Palestine conflict. Britain did not apply formal 
pressure on the Canadian government. But some British officials complained that the 
Canadian delegation’s pro-partition diplomacy showed ‘disloyalty,’ and at one point the 
controversy was almost picked up by the US press. A coordinated response from 
Canadian officials and the British press office contained the story with the necessary 
denials.73 But British concerns reverberated in Canadian government discussions. They 
especially moved King, who held the post of prime minister until November 1948. In late
1947, King visited Britain for the royal wedding and had the occasion to discuss the 
Palestine question with Bevin. He thereafter sought to limit Canadian involvement with 
the Palestine question to the extent that he could.
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In this context, the officials who had anchored Canadian Palestine diplomacy at 
the UN elaborated their rationale for the record. 
Ideology and Strategy in Canadian Diplomacy
In a memorandum dated 27 December 1947, the external affairs officials most 
closely involved with Canadian support for partition reviewed their approach to UN 
diplomacy on Palestine. Pearson circulated the document within the government along 
with a note addressing British accusations of Canadian disloyalty. There were those, 
wrote Pearson, who attributed the Canadian delegation’s activities to ideological 
support for Zionism, suggesting that the delegation was ‘acting from purely altruistic 
motives in a matter which did not directly concern Canada.’ Pearson, then under-
secretary of state at external affairs under St.-Laurent, wrote that rebuttals were 
developed in the attached document: ‘The memorandum was prepared for the purpose 
of indicating that the delegation acted on the basis of practical and realistic 
considerations in the Palestine discussions.’74 
The memorandum suggested that proposals for Jewish statehood by way of 
partition were simply more ‘practicable’ than any alternative. The Arab proposal for ‘an 
independent unitary state under the control of an elected government, in which Arabs 
and Jews would serve together in the proportions which the electorate desired,’ was 
‘completely unacceptable to the Jewish Agency’ – it was therefore not a serious basis 
for discussion.75 The authors cited Jewish Agency representatives to the effect that 
partition, which they publicly accepted, ‘represented a “serious attenuation” of their 
original demand for an undivided Palestine under Jewish control, in which responsibility 
for immigration and economic development would be transferred without delay to the 
Jewish Agency.’76 Zionist diplomacy was cooperative whereas Arab diplomacy was not. 
Moreover, had the Zionist leadership not succeeded in its diplomacy, it ‘would have 
74 DCER Vol. 13, 948.
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discredited the Jewish Agency and played into the hands of Jewish extremists who 
were said to be prepared to seize the whole of Palestine by force.’77
Against the British accusation of disloyalty, the authors insisted that the 
Canadian delegation had in fact tried to coordinate policy despite British ‘detachment’ 
from the UN proceedings. Canadian representatives kept British interests in mind and, 
‘whenever the United Kingdom views could be ascertained, endeavoured to have them 
taken into account in the preparation of plans.’78 But in the final count Britain was itself 
not being cooperative. ‘The over-riding consideration in the minds of the United 
Kingdom authorities appeared to be the strategic importance to the United Kingdom of 
good relations with the Arabs, and for this reason they seemed to hope that the United 
Nations would fail to reach any agreement whatever on the Palestine question.’79 The 
alternative to a constructive UN resolution seemed to be a chaotic civil war in Palestine.
This ‘would place an even more severe strain on United States-United Kingdom 
relations.’80 The Canadian delegation had thus worked to avert an international crisis, 
cooperate with key allies, and defend Canadian interests. 
The memorandum also expressed a broader vision of the Western interest in 
Zionist statehood. The authors wrote:
The plan of partition gave to the Western powers the opportunity to establish an independent, 
progressive Jewish state in the Eastern Mediterranean with close economic and cultural ties with 
the West generally and in particular with the United States. The USSR was willing now to 
cooperate in the establishment of this state, the existence of which might be of very great 
consequence to the Western powers in the future political development of the Middle East.81 
The document’s argumentation echoed the rationale for pro-partition diplomacy already 
voiced that autumn by the external affairs department’s Gerry Riddell. It was inserted 
almost verbatim into the annual volume of Canada at the United Nations.82
The most detailed studies that have been published about Canadian support for 
the partition of Palestine are Bercuson’s Canada and the Birth of Israel and Tauber’s 
Personal Policy Making. Both studies review the disagreement between prime minister 
King and the external affairs diplomats grouped around Pearson. King wanted to defer 
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to Britain’s judgement, and worried about domestic Tory reaction if the government did 
not slow its realignment with the US. In February 1948 he wrote concerning the 
Palestine debate that if, ‘in addition to it being alleged that we were being dominated by 
the United States on economic matters, we were being dominated as well on military 
matters, we would have a hard battle to face in our country.’83 Had US and British policy
been aligned there would not have been a problem. But the Truman administration’s 
diplomatic support for Zionist gains ran against the Attlee government’s efforts to 
develop Arab protectorates around Palestine. In this Anglo-American dispute, Pearson, 
appointed secretary of state for external affairs in September 1948, effectively moved to
align Canada with the US.
Bercuson reproduces the strategic arguments of those close to Pearson. He 
details Canada’s UN diplomacy at the General Assembly in 1947 and then at the 
Security Council, on which Canada served a two-year term beginning in January 1948. 
Canadian officials perceived the situation in Palestine in light of broader government 
priorities. In March 1948 King accepted a proposal from the Attlee government to 
participate in new military alliance discussions under ‘the active leadership of the United
Kingdom and the United States’ – negotiations that would lead to the establishment of 
NATO.84 The design of postwar world order remained the paramount consideration for 
Canadian officials. Palestine figured into this process as an irritant in Anglo-American 
relations. Bercuson argues that in this setting, support for Israel became Canada’s best 
option for promoting Anglo-American understanding on the Middle East. Bercuson 
describes King’s echo of British misgivings about Israeli advances as unhelpful: ‘the 
slavish acquiescence which King insisted upon in the Palestine matter was not 
necessary, and it is even possible that Canada might have helped the British face 
reality in Palestine somewhat sooner than they did if Ottawa had not given Whitehall a 
blank cheque.’85 Pearson’s logic was more constructive. ‘Since there was no chance at 
all that the United States would be won over to Britain, it was clear that the British would
have to be dragged over to the United States and that Canada had a definite national 
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interest in helping to do the dragging.’86 Canadian support for Israel, Bercuson 
concludes, reflected an ‘even-handed’ defence of Canadian interests.87
Tauber takes issue with Bercuson’s analysis. He considers Pearson’s strategic 
rationale a subterfuge for ideological support for Zionism. Tauber was writing from 
within Israel’s patriotic consensus, his study funded in part by the Canadian embassy in
Tel Aviv and the Israel Association for Canadian Studies.88 He shares Bercuson’s 
deference to the orthodox Zionist historiography of 1948. To attribute Zionist ideological 
motives to someone is not, for Tauber, to criticize their approach to Palestine, but rather
to credit them with a focus on ‘the moral aspects, truth and justice, and a humanitarian 
attitude.’89 But in Tauber’s reading, Canadian support for partition was not a strategic 
choice. It was a moral choice; one made to great effect by Rand, and then by diplomats 
like Riddell and Pearson, compelled by principle to work for a ‘just cause’ against the 
preferences of their prime minister.90
It is often difficult to disentangle ideology from strategy. The politics of state 
power and of capital accumulation can be reduced to a systemic logic. But while these 
politics may dictate the conduct of a given power, they are at a minimum enveloped in 
less cynical mythology. As Eqbal Ahmad writes, ‘The British carried the white man’s 
burden; the French had their mission civilisatrice; and America stood watch over the 
world’s freedom. Each, in its mission, was threatened by the forces of evil – the yellow, 
the black, and the red perils.’ In all cases, ‘modern imperialism has needed myths to 
legitimize itself.’91 The ideas that legitimize the exercise of power are not, however, 
without a certain force of their own. It is relevant to consider how E.H. Carr addresses 
the relationship between principles and power in his main work on International 
Relations. Carr cites the US theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, for whom politics must 
always balance ‘the ethical and coercive factors of human life.’92 The politics of 
Palestine provide a reminder that ‘ethical’ or principled thinking need not be benign. 
86 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 217.
87 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 240.
88 Tauber, Personal Policy Making, v.
89 Tauber, Personal Policy Making, 70.
90 Tauber, Personal Policy Making, 84.
91 Ahmad, The Selected Writings, 211.
92 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(New York: Perennial, 2001), 100.
150
The Bounds of Postwar Internationalism
Considerations of principle can lead to fiercer oppression than strategic coercion would 
warrant. The history of racism is full of cases in which the culture and ideology of inter-
group hostility not only justified state oppression, but in some measure prompted it. In 
few imperial episodes are either the ideological or the strategic element entirely absent. 
Western support for the transformation of Palestine into an Israel fashioned as ‘Western
outpost’ has always blurred these elements. This has been true in the secondary as in 
the leading Western powers.
For Pearson as for Bercuson, the strategic case was heavily influenced by the 
realities of US politics. Within the US itself, the case for Jewish-state-as-Western-
outpost was embraced more by public ideologues than by imperial planners. These 
were years in which the US intellectual community rallied to the cause of US empire. 
Just as the president of the American Historical Association explained that the US 
needed to mobilize for a ‘total war’ that would ‘enlist everyone,’ the historian no less 
than the physicist, the Sunday editor of the New York Times explained that the role of 
the press was ‘to gain for American policies the support of public opinion at home and 
abroad.’93 On Palestine, such patriotic intellectuals tended to support Zionism. In 
November 1947 Reinhold Niebuhr himself signed a public letter declaring that in the 
whole of the Middle East there were only ‘two islands of Western civilization, Jewish 
Palestine and Christian Lebanon,’ on which the US could reasonably base its policies.94 
In May 1948 the journalist Walter Lippmann, a leading pioneer of US Cold War politics, 
wrote that by supporting Israel the US could gain a ‘foothold’ in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.95 In 1947-8 many of the most prominent intellectual champions of US 
power endorsed Zionist aims.
The actual centres of US strategic decision-making, in contrast, did not. The US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed partition as an unnecessary provocation of the Arab 
world.96 Opposition from within the US State Department was even more insistent. 
George Kennan, director of the department’s policy planning staff, insisted that there 
was no US interest in Palestine that could justify disrupting ‘understanding and 
93 Bruce J. Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the Beginning 
of the Cold War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 129.
94 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage, 1992), 30.
95 Evensen, Truman, Palestine, and the Press, 163.
96 Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, 110.
151
The Bounds of Postwar Internationalism
cooperation and between ourselves and the British . . . on Middle East matters. . . . The 
British position there is in large part our position.’97 These objections were overcome by 
the Truman administration and Congress. Domestic factors were surely at work. It is 
also interesting to see just how directly Truman invoked the logic of the colour line in 
defending his position. Bruce J. Evensen cites Truman’s critique of State Department 
politics on Palestine as follows: ‘They were an anti-Semitic bunch over there, they put 
the Jews in the same category as Chinamen and Negroes.’98 
US discussions reflected the position of the US as the predominant Western 
power. Direct regional considerations, about a Jewish state as an ‘island of Western 
civilization’ or a ‘foothold’ for US power, were appropriate. In secondary states like 
Canada, it was the politics of more powerful allies that framed strategic discussions. 
This has repeatedly been the case since the 1940s. The fact of US support for Israel 
provides leverage to pro-Zionist opinion elsewhere in the West. Wendehorst notes that 
the Revisionist wing of the British Zionist movement itself latched onto this fact as early 
as 1946. British Revisionism was organized at the time through the Jewish Dominion of 
Palestine League, continuing to argue that Britain should establish a Jewish state 
governed by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, a self-governing Dominion like Canada 
and Australia. Among the benefits of creating a Jewish Dominion, the League argued, 
would be ‘denying to the circles purposely interested in British-American estrangement 
one of their most potent instruments of propaganda.’99 In Canada, the Zionist movement
deployed a parallel argument. Bercuson’s study both echoes this argumentation and 
provides a record of how it developed.
Bercuson’s Canada and the Birth of Israel remains the most detailed study of 
Canadian politics on Palestine during the 1940s. But to responsibly engage with it, as 
with his The Secret Army, it is necessary to devote some critical attention to its 
polemical framing. We will return shortly to his research concerning the Canadian 
strategic case for supporting Israel. First, once again, the imprint upon Bercuson’s 
research of his own politics on Palestine needs to be noted.
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Bercuson opens the study with a bold claim to academic neutrality. From a 
posture of professional scholarship he dismisses those histories that are written without 
‘due regard for historical fact.’100 Bercuson has academic stature, and the book has a 
reputable academic publisher. Of course none of this prevents him from sliding into 
propagandist historiography. Canada and the Birth of Israel conveys important details, 
but it also puts forward a formulaic defence of the Zionist politics of force, presented 
with a disregard for basic standards of proof.
The Zionist politics of force are presented to readers vividly. They come through 
with particular clarity in an exchange that Bercuson cites between Elizabeth MacCallum
and the Zionist diplomat Michael Comay, the first head of the Israeli foreign ministry’s 
British Commonwealth division. Bercuson sets the scene for this June 1948 encounter. 
He then relays the content. MacCallum asks Comay whether it might not have been 
better if ‘the Zionist movement had addressed itself in the past to making the Arabs their
allies, rather than persuading the rest of the world to support the Jews.’ ‘No,’ Comay 
responds, elaborating classic political Zionist doctrine: ‘the only way we can succeed is 
to ram our state down the throats of the Arabs. Then they’ll accept it.’101 
Comay’s doctrine seems harsh. But by this point in the study, readers have been 
informed that Comay in fact understands the Arabs well. Comay’s position, we find, is 
corroborated almost word for word by the Arab leadership. To establish this point, 
Bercuson reconstructs another exchange, this one between the Israeli diplomat Abba 
Eban and Abd al-Rahman Azzam, secretary-general of the Arab League. The diplomatic
backdrop is the autumn 1947 diplomacy concerning UNSCOP’s partition proposal. 
Bercuson attributes to Eban an innocent inquiry: ‘Why not have negotiations before and
instead of the war’? And to the Arab League’s secretary-general a thorough vindication 
of the Zionist politics of force:
Get one thing into your heads. You will not get anything by compromise or peaceful means. You 
may perhaps get something, if at all, by force of arms . . . If you win, you will get your state. If you
get your state  . . . you have a chance that the Arabs will one day have to accept it . . . But do not 
consider for a single moment that you will ever have a chance of our accepting you in advance.102
100 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, viii.
101 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 195.
102 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 106-107.
153
The Bounds of Postwar Internationalism
This exchange is presented as fact. Beyond the utter implausibility of the dialogue, 
readers who do not check Bercuson’s sourcing are given no hint that it is nothing more 
than an uncorroborated account written by Eban.103
Notwithstanding his tendency towards propagandist historiography, Bercuson 
traces the development of strategic arguments for Canadian support for partition in 
useful detail. By autumn 1946 the Zionist movement’s appeals to Canadian officials 
were focused on the politics of Anglo-American relations. Bercuson attributes this 
approach to the Canadian scholar Lionel Gelber, who earlier that year began working 
with the Jewish Agency in New York. Gelber was aware of two critical points concerning
Canadian policy. First, that Pearson was the rising force in Canadian external affairs. 
And second, that he and his colleagues were fixated on the developing Anglo-American
alliance. Gelber thus developed an argument based on the assertion, as Bercuson 
summarizes it, that ‘Canada was tailor made to play “honest broker” over Palestine, not 
between Arab and Jew, but between the United States and the United Kingdom.’104 The 
logic was that by supporting partition Canada could encourage British alignment with 
the US. The first appeal to Pearson on this basis was made by Zionist Organization of 
Canada president Sam Zacks, meeting with Pearson in late October 1946. Recall the 
context. In early October Truman had publicly declared his support for partition. This 
could hardly have escaped the attention of Pearson, who for two years ending in 
September 1946 served as Canadian ambassador to Washington. Zacks emphasized 
the Anglo-American tension on which Pearson was already focused. Pearson, in turn, 
explained that he would adhere to any Anglo-American understanding on Palestine and 
also that he himself already felt that ‘partition in Palestine was the just and only solution 
to the Jewish problem.’105
One can debate at length the relative weight of Pearson’s perceptions of Anglo-
American relations and his acceptance of Zionism as an appropriate policy facing the 
Middle East and the European Jewish refugee crisis. Pearson, as Bercuson notes, ‘was
also no maverick when it came to Canadian refusal to admit Jewish refugees to 
Canada.’106 In any case, the agreed fact is that Pearson’s ascendancy in Canadian 
103 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 253.
104 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 51.
105 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 51.
106 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 62.
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external affairs and Canadian support for partition were closely tied to one another. 
Thus an early chapter in Canadian internationalism was support for the admission of 
‘Jewish Palestine,’ in Chaim Weizmann’s phrasing, to ‘the modern family of nations.’
Some Canadian officials continued to view Israeli policy with misgivings. 
Bercuson recounts how Escott Reid, one of Pearson’s closest aides, expressed some 
of these in February 1949 to Eliahu Epstein, Israeli ambassador to the US. Epstein was 
visiting Ottawa to cultivate Canadian-Israeli relations and lay the basis for Israel’s 
application for membership in the UN. Reid took the occasion to argue that Canadian 
policy depended on how Israel conducted itself. In December 1948 Israeli operations in 
the Palestinian southwest had expanded to the point of invading Egyptian territory; 
Israeli forces seemed intent on preventing hundreds of thousands of displaced 
Palestinians from returning to their country; and the Israeli government showed no sign 
of allowing international administration of Jerusalem. Reid expressed concern on these 
three points. Epstein reacted sharply, writes Bercuson, surprised ‘to find such an 
attitude in the department of a Government considered friendly to Israel.’ Reid 
responded that he had only meant to convey concerns ‘in a friendly way.’ Later the 
same day, Pearson met with Epstein and distanced his government from these 
criticisms. Neither population transfer nor territorial expansion would prevent official 
Canadian-Israeli friendship. Hence, in May 1949, the Canadian government of Pearson 
and St.-Laurent co-sponsored the resolution admitting Israel to the UN.107
Conclusion
The Canadian government lent its support to the partition of Palestine amidst a 
significant shift in Canadian foreign policy. As against its interwar status as a relatively 
isolationist Dominion of the British Empire, the Canadian state was becoming an early 
postwar partner in a reshaped Western alliance, globally centred on US power. 
Rhetorical shifts aside, the Canadian leadership was meanwhile bringing the privileged 
position it had come to occupy in the era of more formal colonialism into the postwar 
world. The ‘internationalism’ it pursued in this context was real enough, but was also 
107 Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 226-228.
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sharply restricted. London no longer dictated Canadian conduct in external affairs; 
King’s relative isolationism also gave way to a more assertive Canadian diplomacy in 
international forums like the UN. Throughout this process, however, the Canadian 
government’s global approach remained anchored in Western alliance politics, and 
aligned above all with the exercise of Anglo-American power.
In Canada as in the US, the influence of reigning political culture enforced a 
certain identification with Zionist as against Arab claims. Wartime catastrophe for the 
Jews of Europe tended to give additional moral weight to Zionist claims while Arab 
argumentation, despite the onset of formal decolonization, rarely resonated. However if,
in the US, the ideological case for Zionism balanced with the direct strategic 
calculations in the purview of a leading superpower, in Canada, strategic calculations 
were more derivative. In purely strategic terms, the argumentation in favour of Israel-as-
Western-outpost suggested in the external affairs memorandum of 27 December 1947 
was less significant than the wider question of Anglo-American relations, in which 
Canada had a more direct stake. Across the world, early postwar diplomacy concerning 
Palestine showcased the increased global significance of US power. The impact on 
Canada was decisive. Although Britain remained the paramount Western power in the 
Middle East, the disconnect between its regional preeminence and its growing reliance 
upon the US was gradually becoming apparent. At their base, Canadian internationalist 
politics were remarkably parochial. The politics of London and Washington still formed 
the most important points of reference. The Canadian government thus approached the
Middle East with an internationalism attuned above all to the dynamics of the Anglo-
American alliance. So it would remain for some time to come.
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‘The Korean parallel will be in many minds. In that case the USA were able to gird themselves effectively 
with the collective armour of the UN. There will be many who are not convinced that in the present case 
the UK and France could not have achieved similar salutary results (and with USA support) in their efforts
to bring about a cease fire, separate the fighting elements and introduce minimum stability in the Middle 
East.’1
-Arnold Heeney, then Canadian ambassador in Washington 
(31 October 1956)
‘I go on repeating to myself: nowadays admit that you are the loser! They showed much more daring and 
dynamism . . . they played with fire, and they won.’2 
-Moshe Sharett, former Israeli prime minister (4 April 1957)
* * *
The Suez Crisis of 1956 marked the high point of Anglo-American tension in the 
postwar period, focusing the core concerns of Canadian foreign policy on the Middle 
East in an unprecedented way. The Anglo-French assault on Egypt, coordinated with 
Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and much of the Egyptian Sinai, butted up against 
vehement US opposition. The US, as Peter Gowan has written, was developing hub-
and-spokes strategic ties with its allies based on the acknowledged pre-eminence of US
power;3 it was not disposed to welcome unauthorized allied action in the Middle East.
Moreover, this particular action was perceived as a clumsy strategic blunder. A 
popular and diplomatic backlash through much of the Third World developed 
immediately. The Soviet Union gained anti-colonial prestige in the Middle East just as it 
was politically exposing itself by crushing the Hungarian workers’ uprising. ‘It was an 
amazing miscalculation of forces and circumstances,’ recalls Lester B. Pearson, who 
was at the time still Canada’s secretary of state for external affairs. ‘It was not even a 
good military operation.’4 Pearson, with his long-professed commitment to ‘the close 
understanding and friendly cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon peoples,’ headed up 
a Canadian diplomatic scramble to help restore Anglo-American alignment.
1 Greg Donaghy, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [henceforth DCER] Vol. 22 (Ottawa: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001), 185.
2 Livia Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism, Third Edition: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal 
Diary and Other Documents (Belmont, Massachusetts: AAUG Press, 1986), 49.
3 Peter Gowan, ‘The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty,’ Socialist Register 39 (2003), 6-16.
4 John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 241.
157
Suez and the Adjustment to US Primacy
These events carry singular significance in Canadian diplomatic iconography. 
For his role in United Nations diplomacy during the Suez Crisis, Pearson was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize. And he was in turn positioned as the symbolic linchpin of 
Canadian liberal internationalism as it conceives of itself on the world stage. In the 
Canadian public arena and scholarly literature alike, the concept ‘Pearsonian 
internationalism’ is pervasive, and it continues to frame foreign policy discussions up to 
the present. Liberals and social democrats advocating a more progressive and 
internationally-minded foreign policy for Canada persistently invoke the concept in one 
or another form.
The contemporary terms of discussion are reviewed in Paul Heinbecker and 
Bessma Momani’s Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, a volume 
bringing together the writings of Canadian academics and diplomats.5 A picture 
emerges of two major political currents vying for official predominance in Canada: the 
liberal internationalists, positioning themselves in the tradition of Pearson’s Middle East 
diplomacy and avowedly committed to multilateralism and the rule of international law; 
and the neoconservatives, who view the Middle East as the terrain for a clash of 
civilizations in which Canada should join traditional allies on wartime footing. Within this 
contest, liberal internationalists look to Pearsonian diplomacy for symbolic historical 
leverage against the neoconservatives’ nearly unconditional pro-Israel fervour.
The assertive pro-Israel push from Canadian neoconservatives in recent years 
has not met a real push-back from liberal internationalists so much as it has 
encountered scattered expressions of diplomatic unease. Here a limited parallel can be 
identified with the rise of the Israeli right amidst defensive objections from liberal 
Zionists and the Israeli political centre.6 In both cases, moderate sections of the political
establishment object more to their rightist opponents’ unapologetic intensification of 
established policy – alignment with Anglo-American power in the Canadian case, 
coercive exclusion of Palestinians in the Israeli – than to its essential core. Weak 
historical reference points mark the moderate intellectuals’ defensive posture.
5 Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, eds., Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2007).
6 See Dan Freeman-Maloy, ‘Kadima’s Black Flags and Israel’s Image Problem,’ The Palestine Chronicle 
(29 November 2011), <http://www.palestinechronicle.com/kadimas-black-flags-and-israels-image-
problem>.
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Critically revisiting these reference points is one way to challenge the narrow 
constraints of established political discussions.
This chapter examines the prized apex of Pearsonian diplomacy. It argues that 
Canada’s putative internationalism in the era of the Suez Crisis was determined by a 
politics of empire that was evolving as the centre of Western power and decision-
making continued to shift from Europe to the United States. Israeli scholar-statesman 
Michael Oren, who served as the second Netanyahu government’s ambassador to the 
United States, and Canadian diplomat Michael Bell, who occupied various 
ambassadorial posts in the Middle East, both use the same phrase to describe 
Pearson’s diplomacy at the time: ‘fair-minded.’7 Value judgements of this kind are by the
nature of things ideologically loaded. Political principles of a different kind lead to 
different conclusions. In any event, whatever else it may have been, Pearsonian 
diplomacy was not a politics of wide internationalism or of international law.
These were years when the Palestinians themselves were effectively 
marginalized; removed from the political map in 1948, the Palestinians lacked viable 
national organization until the 1960s. But the Palestine question remained near the core
of Middle East politics. The Suez Crisis featured the first Israeli occupation of the Gaza 
Strip, from November 1956 to March 1957. And all of the disputes concerning Israel’s 
place in the regional order were inescapably connected to questions of borders and 
refugees – of how much of historic Palestine would be under Israel’s control and what 
would become of the Palestinians pushed out of these lands. Canada’s approach to the
Palestine question was in this context subsumed in its broader approach to the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
For Canada the decisive actors in the politics of the Middle East were, as ever, 
the US and Britain. In a March 1956 memorandum voicing some misgivings about the 
strategies of Canada’s ‘Anglo-American betters,’ as he described the US and Britain, 
Canadian diplomat John Holmes re-iterated the basic article of faith: these two powers 
occupied a ‘position of leadership’ in the Middle East that deserved Canadian support; 
‘however much we argue against an arrogant use of that position it is nonetheless in 
7 Michael B. Oren, ‘Faith and Fair-mindedness: Lester B. Pearson and the Suez Crisis,’ Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 3, no. 1 (1992), 48-73; and Heinbecker and Momani, Canada and the Middle East, 8.
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our interests to preserve it.’8 Canadian diplomats by their nature looked to Washington 
and London. But others made parallel judgements. In 1955, for example, an Israeli 
diplomat posted to France looked to the same power centres. He suggested that Israeli 
strategic cooperation with France on the Middle East needed to be put in perspective: 
‘the United States and Britain are the masters of this region.’9 Canadian officials felt 
invested in this state of affairs. And, more to the point, in the internal harmony of the 
Anglo-American alliance itself.
This chapter begins by reviewing the Anglo-American strategies and perceptions 
of Israel that framed official Canadian thinking. It then identifies Canada’s operative 
integration into the US foreign policy system (notably with respect to weapons 
supplies), and the continued unease of its officials when faced with strategic tension 
between the US and Britain. Anglo-American tension remained the element of Middle 
East politics that most animated Canada’s internationalists. This concern shaped the 
Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. For Canadian policy-makers, the fundamental 
problem with the war launched by Israeli, British, and French forces in 1956 was not the
violation of basic norms of decolonization. It was that it was pursued without US 
authorization.
The Canadian government did not perceive Britain’s Eden government as 
possessing either the independent power or the strategic sense necessary to anchor 
allied strategy in the Middle East. Amidst the Anglo-American tensions of 1956, the 
Canadian government thus gravitated more closely to the US than did the other 
‘members of the old Commonwealth’ (as the white Dominions were now more 
commonly called). But the Canadian internationalists never quite matched the 
ostensible anti-colonialism of the Eisenhower administration. Once again the Canadian 
government tried to mediate between allied power centres. In the process, Pearson and
his colleagues worked to secure for the attacking powers the most advantageous 
conditions possible for troop withdrawals.
The Eisenhower administration was no champion of decolonization or Western 
non-intervention in the Third World. It was under its direction that the US sponsored 
8 DCER Vol. 22, 5, 7.
9 Zach Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, 1952-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1997), 58.
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coups d’état in Iran and Guatemala; that the US announced that it would defend the 
Western sphere of influence through the aggressive nuclear doctrine of ‘massive 
retaliation’; and that the US first supported and then moved to replace French 
colonialism in Vietnam.10 Alfred Grosser writes that much of the world felt ‘that American
anti-colonialism was merely a pretext for substituting an American for the European 
presence in the former colonial territories.’11 This was essentially accurate. In the Middle
East, however, the European powers and Israel made the US of the 1950s look 
moderate by comparison. Canadian officials staked out a position between supposed 
US moderation and the war aims of the tripartite aggressors. Tory opinion in Canada 
was outraged that Canada’s Liberal government was not more closely aligned with the 
attacking powers.12 But in Britain itself, many were more understanding. The London 
Daily Telegraph, for example, would in March 1957 praise the Canadian government’s 
record at the UN, explaining that ‘Canada tried to temper with realism the legalism into 
which the Assembly was forced by Afro-Asian rigidity and American timidity.’13
For Britain, the experience of the Suez Crisis dispelled any illusions that a 
successful imperial strategy could be pursued independently of the US. The Canadian 
government sought to soften this blow. For Israel, on the other hand, the experience 
enforced the lesson of 1948: that military conquests could yield political gains. In its 
modest way, the Canadian government contributed here too, opposing any penalties for
Israeli aggression while favouring rewards that would allow Israel to withdraw with an 
air of strategic success. An interesting thread of Canadian participation in peacekeeping
runs through this history. And there may be something of political worth in it. But 
Pearsonian diplomacy itself is an extraordinarily weak precedent for criticism of Israeli 
policy. The role of Western diplomacy in cultivating the Israeli leadership’s sense of 
impunity has worsened the Palestine crisis at every stage. And in this respect as in 
others, Pearson’s Canada contributed to the problem.
10 On the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ see Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: 
The Pentagon’s Secret War Plans (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 105. 
11 Alfred Grosser, trans. Michael Shaw, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 137.
12 See, for example, José E. Igartua, ‘“Ready, Aye, Ready” No More? Canada, Britain, and the Suez 
Crisis in the Canadian Press,’ in Phillip Buckner, ed., Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 47-65.
13 Bernard Figler, ‘History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada,’ in ed. Eli Gottesman, Canadian Jewish 
Reference Book and Directory (Ottawa: Central Rabbinical Seminary of Canada, 1963), 93.
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Israel Propositions the Western Alliance
From the moment of the Israeli state’s establishment, its leadership approached 
neighbouring Arab societies, as it approached the Palestinians, with a strategy based 
on military force. External support was needed to provide the means for this policy. At 
first, the Israeli leadership courted the support of the Soviet bloc as well as the West. 
Western Zionist networks had been critical to Zionist arms procurement in 1948; but 
one of the most important logistics and procurement centres operated by these very 
networks had been in Zatec, Czechoslovakia. In United Nations partition diplomacy too,
the Soviet bloc had joined US allies in supporting Zionist efforts. It was against the 
Arabs that Israel sought support. A posture of neutrality between the Western and 
Soviet blocs initially seemed expedient. For the Western alliance being marshalled by 
the US, however, hostility to the Soviet Union soon became the structuring element of 
global policy. And securing Western support was Israel’s over-riding priority. In July 
1950 Israel abandoned its posture of neutrality by declaring support for US operations 
in Korea.14  In the years ahead, it sought to position its own regional war aims within the 
framework of Western Cold War strategy.
‘The principal goal of Israel’s foreign policy,’ writes Zach Levey, ‘was the creation 
of a strategic relationship with the United States, the leader of the free world.’15 US 
economic support for Israel built up quickly. In January 1949 the US Export-Import Bank
extended $100 million in credits to Israel to import US goods and services, which Levey
identifies as having saved Israel from economic collapse.16 Fundraising for Israel on the
part of allied Western Jewish organizations was another indispensable line of support. 
In the first decade of Israeli statehood the United Israel Appeal (UIA) and related 
successors to the old Zionist funds were ‘the principal source of Israel’s foreign 
currency “earnings”.’17 While Canadians contributed, the most large-scale fundraising 
occurred in the US. For all of these links, however, US planners were reluctant to 
directly supply Israel with advanced weaponry. Israel never ceased in its efforts to 
14 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1987), 189.
15 Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, 1.
16 Levey, Israel and the Western Powers, 4.
17 Daniel Elazar, Introduction to Ernest Stock, Partners and Pursestrings: A History of the United Israel 
Appeal (Lanham: University Press of America with the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 1987), xi.
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widen US strategic assistance. In the meantime, it looked to acquire weapons from 
other powers – especially from France and Britain, but also from smaller Western states
including Italy, Belgium, and Canada.
Canadian foreign policy planning took local interests into account. This 
encouraged, among other things, pursuit of export opportunities for the Canadian 
armaments industry.18 But the supply of weaponry raised larger strategic questions. 
Planners considered these in light of the Canadian state’s position within the alliance 
systems structured around US and British power. A strategic case for attaching Israel to 
these alliances as a regional enforcer was already in public circulation. Arabs were 
considered unreliable subjects in an age of decolonization. The proposal to use Israel 
as an instrument to manage them was summarized in 1951 by Gershon Schocken, 
editor-in-chief of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz. Israel, wrote Schocken, could be trusted not 
to pursue ‘an aggressive policy against the Arab countries, if that will run clearly counter
to the wishes of the United States or Britain.’ But in the right circumstances Israel could 
deliver powerful blows against Arab upstarts: ‘if the Western powers will prefer, once, 
for whatever reason, to close their eyes, you can rely on it that Israel will be capable of 
sufficiently punishing one or more of the neighbouring countries, whose lack of courtesy
towards the West has gone beyond the permissible limits.’19  
Canadian officials sometimes echoed this argumentation. The August 1951 
cabinet discussions concerning sale to Israel of a stock of 25-pound guns is a case in 
point. The cabinet minutes record that Pearson, speaking for external affairs, and 
Brooke Claxton, then minister for national defence, agreed that Canada’s North Atlantic 
commitments were compatible with the supply of weaponry to Israel: ‘With the Arab 
world in a state of internal unrest and mounting anti-Western hysteria, Israel was 
emerging as the one stable element in the area.’20  But here as across the world, 
Canadian officials were looking to US and British strategy and working to align 
themselves with it. Their interpretation of Anglo-American strategy and their thoughts on
how best to relate to it set the terms of discussion. The strategic rationale for supporting
18 See, for example, Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER Vol. 17 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 1996), 1735; and Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER Vol. 21 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, 1999), 1217.
19 Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection, 189.
20 DCER Vol. 17, 1728-9.
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Israel persistently surfaced. But during the 1950s this was not the main strategic 
conception, either in the US or in Britain.
The relations of power between the US and Britain strongly favoured the US. It 
was nonetheless Britain that had facilities in the Middle East and experience with the 
region. In the overlapping spheres of influence established by the two powers, the 
Middle East was thus identified at the beginning of the 1950s as ‘a British and 
Commonwealth responsibility.’21 Here the term ‘Commonwealth’ is ambiguous. 
Decolonization was bringing Third World states into the organization. With dilution of its 
racial character came erosion of its utility as an imperial forum. Pearson is cited as 
having said that ‘the advent of African Commonwealth states doomed the 
Commonwealth system.’22 In the early postwar period, the problem was Asian 
membership. British officials managed the problem by drawing a distinction between the
‘new’ and the ‘old’ Commonwealth. In this way the 1951 meeting of Commonwealth 
prime ministers yielded opportunities for more reliable coordination. Ritchie Ovendale 
explains that special sessions were convened from which Asian members were 
excluded. ‘Talks on the defence of the Middle East and Africa were confined to Britain, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.’23 Here Britain 
and the ‘old Commonwealth’ developed plans for a Middle East Command based in 
Egypt. Canada was old Commonwealth; but it was also deeply integrated into a North 
American arrangement. The Canadian government was therefore assigned to US rather
than to British areas of responsibility. It associated with allied policy in the Middle East 
from a distance.
British strategy centred on maintenance of a direct troop presence in Arab 
countries, approved by nominally independent governments tied to Britain by treaty 
obligations. The Hashemite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq were among Britain’s 
closest protectorates. But it was Egypt, where Britain had maintained an uninterrupted 
troop presence since 1882, that was the centrepiece of British strategy. Managing 
Egyptian politics proved challenging. An Egyptian popular upheaval in 1935 had forced 
21 Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the 
Cold War, 1945-1951 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 124.
22 Gordon T. Stewart, ‘“An Objective of US Foreign Policy since the Founding of the Republic”: The United
States and the End of Empire in Canada,’ in ed. Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire, 96.
23 Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, 119, 126.
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Britain to make concessions to nationalist demands, producing a compromise in the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The result was not outright colonial rule. But nor was it 
independence. After World War II agitation spread in Egypt against various provisions of
the 1936 treaty, especially the authorization for Britain to maintain its military occupation
of the Suez Canal zone. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to revise the treaty made little 
progress. In October 1951 the Egyptian government, impelled by popular pressure, 
unilaterally renounced the treaty. Alongside diplomatic pressure for a British withdrawal 
there emerged a guerrilla campaign. From October 1951 to January 1952, British forces
in the Canal zone faced periodic attacks from units of volunteer irregulars.24
Canada was asked only for declaratory support. Soon after Egyptian 
renunciation of the treaty the Canadian government received a message to this effect 
from Britain. The message explained that the British, tasked with the security of the 
Middle East, ‘shall regard ourselves as agents acting on behalf of the free world when 
we say that we intend to stay in Egypt whatever the cost.’ Egyptian consent was 
besides the point:
We would reject any suggestion that as the existence of a base in Egypt is a cardinal feature of 
the Allied Middle East Command organization there can be no Allied base there if Egypt will not 
participate. If the Egyptians agree to participate in the Middle East Command, well and good, and
the base would become an Allied base. But if there is no agreement with Egypt we still intend to 
hold the base so that it may be available for use by the Allies.25
The Canadian government publicly supported this position. But significantly, Canadian 
officials repeatedly emphasized among themselves that this support came only after US
support had been confirmed. ‘As a matter now almost of instinct and habit,’ wrote one 
external affairs official, ‘we were accustomed to consult both London and Washington 
on all major questions.’26
For its part, the Israeli threat was not altogether removed from Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations. Amidst the wave of anti-Egyptian racism that swept the British sphere 
during this period, Winston Churchill, who returned to the office of prime minister in 
October 1951, invoked the possibility of authorizing an Israeli attack. In December 1951
he suggested that this threat be conveyed to the Egyptians in the tradition of gunboat 
24 Anouar Abdel-Malek, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Random 
House, 1968), 31.
25 DCER Vol. 17, 1719-20.
26 DCER Vol. 17, 1725.
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diplomacy: ‘Tell them that if we have any more of their cheek we will set the Jews on 
them and drive them back into the gutter, from which they should never have 
emerged.’27 But this was more an outburst than a statement of policy. Britain had its 
own troops in place. Moreover, the effort to maintain treaty obligations with Arab states 
needed on some level to reflect the fact that the main external threat to them came from
Israel. Even in 1956 the British government would seek, if clumsily, to downplay its 
collusion with Israel.
By the time the Free Officers movement within the Egyptian military staged their 
coup d’état of July 1952, the country had been pushed to the brink of chaos. Perhaps 
the worst moment came in January of that year, when British tanks and artillery 
attacked the Government House at the Suez Canal station of Ismailia. British forces 
killed more than 150 Egyptians, mostly peasant policemen, provoking massive outrage. 
Anouar Abdel-Malek describes a broad popular response, with factories closed by a 
general strike and workers converging with large student demonstrations. Abdel-Malek 
also describes the descent upon Cairo of organized teams of arsonists whom he 
associates with the Egyptian far right.28 Many lives were lost in the ensuing destruction, 
including that of Canadian trade commissioner J.M. Boyer; Churchill took the occasion 
to deride Egyptians as ‘lower than the most degraded savages now known.’29 At 
moments like this US confidence in British policy frayed. Faced with the destruction in 
Cairo, US secretary of state Dean Acheson remarked that the ‘splutter of musketry’ may
not deserve the confidence that Churchill placed in it.30
Against this backdrop the Egyptian Free Officers coup was greeted with cautious
US optimism. Abdel-Malek describes the consolidation of the new regime in the 
summer of 1952. ‘Political confusion was at its height,’ writes Abdel-Malek, ‘and some 
people went so far as to wish for a real popular revolution.’ With peasants calling for 
agrarian reform and organized labour echoing demands for change, a strike was 
declared by workers in the Anglo-Egyptian textiles factories of the Beyda Dyers 
Company at Kafr el-Dawwar. Union leaders Mustafa Khamis and Mohammed Hassan 
27 Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Postwar 
Decolonization, 1945-1973 (London: Routledge, 2012), 19.
28 Abdel-Malek, Egypt, 35-7.
29 DCER Vol. 21, 1237; and Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2003), 40-41.
30 Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East, 19.
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el-Bakary addressed a demonstration of workers and peasants in front of the factories, 
speaking ‘of a new era, of the end of injustice, of oppression.’ The response was swift: 
‘This was August 13. On the same day the army surrounded the factory, dispersed the 
demonstrators and set up a military tribunal that tried the two labour leaders on the spot
and sentenced them to death. They were hanged high the next day.’31 US planners 
were enthusiastic about this suppression of the communist threat. The ‘robust handling’ 
of the strike, writes Steven C. Smith, ‘sealed US approval of the Free Officers.’32 The 
next month Acheson pledged to Egypt ‘the active friendship of the United States.’33 
British officials had misgivings about US policy on Egypt. In part this reflected 
different strategic calculations. As the Egyptian military regime suppressed the left it 
also pursued a programme of agrarian reform. This effort was supported by banking 
and industrial capital; the National Bank of Egypt remarked that ‘any reform whatever, 
no matter how radical, is preferable to the anarchy of a mass movement.’34 The regime 
was also making overtures to foreign capital that were welcomed both by the Egyptian 
Federation of Industries (EFI) and by the US ambassador to Cairo, Jeffersen Caffery.35 
Britain, on the other hand, stubbornly continued to support traditional landed interests. It
also continued to collide with Egypt over occupation of the Canal zone. Anglo-American
disagreement was compounded by a growing sense of rivalry. Just as the US had 
driven a unanimous NATO resolution in support of French warfare in Vietnam, it had 
publicly supported Britain against Egypt.36 British foreign secretary Anthony Eden was 
among those questioning US motives: ‘All the Americans want to do is to replace 
France and run Indochina themselves. They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want 
to run the world.’37
For Canadian officials, for the time being, such Anglo-American differences were 
not especially troubling. Canada’s regional arms supply policy was harmonized with 
both the US and Britain, which, alongside France, coordinated Western arms shipments
to the Middle East under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The Canadian 
31 Abdel-Malek, Egypt, 69-70. 
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government also participated in more direct international management of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In 1954 a Canadian soldier, E.L.M. Burns, was appointed to command 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This was the force tasked
with monitoring the armistice lines of 1949 that served as Israel’s undeclared borders. 
Arms supply and peacekeeping policies involved the Canadian government in Middle 
East politics to some extent. But in the final count the region was as peripheral to core 
Canadian concerns as Canada was to the Middle East.
By 1954 the British proposal for a Western strategy centred on military bases in 
Egypt was discredited. The US under the Eisenhower administration was no longer 
following the British lead. US secretary of state John Foster Dulles came to feel that 
close US association with Britain could be almost as provocative to the Arab world as 
US association with Israel. As an alternative to reliance on the British in Egypt, Dulles 
proposed developing a ‘northern tier’ of Western-allied states, to include Turkey, Iraq, 
Syria, Pakistan, and perhaps Iran.38 British forces in the Suez Canal zone were anyway 
doing little beyond dealing with the periodic guerrilla attacks provoked by their 
presence. That year Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser consolidated his control of the 
Egyptian military government. And in October, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement for British 
troop withdrawals was finalized. The agreement was a compromise. The British military 
would be authorized to make use of Egyptian territory in the event of an international 
war, but it would not maintain a presence in peacetime. All British military personnel 
would be withdrawn from the Canal zone by June 1956.39 Late 1954 witnessed two 
other inter-related developments in Egypt. The first was another wave of government 
repression against the left. The second was a stepped-up effort on the part of Nasser’s 
government to cultivate strategic ties with the US and Britain.40
To Canadian officials Britain, taking the US cue, seemed to be accommodating 
itself to the Nasser government. The same could not be said of Israel. Western alliance 
with anti-communist regimes in the Arab world might isolate Israel from Western 
support as it sought to consolidate and expand the conquests of 1948. In the summer of
1954 Colonel Benjamin Givli, head of Israeli military intelligence, thus instructed Israeli 
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intelligence assets in Egypt to carry out attacks on US and British targets in order ‘to 
break the West’s confidence in the existing regime.’ ‘The Israeli origin should be totally 
covered,’ instructed Givli, ‘while attention should be shifted to any other possible 
factor.’41 In July the unit responsible was caught after a bomb in the pocket of one 
operative accidentally exploded in Alexandria. The mission was a spectacular debacle. 
Canada had just established a diplomatic mission in Cairo. In December 1954 Israel 
requested that the Canadian government use its representatives in Cairo to protest the 
trial of the captured Israeli operatives.
The request came from the Israeli ambassador to Ottawa, Michael Comay. 
Comay’s representations were summarized in a memorandum written for Pearson by 
external affairs diplomat Jean Chapdelaine. Comay, like other Israeli diplomats across 
the world, charged the Egyptian government with conducting a ‘show trial’ against ‘a 
group of Jews in Egypt who had been falsely accused of plotting in favour of Israel.’42 
He also urged that Canada support Israel in its demand that Egypt forego belligerency 
rights and allow Israeli shipping through Egyptian territorial waters.
Naturally ‘the Israelis wish to show that they want peace,’ Chapdelaine wrote, 
‘that it is the Arabs who maintain warlike measures.’ The situation was, however, more 
complex. And under the circumstances, domestic Egyptian politics made government 
abandonment of official belligerence unlikely. ‘Because the Nasser régime is perhaps 
the last chance for stability in Egypt,’ he continued, ‘it should not be condemned too 
strongly for resorting to those tactics in order to survive.’ The Canadian government 
considered Israeli claims against Egypt with caution. On the issue of the ‘show trial,’ 
Chapdelaine emphasized that Canada could not afford to give Israel unqualified 
support. ‘Whereas for a variety of reasons we can be reasonably assured that our 
relations with Israel are on a sound footing, we have less reason to be complacent 
about Canada’s relations with the Arab states.’ The fact that the Egyptian story 
concerning these arrests seemed more credible than the Israeli enforced a measure of 
caution. Chapdelaine concluded: ‘the future of our diplomatic mission in Egypt should 
not be jeopardized so soon after its establishment by pressing too vigorously Israeli 
contentions which may not be as well founded as Israel might make them appear.’ 
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Chapdelaine recommended that the Canadian government take no action beyond the 
usual: consultation with the US and Britain.43
Reflecting on this period in his memoirs, Pearson writes that Israel emerged as 
‘an outpost . . . of the West in the Middle East.’44 This is accurate enough; while Britain 
positioned itself as the regional guardian of Western interests, Israel tried to do likewise 
– it also did all it could to disrupt the development of competing Arab client 
relationships. The Canadian government associated both with Britain and with Israel, 
but cautiously. US power was increasingly making itself felt. Prime minister St.-Laurent 
summarized the linchpin of Canada’s global policy: ‘while we sometimes differ about 
tactics, the rest of the free nations cannot quarrel with the strategy of American 
leadership.’45 And in 1954 US strategy seemed to involve extension to the Middle East 
of something like the Latin American model. In these circumstances the Canadian 
government limited its own Western alliance commitments in the region while avoiding 
disputes among allies.
Converging Drives to War
Israeli politics before 1967 are the object of much liberal nostalgia. These were 
the years of an Israel dominated by Ben-Gurion’s Labour Zionism, before the perpetual 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In all that concerns this period the gap
between the record of Israeli politics and its established representation in the West is at 
its widest. One useful source detailing actual Israeli conduct during this period is the 
account provided by the Canadian commander of UNTSO, E.L.M. Burns. As head of 
UNTSO from 1954-6 Burns was responsible for monitoring the 1949 armistice lines. He 
was then appointed to command the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that 
replaced Israeli forces in Gaza and the Sinai when Israel finally withdrew after the 
occupation of 1956-7. Burns provides a record of his service in a book entitled Between
Arab and Israeli.
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Burns writes ruefully of the early period of his service, when he ‘was still 
sufficiently naïve to believe that statements of senior officials of the [Israeli] Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs could be relied upon to represent the intentions of the real directors of 
Israel’s foreign and defence policies.’46 The policies he observed were so at odds with 
official Israeli statements that common sense drove him to a certain degree of criticism. 
The mythology of a defensive Labour Zionist Israel was from the beginning at odds with
the record provided by observers like Burns. Rejection of this mythology now has more 
irrefutable foundations. In more than 2,400 pages of diary entries Moshe Sharett, 
Israel’s first foreign minister and then prime minister from 1954-5, sheds light on Israeli 
strategy. The Sharett diaries were eventually published in Hebrew, and after a struggle 
over publication rights the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) 
made selections available in English.47 The reality depicted by Sharett is now also 
corroborated by declassifed Israeli materials. The details of Israeli government 
discussions are accessible in a study written by Motti Golani, Israel in Search of a 
War.48 The Canadian government’s policies towards Israel should be considered 
alongside the reality revealed in materials such as these.
The priorities of the Western powers aside, the Israeli leadership was from the 
early 1950s developing ambitious war plans on every front. War was pursued most 
aggressively by Ben-Gurion and those closest to him, especially Moshe Dayan and 
Shimon Peres. As early as 1951 Ben-Gurion had his military advisers draw up plans for 
occupation of the West Bank.49 When Israeli cross-border warfare escalated in earnest, 
it was the West Bank that was first targeted, in the Qibya massacre of October 1953. 
Publicly Sharett defended the action as foreign minister. Privately he was livid: ‘when I 
opposed the action,’ he wrote on learning details of the Qibya raid, ‘I didn’t even 
remotely suspect such a bloodbath.’50 In the years leading up to the Gaza-Sinai 
campaign of 1956 Israel considered war against every neighbouring country. To 
observers like Burns, Israeli policy seemed dangerously provocative. Sharett defended 
the attacks publicly while leaving a remarkable record of private hand-wringing. In 
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March 1955, for example, Sharett, then Israeli prime minister, described the latest IDF 
attack on the West Bank as follows: ‘This may be taken as a decisive proof that we 
have decided to pass on to a general bloody offensive on all fronts: yesterday Gaza, 
today something on the Jordanian border, tomorrow the Syrian DMZ.’51 Recorded Israeli
war aims ranged from establishment of a Christian protectorate in Lebanon to the 
occupation of southern Syria.52
The most sustained Israeli war planning targeted Gaza and Egypt. The 
Jordanian government held the West Bank, and it was closely tied to Britain. Syria and 
Lebanon, despite the evacuation of French forces in 1946, were still considered part of 
the French sphere. Egypt was not only the most important of the Arab states. It also 
came to be seen by Western planners as one of the most challenging centres of anti-
imperialist agitation. In 1951 Churchill invoked the possibility of prompting an Israeli 
assault on Egypt. That year, Ben-Gurion considered approaching Britain with a proposal
for Israel to occupy the Egyptian Sinai, expel the population, and offer the Suez Canal 
up for international control.53 As it happened, Israeli and Western warfare against Egypt 
was not coordinated until 1956. But much earlier, Israeli hawks were already trying to 
provoke a war. Motti Golani reviews how Israeli planners directed raids on Gaza with 
the aim of sparking a widened conflict. ‘Dayan never spoke about an Israeli-initiated war
in so many words before April 1955,’ writes Golani, ‘but this had always been the real 
thrust of his entire posture, which was in no way “hysterical”, as Sharett tended to 
describe it.’54 As it prepared for war, Israel appealed to the West for more weaponry.
It was clear to Canadian officials that Israel’s border wars were about more than 
self-defence. IDF raids were being framed as retaliation for Palestinian infiltration. In 
other words, Israel was demanding that the Arab states clamp down on the 1948 
refugee populations. In Gaza, as Burns noted, Palestinians were trapped, blocked from 
entering Egypt by Egyptian authorities and excluded from their former lands by an 
‘Armistice Demarcation Line which they cross in peril of being shot by Israelis or 
imprisoned by Egyptians.’55 Between the wars of 1948 and 1956 Israeli forces killed 
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thousands of Palestinians as they tried to return to territory held by Israel. Although the 
‘vast majority’ (in the estimation of Benny Morris) made the journey for social or 
economic reasons, Israeli diplomacy focused on those few who returned in small 
guerrilla units, the fedayin.56 Burns was among those pointing out that the Arab states 
could not be expected to repress the Palestinians as thoroughly as Israel demanded. 
The exclusion of the Palestinians and the annexation of their lands were viewed with 
nearly unanimous Arab outrage. As Arab regimes clamped down on Palestinian 
infiltration they were enforcing ‘a suspension of hostilities against Israel,’ wrote Burns, ‘a
state of affairs which would lead towards a peace leaving Israel in possession of the 
lands from which she had forcibly expelled the Arabs.’57 Any regime that did not want to 
make an enemy of its public had to approach this issue with caution. Israel, moreover, 
did not seem set to confine itself to disproportionate retaliation. Burns was especially 
critical of the Israeli operations he was monitoring. But as Israel sought to build up its 
intervention forces, few found the cover story of cross-border retaliation credible.
One obvious contradiction was identified in a November 1954 memorandum 
written by Canadian under-secretary of state for external affairs Jules Léger. He wrote:
The weapons which the Israelis have been seeking – jet aircraft, tanks, aerial bombs and 
increased artillery – seem well beyond their needs for defence against the Arabs, in the present 
disorganized state of the latter. The best available evidence indicates that Israel could now 
defend itself against any attack the Arabs could mount. Moreover, the weapons in demand are 
not those normally used for punitive raids (assuming one could find justification for the retaliatory 
raids carried out by Israeli forces). This circumstantial evidence could mean, therefore, that the 
Israelis are contemplating large-scale operations.’58
Since the spring of 1954 Israel had been appealing to Canada to supply it with a 
squadron of advanced fighter aircraft.59 The jets in question were F-86s which a 
Canadian firm was producing under a licensing agreement with the US. But ‘the Israeli 
air force,’ in the judgement of the Canadian defence ministry, was already ‘at least a 
match for the combined air power of the Arab States.’ The F-86s were in a class of 
swept-wing aircraft that even British forces were not deploying in the Middle East. 
Officials were most worried about the implications of expanded Israeli attacks on the 
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West Bank. In the Canadian nightmare scenario, what if Israel launched an invasion to 
the east in circumstances that compelled Britain to intervene under the terms of its treaty
with Jordan, only to face an Israel armed with Canadian aircraft?60 Canada’s international
commitments seemed to dictate a cautious approach to Israel’s military build-up. The 
issue of Canadian fighter aircraft for Israel was, however, not yet put to rest.
In 1955, relations between the Nasser government and the Western powers 
began to deteriorate. From the Egyptian perspective, US conditions for military and 
economic assistance too closely resembled the old imperialism. Since the Free Officers
coup, Egypt had been appealing to the US for military supplies. The US provided Egypt 
with domestic policing equipment – but attached strict conditions to military aid. In 
return for US supplies Egypt would be obliged to adhere to a Western defence pact; the
US also proposed direct supervision of Egyptian by US military personnel.61 US officials 
meanwhile blocked alternative sources, instructing Spain, for example, to cancel a $3 
million arms shipment that Egypt was expecting.62 In the economic sphere, conditions 
were similarly strict. Repressing the left and opening the country to foreign capital was 
not enough. Abdel-Malek recalls the conditions that the US attached to 1955 loan offers
through the IBRD (the original centrepiece of the World Bank): ‘control of the Egyptian 
budget by the IBRD, and a ban on any new borrowing; in order to modernize herself 
Egypt would thus be called upon to return to the days of Anglo-French control under 
Ismail, the prelude to the occupation of 1882!’63 The Nasser government had in its 
foreign policy oriented towards the West. But it was also pursuing Egyptian 
independence and trying to part with a colonial past. It was not prepared to accept 
demands of this kind.
Israeli attacks lent a sense of urgency to Egyptian arms procurement. In 
September 1955, with negotiations with the West stalled, Egypt concluded an arms deal
with Czechoslovakia. The agreement came without political conditions. But much as 
leading Egyptian communists remained in jail, the Nasser government had now bought 
arms from a Soviet bloc state. It was campaigning against Anglo-American efforts to 
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press Arab states into a Western defence pact. And Nasser himself had attended the 
Bandung conference of April 1955, the launching point for a coordinated Third World 
anti-colonialism. The Egyptian government had not yet ruptured with the West. Through
to the summer of 1956, it continued to negotiate with the Western powers for 
development assistance. Most significantly, it was to the IBRD that the Egyptian 
government looked for loans to finance its priority project, the Aswan Dam, aimed at 
addressing Egypt’s food crisis by opening new lands for agricultural cultivation.64 But 
Cold War neutralism meant defiance of US power. And the logic of supporting Israel as 
an enforcer gained ground. In October 1955 Kermit Roosevelt, director of the CIA and 
grandson to Theodore, sent the Israeli government a message: ‘if, when Soviet arms 
are received by Egypt, you will choose to hit them, no one will challenge you.’65
The Czech arms deal had a contradictory effect on Israeli war plans. On the one 
hand, an Israeli invasion now seemed more likely to receive US support. ‘[T]he US is 
interested in toppling Nasser’s regime,’ remarked Ben-Gurion on receiving Roosevelt’s 
message, ‘but it does not dare at the moment to use the methods it adopted to topple 
the leftist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and of Mossadegh in Iran . . . It 
prefers its work to be done by Israel.’66 It seemed that Israel might finally receive 
recognition as an instrument of US empire. On the other hand, Israeli planners had for 
months already been doing everything possible to provoke a war with Egypt. The Czech
weapons may have enforced Israel’s Cold War position. But they also produced a 
credible deterrent. As a result, writes Golani, ‘the Egyptian-Czech deal did not push 
Israel into war: on the contrary, it put an end, for the time being, to Israel’s efforts to 
bring about war.’67 Ben-Gurion looked to strengthen Israel’s position before launching 
another major attack. He was especially deterred by the prospect of retaliatory air 
strikes from Egypt, and felt that better air cover was needed to guarantee that the war 
would not spill back into Israeli territory.68
It was thus under changed circumstances that, in 1956, Israel renewed its 
appeals for Canadian F-86 fighter jets. The terms of Canadian production of these 
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swept-wing aircraft required US consent for export to any non-NATO power. Even if the 
Canadian government had wished to fulfil Israel’s requests in 1954, the US may well 
have cautioned against it. Now things were different. In April 1956 secretary of state 
Dulles directly appealed to the Canadian government to make the deal.69 US support 
amplified Israel’s requests like nothing else could. The next month prime minister Ben-
Gurion reiterated the official narrative in a letter to his Canadian counterpart, St.-
Laurent: ‘we are convinced that trebling the number of our fighter planes of this class is 
the indispensable minimum to deter aggression and to enable us, if need be, to 
withstand attack.’70 This defensive posture continued to lack credibility. No Canadian 
official meaningfully refuted Léger’s earlier judgement that ‘the Nasser Government has
demonstrated its desire not to be stampeded into a renewal of hostilities with Israel.’71 
But Canadian government ink flowed in an effort to rationalize the combined force of 
local defence industry interests and US requests.
Before Canada shipped the aircraft to Israel, the Suez Crisis erupted. It was not 
Canadian-supplied aircraft, nor the Israeli Air Force at all, that provided the air cover for 
Israel’s 1956 occupation of Gaza and the Sinai. Egypt’s aerial deterrent was instead 
neutralized by direct Anglo-French bombing. The European powers had their own 
reasons to wage war. France identified the Nasser government with the resistance to 
French colonialism in Algeria. By the summer of 1956 shared objectives brought France
and Israel into a wide-ranging strategic partnership.72 Meanwhile Egyptian negotiations 
with the US and Britain collapsed. Egypt was extraordinarily invested in development of 
the Aswan Dam. And negotiations with the IBRD seemed to be making progress. But in 
July 1956, the US made a public show of rebuking Egypt through a sudden cancellation
of IBRD loan offers. Dulles boasted that this was ‘as big a chess move as US diplomacy
has made in a long time.’73 It was expected that Nasser would be forced to appeal for 
Soviet funds. Instead, Egypt looked to a local source. On 26 July 1956 Nasser 
announced nationalization of the largely European-owned Suez Canal company. In 
British cabinet discussions the next day it was privately conceded that Nasser was not 
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breaking any laws; ‘from the strictly legal point of view, his action amounts to no more 
than a decision to buy out shareholders.’74 But this was not friendship to the West. 
Dulles proposed patience and coordinated Anglo-American subversion of Nasser.75 
Britain’s Eden government took a different course, mobilizing its troops for a 
conventional war. So it was that Israeli forces would strike Gaza and Egypt under 
European air cover.
Canadian discussions about the supply of fighter aircraft to Israel nonetheless 
offer a telling glimpse into Pearson’s department of external affairs. The request from 
Dulles carried enormous weight. Pearson wanted to oblige, but he did not want Canada
to seem too far ahead of the US and Britain in its military support for Israel.76 On the 
other hand, that Canada had so little invested in the Middle East seemed to make it a 
strategic Western arms conduit. R.M. Macdonnell, one of the Canadian officials most 
involved in these discussions, explained:
It is true that we, rather than the United States, would have to take the anger of the Arabs and 
this is unpleasant. However, we have no purely national interests in the area, our fund of goodwill
is apparently fairly large and this might be a small sacrifice for us to make for a common cause. It
is not right to think in terms of ‘pulling American chestnuts out of the fire.’ The chestnuts in this 
dangerous area are as much Canadian as they are American or British, because we would be 
inevitably involved in the consequences of war.77 
Macdonnell argued that Arab outrage could anyway not cost Canada much, ‘with the 
possible exception of a few broken windows in our Missions in Cairo and Beirut.’78 True, 
he conceded, others in the Third World might be upset, since ‘Israel is looked upon by 
most of the anti-colonial nations of Africa and Asia as something in the nature of an 
imperialist stronghold.’79 But Canada’s primary attachment was to the West. Pearson 
shied away from unilateral action. He pressed for the US to announce an 
accompanying arms shipment of its own to Israel in order to give the impression of 
collective Western action. On this condition he consented to the deal.80
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The contracts were signed and delivery of a squadron of Canadian F-86s to 
Israel was scheduled to begin in November 1956.81 The eruption of the Suez Crisis at 
the end of October resulted in a quiet refund.82 Pearson rushed to New York to earn his 
Nobel Peace Prize. But the fact remains: Pearson was willing to position Canada 
alongside France at the cutting edge of Western military support for Israel. From the 
1949 armistice lines, Burns documented Israeli aggression on various fronts and urged 
against such arms sales.83 It was Pearsonian policy to brush aside these misgivings, in 
support of Israel and in partnership with the politics of US empire.
Challenges to Western Cohesion
For fully a decade after the 1948 war, British and Israeli policy in the Middle East 
were at odds with one another. Not until 1958, when a military revolt in Iraq overthrew 
Britain’s Hashemite protectorate and Israel assisted Britain in its defence of Hashemite 
rule in Jordan, did Britain stop pressuring Israel for border concessions and start 
supplying Israel with advanced weaponry.84 In the lead-up to the Suez Crisis, Britain’s 
Conservative government was by no means publicly aligned with Israel. But by late 
1956, both British and Israeli war planners came to consider collusion against Egypt 
expedient. The result was the coordinated assault launched in the final days of October 
1956. It would be the last war that either state waged without the support of the US.
Canadian concerns over British policy in the Middle East were building up 
throughout 1956. In March, US secretary of state Dulles commiserated with Pearson 
over ‘the rather jittery’ behaviour the British were exhibiting under the leadership of 
Anthony Eden, prime minister since Churchill’s retirement in early 1955. Pearson 
assumed the role of an old Commonwealth confidante, sympathizing and adding that 
Eden’s father, too, had been ‘quite eccentric.’85 The British response to Egyptian 
nationalization of the Suez Canal sharpened Canadian concerns. Soon after the 
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nationalization was announced, Eden wrote to St.-Laurent that ‘we should seize this 
opportunity of putting the canal under proper international control as a permanent 
arrangement.’ If political pressure to this end did not suffice, Eden continued, ‘force may
have to be used to secure Egyptian agreement.’86 This was precisely the kind of clumsy 
colonial gesture that Dulles had complained to Pearson about. The day that Eden’s 
telegram arrived, Pearson wrote to Canada’s high commissioner in London, Norman 
Robertson. US representatives had confirmed to Pearson that the British line did not 
have US blessing. Pearson expressed his abiding hope to Robertson: ‘Surely the UK 
Government will not do anything which would commit them to strong action against 
Egypt until they know that the US will back them.’87 
That was July. Through August and September, the British government 
simultaneously mobilized for a war against Egypt and campaigned to strip Egypt of 
control of the Suez Canal. The French government wished to topple Nasser over 
Algeria and supported Britain’s maximalist positions; the US State Department worked 
to prevent the allies from investing themselves in demands that were no longer within 
their power to impose. Canada’s St.-Laurent government was torn by its traditional 
alignments. In August John Diefenbaker, the leader of Canada’s Progressive 
Conservative opposition, asked in the House of Commons whether the government 
stood with the US or with the European powers. The Canadian government was loathe 
to publicly make a choice. ‘I must deprecate,’ responded Pearson, ‘in a friendly way, the
implication of my hon. friend’s question that there is necessarily any difference of policy 
in this matter between the United States on the one hand and the United Kingdom and 
France on the other.’88 All knew that this was wishful thinking. Privately, Canadian 
representatives urged restoration of NATO cohesion.
The Canadian government at first avoided unnecessary involvement in 
diplomacy on the Suez question while urging that British strategy be made ‘consistent 
with present-day political facts in Asia and Africa.’89 Trying to outmanoeuvre Third World 
anti-colonialism was one thing; confronting it head-on was another. September opened 
with the Canadian government’s faith in the Eden government’s approach wearing thin. 
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‘There seems,’ Robertson reported from London on 3 September, ‘to be a lack of 
imagination and skill on the part of those who are concerned here with the public 
relations aspect of UK policy moves.’90 A meeting of the NATO Council later that week 
provided the opportunity for Pearson to state the Canadian government’s position. The 
Egyptian government had been characterizing demands for international control of the 
Suez Canal as ‘collective colonialism,’ in Nasser’s phrasing.91 In his speech to the 
NATO allies Pearson dismissed this notion, affirming that Suez was of course not an 
issue to be discussed ‘in terms of nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, etc.’; it was, 
Pearson argued, simply in the interests of the general good that the Suez Canal be 
subject to ‘agreed international arrangements which would minimize the possibility of 
interference – political or economic – and prevent its exploitation by any single state – 
including the state through whose territory the Canal runs.’ But, he emphasized, force 
should only be used as a last resort and in harmony with NATO and the UN.92 In sum, it 
was Canadian policy throughout this period to try and dissuade Britain from rash action 
while promoting strategies for ‘selling internationalization . . . to the Afro-Asians.’93 In 
October, the Canadian government was prompted to a new level of involvement.
Public diplomacy had not provided a viable basis for Britain to wage war on 
Egypt. A classic colonial intervention of the sort that Britain could have undertaken in an
earlier era no longer seemed possible. Thus, in the search for a pretext, the Eden 
government turned to Israel. ‘The French were the matchmakers,’ writes Avi Shlaim.94 
On French initiative and by means of French mediation, the British and Israeli 
governments combined their war plans. After preliminary discussions, planners from all 
three powers met from 22-25 October in the Parisian suburb of Sèvres to finalize a plan
of action. Forty years later a copy of their signed agreement was released to 
researchers by the Ben-Gurion Archive at Sde Boker. ‘With the release of the protocol,’ 
writes Shlaim, ‘the tripartite meeting at Sèvres became not only the most famous but 
also the best-documented war plot in modern history.’95 Operations and publicity were 
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planned along the following lines. An Israeli attack would spark the campaign. In the 
name of self-defence, Israel would strike across Gaza and the Sinai, and Israeli troops 
would advance towards the Suez Canal. Britain and France would provide cover for 
Israel by means of air strikes against Egyptian airfields. They would then invade Egypt 
in the name of peacekeeping, declaring that the safety of the Canal demanded Anglo-
French intervention in order to impose a buffer between the Israeli and Egyptian armies.
Israel would get its air cover and Britain its political pretext.96 On 29 October, Israel 
initiated this scenario.
Canadian involvement in managing the ensuing backlash at the United Nations 
is considered the historic summit of liberal Canadian internationalism on the Middle 
East. This Canadian perspective is defined by its fixation on inter-allied tension. Looking
at the impact of the tripartite attacks can help to provide a broader perspective. The 
principal study of the crisis is Keith Kyle’s Suez, a more than six-hundred page volume 
first published in 1991 and updated in 2003. Kyle describes the opening attacks:
The first casualties of the war were Palestinian Arab civilians. At midday on 29 October a curfew 
affecting them was announced on the radio to begin that evening at 5pm. When a unit of the 
[Israeli] Border Guard arrived at the village of Kafr Kassem [a village within the 1949 armistice 
lines, its inhabitants citizens of Israel] … to notify the village of the curfew and to enforce it, it was
told that a number of farm workers, mainly olive-pickers, would come back to the village later 
than five. When they arrived in carts, lorries or on bicycles they were shot. Forty-three were 
killed, many of them women and young boys and girls.97 
Yitzhak Rabin was then commander of Israel’s northern front, and as the war began he 
also took the opportunity to expel somewhere between two and five thousand 
Palestinians whom he identified as ‘a burdensome security problem’ from the Galilee 
into Syria.98 The major IDF operations targeted Gaza and the Sinai.
Thus began Israel’s four-month occupation of the Gaza Strip. The IDF occupied 
the territory quickly, bringing an additional three-hundred thousand Palestinians under 
Israeli control, more than two-thirds of them refugees from 1948. It proceeded to carry 
out massacres which Nur Masalha attributes to the Israeli objective of pushing 
Palestinian refugees away from the armistice lines. Some fled; a reporter for The Times
of London wrote that on 1 November the narrow road between Gaza and El Arish ‘was 
96 Kyle, Suez, 329.
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choked with fleeing Arab refugees,’ while others ‘had taken to the sea in frail little 
boats.’99 But the vast majority stayed. Masalha cites testimony on the aftermath of the 
Israeli occupation of Khan Yunis. ‘When the soldiers came in,’ explains one resident of 
the town, named Abu Talal, ‘we did not even know which country they were from. We 
had heard talk about British and French troops.’ Abu Talal describes how Israeli soldiers
entered his house and opened fire on him and his brothers, killing one, shooting 
another in the leg, and hitting Abu Talal’s elbow. Outside, larger killings took place: 
‘There were corpses everywhere, and because of the curfew no-one could go out to 
bury them for about four days.’100 A New York Times report cited UN sources to the 
effect ‘that 400 to 500 persons were killed at Khan Yunis during the first days of the 
occupation, 700 at Rafah and thirty to fifty in the town of Gaza.’101 In parallel, the IDF 
invaded Egypt. This began with the dropping of paratroopers about seventy kilometres 
from the town of Suez and a ground offensive from Israel, more than 250 kilometres 
further east.102
British and French reactions to Israel’s attacks immediately raised suspicions 
across the world. In a White House meeting on the evening of 29 October, Dulles 
speculated that the three powers might be coordinating policy.103 The next day, the 
Canadian government received contradictory appeals from the British and the US 
governments. In a telegram to St.-Laurent, Eden presented Britain’s declared narrative, 
which he had just announced in the British House of Commons. ‘Our latest information 
is that Israel has accused Egypt of aggression and is delivering a counter attack,’ wrote 
Eden. ‘We and the French with us propose therefore at once to send a requirement to 
Israel and Egypt demanding that hostilities must cease immediately and that troops 
must be withdrawn from both banks of the Canal.’104 Otherwise the allies would 
intervene. This was the famous Anglo-French ‘ultimatum.’ Its plain meaning was that 
Israeli troops should hold territory up to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Abba 
Eban, then Israeli ambassador to the US and the UN, later wrote: ‘Since we were 
nowhere near the Canal, we would have to withdraw forward in order to obey the 
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ultimatum.’105 US planners expressed dismay with the allies’ failure to consult them 
before initiating this explosive scenario.
US representatives provided a powerful counter-point to Eden’s appeal. ‘Dulles 
telephoned me from Washington,’ Pearson wrote to Robertson on 30 October, ‘in a 
state of emotion and depression greater than anything I have seen before in him.’106 
Dulles felt that the West was losing a significant opportunity. A week earlier, workers, 
students, and writers in Hungary had risen up in one of the most important popular 
rebellions in the history of Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe. The movement that erected 
barricades in the streets of Budapest was no fifth column of the West; it was from a 
position far to the left of Soviet authorities that the movement spoke of freedom of 
expression, of independence, and of socialist self-management. Workers’ councils were
the backbone of the Hungarian uprising, which was soon facing off against Soviet 
tanks.107 But this was the one region in the world where the US could with some 
consistency oppose the imperial authorities. The Soviet Union seemed politically 
exposed. Dulles had hoped to press this point to Cold War advantage; now, he told 
Pearson, ‘the British and French decision undid everything.’108 Allied diplomats 
scrambled to get ahead of the evolving world backlash.
Israeli attacks were immediately taken up at the Security Council. Loathe to lose 
the initiative, the US proposed a draft resolution on the Palestine question demanding 
an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the 1949 armistice lines. The resolution 
also called on all UN member states ‘to refrain from giving any military, economic or 
financial assistance to Israel so long as it has not complied with this resolution.’109 
Britain and France cast their vetoes. And that evening, British and French warplanes 
began bombing Egypt. The Canadian ambassador to the US, Arnold Heeney, reported 
from Washington: ‘There is no doubt whatever that this is regarded here as a very 
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serious blow to the Western alliance and to the cohesion of the free world.’110 War in the 
Middle East now struck at the Canadian leadership’s core priorities.
If the allies’ diplomatic narrative was on the face of it implausible, it was further 
undercut by the coordination of Anglo-French with Israeli attacks. The extent of French 
support in particular troubled British planners, who still hoped, somehow, to obscure the
collusion. Ralph Murray, political adviser to the British command, cited French naval 
shelling of Rafah and the deployment of French planes from Israeli airfields. ‘As seen 
from here,’ wrote Murray, ‘there is little if anything covert about French close and active 
support of Israel.’111 Meanwhile Britain and France mobilized to land their troops on 
Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, at the mouth of the Suez Canal.
At the beginning of the Korean War, the Western powers had pushed for a UN 
mechanism that could in exceptional circumstances bypass a Soviet veto at the 
Security Council. The procedure was termed ‘Uniting for Peace,’ and provided for 
General Assembly action in the event of Security Council deadlock. On this basis the 
General Assembly met late 1 November for an overnight emergency session concerning
the tripartite attacks. Dulles represented the US and tried to keep the initiative. He 
proposed a resolution calling for an end to the Anglo-French bombing and for Israeli 
compliance with the US-sponsored Security Council resolution of 30 October. The 
General Assembly carried this resolution sixty-four votes to five, with Australia and New 
Zealand alone joining the three attacking powers in opposition. The Canadian 
delegation cast one of six abstaining votes. Time was allotted for representatives to 
explain their votes. Pearson represented Canada; and in his speech explaining 
Canadian abstention, he tried to lay the groundwork for an alternative course of action.112
It was in this speech to the General Assembly on 2 November that Pearson 
presented the proposal for which he was to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Pearson 
proposed establishment and deployment of what was to become the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF). This proposal responded to the one signal of flexibility made
by the Eden government. Despite its alignment with Israel, the British war effort had 
encountered resolute opposition even from some of Israel’s most fervent supporters. 
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The US, which had repeatedly been a source of pro-Zionist pressure on Britain, was 
demanding an end to the attacks; Britain’s Labour Party opposition, which had long 
called on the Conservative government to arm Israel as a means of striking at Nasser, 
also condemned the war.113 Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour opposition, 
expressed his ‘deep appreciation’ for the US position and proposed a motion of censure
against the Eden government.114 
Just before the General Assembly’s early November emergency session, 
Robertson reported to Pearson that the British government was feeling the pressure. 
Robertson’s account of a discussion with Ivonne Kirkpatrick, the ranking civil servant in 
the British foreign office, indicates the origin of Pearson’s proposal:
Kirkpatrick told me that in the speech he is going to make in this afternoon’s censure debate, 
Eden will say, after referring to the fighting going on between the Egyptians and the Israelis: ‘But 
police action there must be to separate the belligerents and to prevent the resumption of 
hostilities between them. If the UN were then willing to take over the physical task of maintaining 
peace, no one would be better pleased than we.’ This is not much, but it is something. It means, I
take it, that the UK and France would be prepared to ‘hand over’ the police task they have taken 
upon themselves to a UN force strong enough to prevent the renewed outbreak of hostilities 
between Egypt and Israel pending the conclusion of a peace treaty which would guarantee the 
existence and integrity of the latter.115
Pearson sought to provide Britain with this option. He suggested to the St.-Laurent 
cabinet that Canada propose ‘an emergency UN force to police the area of combat and 
to provide a substitute for British-French intervention, thus giving them a good reason to
withdraw from their own stated objective of restoring peace before they could be 
formally condemned by the Assembly.’116 On 1 November, Pearson flew to New York 
authorized to make the proposal.
This was the substance of Pearson’s intervention at the General Assembly. He 
argued that demands for an end to the fighting were not enough. It was necessary also 
to deal with the problems that had prompted the attacks, namely the Palestine question 
and management of the Suez Canal. This was the only responsible way forward; ‘if we 
do not take advantage of this crisis to do something about a political settlement, we will 
regret it.’117 He then proposed that the General Assembly authorize UN secretary-
general Dag Hammarskjöld to coordinate establishment of a UN peacekeeping force as
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an international instrument for regulating these questions. He hoped to provide the 
British with an exit strategy and to enlist the US in buffering against Third World and 
Soviet moves towards condemnation of the attacking powers. To Robertson in London 
Pearson wrote that Britain, having already completed ‘the blasting of Egyptian military 
airfields and the destruction of Egyptian military aircraft,’ should announce that it had 
contained the threat to Israel and conclude its operations.118 To Henry Cabot Lodge, US 
permanent representative to the UN, Pearson expressed Canada’s desire ‘to head off 
any condemnatory resolution proposed by the Afro-Asians.’119 A measure of support for 
this initiative came from both Britain and the US. This probably marked the high point of
Canadian Middle East diplomacy.
These were days in which Israel consolidated its occupation of Gaza and fought 
its way into Egypt. For this it faced little allied criticism. The focus had turned from 
Israeli to Anglo-French actions. It is remarkable just how brazenly some Western 
liberals sought in the same breath to criticize the colonial powers and to empower 
Israel. On 3 November Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of Britain’s Labour opposition, went 
so far as to include among his critiques of the Eden government that it was trying to 
bring the fighting between Israel and Egypt ‘prematurely to an end.’120 We will return to 
Pearson’s proposals concerning Palestine. Suffice it for the moment to note that his 
plan for a UN force was much more focused on addressing Israeli than Arab 
grievances. In any case, in the early days of November, the main question under 
discussion was not the Israeli attack but the threat of Anglo-French troop landings. 
Pearson cautioned the allies against a ground invasion while preparing to soften its 
diplomatic impact. His proposal for UNEF initially involved a two-stage operation. In the 
first stage, British and French troops in Egypt would become the main component of the
proposed UN force, to which other countries, including the US and Canada, could 
contribute additional units. In the second stage, these troops would be replaced by a 
broader international police force.121 
The US pressed for modifications. When Pearson first made his proposal on 2 
November, Dulles immediately spoke in favour of it. As the St.-Laurent Cabinet fleshed 
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the proposal out, it instructed Arnold Heeney to get further State Department feedback. 
Heeney relayed the concern of US officials: ‘Although they were as anxious as we were
to extricate Britain from her present position, it was important that they should not give 
occasion for a charge of collusion with others to that end.’122 In short, the first phase of 
UNEF operations proposed by Pearson looked too much like conferral of UN legitimacy 
on an Anglo-French invasion. Under US pressure the Canadian proposal was modified 
before being presented to the General Assembly on 4 November. The final text made 
no mention of two stages or of incorporating Anglo-French troops into the UN force. In 
this modified form the resolution passed, as did a second General Assembly resolution, 
sponsored by nineteen Third World states and demanding that no additional troops or 
weaponry be moved into the area. Britain and France abstained from the first resolution
while opposing the second. Their approach, writes Keith Kyle, was ‘to back the 
implementation of the Canadian resolution as opposed to the Afro-Asian one.’123
‘While all this was going on,’ writes Motti Golani, ‘Israel was reduced virtually to 
the position of bystander. Britain and France took the brunt of international pressure 
and superpower outrage, and this was one of the most important kinds of help they 
gave Israel in the Sinai War.’124 Israel took the opportunity to occupy positions it had 
long coveted in the Sinai. In the evening of 4 November the IDF launched its assault on 
Sharm al-Sheikh. Egyptian forces repelled Israel’s first attacks, and the fight lasted 
through the night. Kyle writes that ‘only total air superiority, expressed in two days of 
strafing with rockets and napalm, enabled the daylight attack of [the IDF’s] 9 Brigade to 
succeed by 9.30 a.m..’125 These facts on the ground having been established, Ben-
Gurion was by 7 November publicly boasting that Israel had permanently expanded. He
declared Israeli sovereignty over the city which ‘until two days ago was called Sharm al-
Sheikh and whose name is now Mifratz Shlomo.’126 The Israeli state, its prime minister 
explained, no longer considered itself confined to the battles lines of 1949: ‘The 
Armistice Agreement with Egypt is dead and buried and will never be resurrected.’127 
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Enough world pressure eventually built up to dislodge Israeli forces from these 
positions. In the end, Israeli territorial expansion in 1956-7 lasted only a few months 
longer than the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. But whereas the European allies 
suffered political losses through the Suez Crisis, Israel made political gains. It enforced 
its position as a regional power and established the diplomatic foundation from which it 
would launch the war of June 1967. The aggressive approach of hawkish planners like 
Ben-Gurion, Dayan, and Peres was vindicated, and the relative moderation of internal 
critics like Sharett forever brushed aside. The Israeli leadership’s expectation of 
impunity in aggression remained intact; the consequences for the region, and for the 
Palestinians in particular, were to be severe.
Under Pearson’s direction, Canadian external affairs officials were prominently 
involved in Suez Crisis diplomacy through to Israel’s March 1957 withdrawal from Gaza 
and the Sinai. But they in no way tried to avert this outcome. Instead, Pearson carried 
out what amounted to diplomatic damage control for the attacking powers. Israel, like 
Britain, was over-extended. It could not yet sustain the annexation of additional territory.
Some in the international community tried to impress upon Israel the lesson that 
aggression of this kind would not yield gains. Pearson was not among them. Instead, 
for Israel as for Britain, Pearson tried to secure the most favourable conditions possible 
for an end to this wave of attacks.
For Europe and the Old Commonwealth
The record of Canadian policy during this period, and of the internal government 
discussions that oriented it, is accessible in volumes published by the Canadian 
government, notably its Documents on Canadian External Relations. The details 
undermine the mythology about Pearson’s commitment to wide internationalism and the
rule of international law. It was a few years after the Suez Crisis that ambassador Smith
discussed Canadian policy in the Middle East in terms of the ‘relations between the 
white nations of western Christendom and the rest of the world.’128 By then, control of 
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the federal government had shifted from Pearson’s Liberals to Diefenbaker’s 
Progressive Conservatives. It was a decade earlier that prime minister King had written 
that Canada should never be treated ‘as if it were some Colonial possession of inferior 
races.’129 Perhaps he was rooted in an earlier political era. Nonetheless, the golden 
years of Canada’s liberal internationalism were bracketed by these signs of enduring 
racism. And during these years, Canadian leaders like Pearson did not rupture with the 
tradition that produced them. Pearson acted with a measure of diplomatic flexibility. His 
approach to the Suez Crisis nonetheless upheld and was enabled by the same politics 
of colonial hierarchy.
Internal government discussions aside, Pearson admits as much in his memoirs. 
He explains that in the late 1960s he joined with Paul Martin, then secretary of state for 
external affairs, in requesting a written review of Canadian foreign policy from Norman 
Robertson. Pearson fully identifies with the result: ‘It summarizes my views better than I
could myself.’ He cites Robertson’s explanation of how Canada lost its relative 
prominence at the UN. Canada, argues Robertson, initially enjoyed a postwar position 
that made it ‘the object of respect and admiration, especially from the lesser powers.’ 
But decolonization complicated things. ‘It is harder for us now to seem to act objectively
on most issues.’ Robertson identifies the reason with some honesty: ‘as the balance of 
opinion and voting is weighted on the side of the “have-nots” there is less room for 
bargaining.’130 There can be little doubt that Pearson’s style of bargaining at the UN 
depended upon the disempowerment of the formerly colonized world. In the 1960s, 
what Vijay Prashad refers to as the Third World project largely swept the privileged 
influence of states like Canada out of the General Assembly.131 Even in 1956, Pearson 
was pressing the limits.
Canada’s UNEF initiative was immediately controversial. Pearson sought to 
provide the US with a means of distancing itself from the allied invasion without 
confronting the allied powers too directly. The Canadian government thus established a 
position it would maintain throughout the Suez Crisis: as a moderate supporter of the 
attacking powers that was not tainted by association with their attacks. Parallel efforts 
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were pursued by Norway. The main competition to this approach came from India, 
whose Nehru government had gained considerable world prestige and was the leading 
point of contact between the US and the UN’s emerging Third World bloc. Krishna 
Menon, a leading Indian diplomat close to Nehru, appears in the Canadian record as a 
main competing source of diplomatic initiative. Thankfully for Pearson, Menon did not 
arrive in New York until 5 November. Pearson writes with some satisfaction about 
Menon’s ‘discomfiture’ when he arrived and moved to oppose the UNEF initiative, only 
to find that its momentum was too well established.132 Before Menon’s arrival, the Third 
World representative who looms largest in the Canadian record is India’s permanent 
representative to the UN, Arthur Lall. 
Disagreements over the UNEF plan surfaced on 4 November, just after the 
General Assembly approved the basic plan. Secretary-general Hammarskjöld convened
a smaller meeting to discuss UNEF’s composition. He took the opportunity to re-
introduce Pearson’s suggestion that the Anglo-French troops who, conveniently, were 
already in the area, should form the initial basis for the UN force. This element of the 
proposal had been omitted when the plan was submitted for General Assembly 
approval. The Canadian report on this meeting cites an immediate reaction from Arthur 
Lall. He emphatically declared ‘that the Afro-Asians would never accept UK and French 
forces in the emergency forces. It would . . . create the impression that the proposal for 
an emergency force had been made to cloak with respectability the impending 
occupation of Egypt by Anglo-French forces.’ Pearson cautiously responded that while it
might be best to find alternatives, Anglo-French participation should not necessarily be 
ruled out. Lall insisted on clarity on this point, ‘argu[ing] with some force that if such 
participation was even contemplated, it would be tantamount to a polite invitation from 
the UN to land troops at once.’ The simple fact was that whereas Lall’s position was in 
keeping with the spirit of the General Assembly vote, Hammarskjöld’s violated it. ‘This 
Indian reaction was of course to be expected,’ acknowledged Lall’s Canadian 
counterpart, Robert Mackay, ‘and we have no reason to doubt that Lall was saying 
moderately what the Egyptians and others would denounce in violent terms.’133 In the 
end, UNEF deployment would be strictly distinguished from the Anglo-French invasion. 
132 Munro and Inglis, Memoirs of the Right Honourable, 251.
133 DCER Vol. 22, 209-11.
190
Suez and the Adjustment to US Primacy
The British government, undeterred, continued to invest Pearson’s proposal with hopes 
to the contrary.
Eden was pushing forward in line with the signal that Pearson had initially picked
up on. First there would be an invasion and then a ‘hand-over’ to a UN force. Eden fed 
this line to the Canadian government as Anglo-French ground forces invaded Egypt. On
5 November Britain dropped several hundred paratroopers west of the Mediterranean 
city of Port Said; the French dropped their own force to the city’s south. ‘We warmly 
welcome the Canadian initiative in New York to establish an emergency international 
United Nations force,’ Eden wrote that day to St.-Laurent. But, Eden noted, the UN 
force would take some days to deploy. ‘This makes it imperative for us to take a grip of 
the situation and to create conditions under which the United Nations force, once it is 
formed, can relieve us of our responsibility.’134 The next day, British troops landed in 
force at Port Said. Anglo-French paratroopers were now joined by an additional 
commando force, which stormed the beach under cover of RAF bombardment and 
naval shelling. Twenty-one of the attacking soldiers were killed in the course of 
occupying the city; Keith Kyle estimates an Egyptian death toll of 750-1,000.135 Amidst 
the assault, Eden sent an updated message to St.-Laurent: ‘We are ready to stop our 
operations as soon as we can hand over responsibility to a United Nations force.’136 
In these circumstances, allied bargaining at the United Nations proved 
challenging. On 6 November Pearson discussed the circulation the day before of ‘a 
draft Arab-Asian resolution which we certainly would not have been able to support.’ In 
this light he wrote approvingly of Hammarskjöld’s initiative ‘to cancel the meeting of the 
General Assembly where there would be intemperate language and a strong resolution 
under the impetus of the events of the day in Egypt.’137 As the effects of the Anglo-
French occupation of Port Said reverberated, the NATO powers tried to contain 
condemnation of the allies. Nathan Pelcovits observes that Canada and Norway were 
most prominently partnered with the US in this effort.138 The Eden government still 
hoped that UNEF could be a mechanism for controlling the Suez Canal more reliable 
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than anything that Britain could have installed without an invasion.139 Western diplomats
at the UN had more defensive preoccupations. Opposition to the attacking powers was 
strong and building. Against this threat, the Canadian delegation felt that ‘the 
constructive effort to establish a UN force had a moderating influence on the pressure 
tactics which were being employed by the Afro-Asians.’140 The effort, anchored by the 
US, focused on drawing the momentum of Third World diplomacy away from 
‘condemnatory resolutions’ and towards efforts to ensure the establishment of UNEF as
a credibly international force.
In the early days of November, the St.-Laurent government was taken aback by 
British actions, which seemed to be disrupting that ‘harmony of sentiment between the 
British Empire and the United States’ which had at least since Ogdensburg been the 
keystone of Canada’s approach to world order. By the end of the month, Canadian 
frustration turned on the US. For the remainder of the Suez Crisis, Pearson took to 
lobbying US representatives on behalf of the Western diplomatic bloc he referred to as 
‘European and Old Commonwealth.’141
The Anglo-French occupation of Port Said was costly. The Nasser government 
immediately sunk vessels to block the Suez Canal. At the time, before the advent of 
supertankers that could transport oil around the Cape of Good Hope, this was still the 
major conduit for West-European oil imports.142 The crisis for the Eden government 
deepened when US Treasury Department officials rebuffed a British appeal for IMF 
funding to prevent a run on the pound.143 From the US, Walter Lippman voiced the 
position of an influential swath of critically pro-war opinion. ‘The American interest,’ he 
wrote, ‘now that we have dissented from the decision itself, is that France and Britain 
should now succeed.’144 This was essentially the Canadian government’s position. The 
Eisenhower administration, however, seemed more interested in cutting Western losses
than in securing wartime gains for the allies. Allied accomplishments were not 
amounting to much. Under Third World pressure, UNEF was being constituted not as 
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an alternative occupation force, but as a face-saving gesture that could facilitate 
unconditional withdrawal by the invading powers.
The Eisenhower administration’s refusal to pit itself against Third World 
diplomats in the manner that European and white Commonwealth representatives 
requested cannot be understood through isolated analysis of UN diplomacy. Nor can it 
be taken to show US moderation in the Middle East. The administration had earlier 
explained to both British representatives and to leading US journalists that US planners 
hoped to topple the Egyptian government – they wished to do the same in Syria. The 
problem was tactical. For the US, economic destabilization and covert action were the 
preferred means.145 Imperial warfare had to adapt to the era. Even in South Vietnam, 
which was emerging as the main theatre for US intervention in the Third World, the US 
had developed a local client government with some regard for neocolonial norms. In 
December 1957, the commander of British operations in Egypt conceded the point. ‘The
one overriding lesson of the Suez operation,’ reflected General Sir Charles Keightley, ‘is
that world opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such.’146 
The US related to Anglo-French operations accordingly. The allied split over the Middle 
East reflected different imperial styles. But more fundamentally, it reflected US 
commitment to maintaining Western control of the region. With this in mind it is worth 
surveying the impact of the allied campaign that the Eisenhower administration was 
being asked to support.
In Egypt, the Nasser government could not hope to counter the combined force 
of the British, French, and Israeli armies by means of conventional warfare. Facing the 
threat of foreign occupation, it instead facilitated preparations for a guerrilla war. Nasser
broadcast a call for Egyptians to prepare to fight the invading forces ‘from village to 
village, from place to place.’147 In Port Said the government began to arm the 
population. Keith Kyle describes the scene: ‘masses of brand-new Czech rifles and 
machine-guns taken from their crates in the warehouses, often with the grease still on 
them, had been distributed freely throughout the city to civilians of whatever age from 
lorries and from piles dumped in the streets.’148 Guerrilla fighting could not block initial 
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allied advances. On the beaches of Port Said, Egyptian irregulars were quickly cut 
down by British forces. ‘I suppose the Wogs must have been very bad shots,’ reflected 
one British commando, ‘and, as we found out throughout the day, practically without 
organization.’149 But popular support for a sustained struggle was widespread. An 
expanded occupation would have been an extraordinarily risky undertaking.
Nor would the risks be confined to Egypt. As diplomats pursued diplomacy, 
people across the region took matters into their own hands. Abdel-Malek samples the 
upsurge sparked by the Suez Crisis: 
general strikes in Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Bahrein, Qatar, Kuwait and Aden; student and worker demonstrations; the enlistment of 
volunteers for the defence of the Canal; effective sabotage of the pipeline on the Syrian-Iraqi 
border and Homs as a token of reprisal. The wave of solidarity spread that spread from Tangier to
the Arabian Gulf brought to light a new leadership whose action proved more effective than that 
of the traditional politicians: the Arab labour unions, particularly in the oil industry. It was the 
action launched at the time of Suez from which the two powerful Arab labour federations were 
born: the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions (IFATU) and the Arab Federation of Oil 
and Chemical Industry Workers (AFOCIW).150
The local social forces against which US interventions in the Third World were most 
commonly directed were being strengthened by allied action. A regional struggle was 
being set in motion in some of the least favourable conditions imaginable for the West.
As for the official Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union was gaining in regional 
prestige. Even as it crushed the Hungarian workers’ uprising it appeared alongside the 
Western powers as comparatively benign. ‘The thunder of Soviet tanks in Budapest,’ 
observed Erskine Childers, ‘had been quite drowned out by the sound of guns in Port 
Said, Sinai and, as always since 1954, in Algeria.’151 This effect was all the more 
profound in that the Soviet Union struck a plausible posture as a defender of Egyptian 
sovereignty. On 5 November Soviet premier Nicolai Bulganin publicly communicated to 
Britain, France, and Israel that Soviet forces were prepared to intervene on Egypt’s 
behalf. The Soviet delegation to the UN meanwhile proposed to the UN Security 
Council that an intervention force be established, including both US and Soviet troops, 
in order to deploy against the three attacking powers on behalf of the United Nations.152 
No proposal of this kind would ever be accepted. But the boost to Soviet prestige was 
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immense. In Egypt itself, these developments were matched by a much more genuine 
mobilization of the Egyptian left; ‘the Communist organizations went into the streets,’ 
writes Abdel-Malek, ‘organizing firearms lessons and setting up resistance committees, 
while writers and journalists of the Left blanketed the country with intense patriotic 
propaganda that produced a few splendid poems.’153 These movements gained a 
prestige that temporarily afforded them political protection. During the two years after 
the Suez Crisis, the Nasser government relaxed its repression of the left.154
Whether the Eisenhower administration could have done much more than it did 
to sideline Third World criticism at the UN is an open question. Success in doing so 
would in any event have been a hollow victory. The administration instead pressed for 
allied withdrawals so that the struggle for control of the region could resume in more 
favourable circumstances. Pearson did not see the need for this tactical retreat. The 
Canadian diplomats under his direction thus formed the moderate wing of a ‘European 
and old Commonwealth’ bloc that urged greater US solidarity with the invading powers. 
If US leadership of the Western alliance was an agreed fact, Pearson sided with the 
Western alliance’s pro-war opposition.
On 24 November came what much of Western pro-war opinion considered ‘the 
last straw.’155 The US voted in favour of a General Assembly resolution sponsored by 
twenty Third World delegations and calling for a complete British, French, and Israeli 
withdrawal. Belgium moved an amendment on behalf of the colonial powers. The 
amendment noted with approval that France had already withdrawn one-third of its 
troops; it cited a British decision to withdraw a battalion of its own; and it related 
planned Anglo-French withdrawals to the functions that UNEF would take up in the 
wake of the invasion. The US joined the Third World in voting the Belgian amendment 
down. US delegates asked the State Department to inform Europe and the white 
Commonwealth that the US could not appear to support ‘the Anglo-French thesis that 
UN forces should take over the job which the French and British had begun.’156 
Canadian ambassador Heeney immediately conveyed to the State Department 
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‘Canada’s anxieties lest the US be weakening in its adjustment to the Western 
Alliance.’157 Pearson directed Canadian diplomats to continue to press this line. On 29 
November, Heeney summarized the Canadian position in a meeting with the US 
secretary of state. ‘It seemed to us,’ Heeney argued, ‘that the time for recriminations 
was past and that we should concentrate on the earliest possible realignment of the 
Western Alliance of which the Anglo-American partnership was the essence.’158 
Without US assistance, Britain was unable to sustain its mobilization. The 
perception that the St.-Laurent government had joined in undercutting international 
support for the invasion inflamed Tory opinion in Canada. In early November, the
Calgary Herald editorialized that Canada’s Liberal government had ‘run out on Britain at
a time when Britain was asserting the kind of leadership the world has missed, and 
needed, in these ominous times.’159 By month’s end, the Tory foreign affairs critic was 
declaring from the House of Commons that November 1956 was ‘the most disgraceful 
period for Canada in the history of this nation.’160 The criticism that Pearson abandoned 
Britain was unfair. His external affairs department did all for Britain that the balance of 
forces allowed. The Suez Crisis did, however, put to rest the idea that any of the 
Western allies could relate to the US on equal footing. Pearson did his best to plead the
allies’ case. None of this changed the fact that authority over Western initiative in the 
Middle East was passing to Washington.
 On 6 December, the assistant under-secretary of state at external affairs, John 
Holmes, expressed a new Canadian perspective on the Middle East. He suggested that
the politics of Western solidarity should give way to a narrower politics of US empire. In 
its forthright relegation of Britain to a secondary position, this perspective remained 
contentious in Canada. But before Suez it is difficult to imagine any Canadian official 
turning so openly from London to Washington. Holmes wrote:
It is clear that the interests of the free world depend upon the extension of the influence of the 
USA in the Middle East. This extension may have to be to some extent at the expense of the 
interests and prestige of the UK in that area. That is not a situation we would have wished, and [it
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is one] which should do everything to mitigate but the stakes are such that British and French 
feelings, if not their basic interests, may have to be sacrificed. Although relations between the 
NATO Powers must be re-established, the USA cannot play the role it must play in the Middle 
East unless it stands somewhat aloof from British and French policies in that area of the 
world . . . Our anxiety over relations between the USA and its European allies should not lead us 
into pressing the USA to accommodate these allies to such an extent that it loses its position of 
influence in the Middle East and Asia, because it is a fundamental interest of NATO that the 
influence be maintained.161
Pearson was not nearly so unequivocal. The first round of inter-allied conflict during the 
Suez Crisis concerned Anglo-French occupation of Port Said. The second concerned 
Israeli occupation of Gaza and the Sinai. In both cases, Pearson lobbied for greater US 
solidarity with the attacking powers against their Third World adversaries.
Imposing Conditions for Withdrawal  
In early 1957, the politics of US empire were extended to the Middle East more 
clearly than ever before. On 5 January, Eisenhower delivered a major policy speech to 
Congress establishing what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The 
president reaffirmed the US insistence that the major threat to the peoples of the Middle
East came not from the Western powers or from Israel but from ‘the menace of 
International Communism.’ By opposing the tripartite aggression, the US had 
demonstrated peaceful and purely defensive intentions. ‘We have shown,’ declared 
Eisenhower, ‘so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not 
be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and 
independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate.’ But, the speech 
emphasized, Europe depended on the supply of oil from the Middle East; and both local
and world interests demanded US vigilance. On these grounds, Eisenhower sought and
received Congressional approval for expanded US military assistance programmes in 
the region, to be supplemented if necessary by US troop deployments. ‘The proposed 
legislation,’ he explained, ‘is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist
aggression, direct and indirect.’ In the struggle over the Middle East, ‘a greater 
responsibility now devolves upon the United States.’162 
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Expansion of the US empire was always enveloped in such defensive 
pretensions. It is necessary to highlight the elasticity of the concept of ‘indirect 
aggression’ that Eisenhower invoked, and against which the US claimed the right to 
intervene throughout the Third World. Both Dean Acheson and Adlai Stevenson would 
describe the US war in Vietnam, for example, as an act of defence against what they 
called ‘internal aggression,’ an offence committed by the local population against the 
US-allied government.163 It was against threats of this kind that Eisenhower pledged 
increased US assistance to those states in the Middle East ‘which have governments 
manifestly dedicated to the preservation of independence and resistance to 
subversion.’164 US sights were trained as much on the popular upsurge described by 
Abdel-Malek as on the Soviet Union, or as on Nasser, whose nationalist policies were 
viewed with increasing US suspicion. Nonetheless, as E.H. Carr emphasizes, effective 
propaganda ‘is limited by the necessity of some measure of conformity with fact.’165 The 
Eisenhower doctrine claimed to rally allies not for a war against popular rebellion or 
independent nationalism but against aggression. Resolution of the Suez Crisis seemed 
a minimum prerequisite to provide allied governments with a plausible cover.
Some Canadian diplomats recognized this logic. Herbert Norman, for example, 
Canada’s ambassador to Egypt, agreed that the US needed to roll back the allied 
attacks of 1956 if its campaign was to have any credibility: ‘Those Arab leaders who 
wish to stand forth as friends of the USA and the West must have some tangible 
evidence that such friendship pays off, and this in the present situation means more 
than military aid to a King of Arabia.’166 Pearson, in contrast, tended to align with West-
European resentment of the US push for unconditional troop withdrawals.
Pearson’s UNEF initiative had been transformed by the General Assembly’s 
insistence that the new force could deploy in Egypt only with Egyptian consent. This 
was a major disappointment. In mid-November Eden still hoped that UNEF would be 
mainly Canadian in composition and that a ‘hand-over’ could be carried out with an 
appearance of continuity.167 Things developed quite differently. E.L.M. Burns was 
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confirmed as the commander of UNEF, but the Egyptian government came close to 
vetoing any additional Canadian participation. Nasser suggested to the US ambassador
to Egypt that public opinion might react unfavourably if ‘Her Majesty’s British troops 
were replaced by Her Majesty’s Canadians.’168 A compromise on the question of 
Canadian participation in UNEF was eventually reached: Canada would contribute 
technical and administrative personnel but not armed units. Later, in March, an 
armoured reconnaissance unit from Canada was also accepted into Egypt. But UNEF 
took shape as a broadly international force, not the Western policy instrument sought by
Eden. The Eisenhower administration tried to soften the blow. Once British officials 
agreed to carry out a full withdrawal, the US immediately resumed economic 
assistance, releasing IMF funds to the British government and providing it with a large 
loan through the Export-Import Bank.169 But if Anglo-American relations gradually 
improved, British opinion was more incensed than ever at Nasser’s insolence; and this 
echoed in Canada. 
The evacuation of British and French troops from Port Said was completed two 
weeks before Eisenhower delivered his speech to Congress. The allies tried to maintain
a posture of strength during their withdrawal. ‘From time to time,’ recalls Burns, ‘jet 
fighters screamed overhead, at low altitude, to remind the Egyptians that Allied air 
power was still ready to counter any resumption of hostilities.’170 But they could boast 
few achievements from their costly war. On the one hand, this allowed Eisenhower to 
argue that Britain and France had shown themselves to be responsive to world opinion 
in a way that the Soviet Union was not. On the other hand, it left the allied desire to 
secure war gains at Egypt’s expense almost entirely unsatisfied. It was in this context 
that attention shifted to the question of Israeli troop withdrawals.
In late 1956 Israel had to some extent cooperated in deflecting world attention 
away from its own attacks. US pressure quieted the spirit of conquest expressed in 
Ben-Gurion’s speech of 7 November. The task of conveying US outrage over Ben-
Gurion’s expansionist declaration had fallen to Herbert Hoover, who temporarily 
replaced Dulles as US secretary of state when the latter was hospitalized on 3 
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November. Hoover summoned Abba Eban’s deputy in Washington and delivered an 
extremely rare US message: ‘Israel’s attitude will inevitably lead to most serious 
measures such as the termination of all US governmental and private aid, UN sanctions
and eventual expulsion from the UN.’171 The Israeli government could not afford to ignore
this warning. It back-tracked and announced that it would in fact withdraw from the 
Sinai. But what Israel could not accomplish by confrontation, it aimed to pursue by quiet
delays. By 1957 Israel continued to hold both the Gaza Strip and much of the Egyptian 
Sinai. Following the Anglo-French withdrawals and announcement of the Eisenhower 
doctrine, Israeli diplomats braced for renewed pressure.
On 8 January Robert Mackay, permanent Canadian representative to the UN, 
reported to Ottawa about a large meeting of UN delegates convened the day before by 
Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir. Israeli diplomats were communicating separately 
with the US and Britain; in this meeting they brought together ‘the representatives of all 
the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, [the] Netherlands, France, Australia, Canada, NZ,
South Africa, Italy and Austria.’172 Israel was seeking allied support for the coming 
confrontation at the General Assembly. Meir and Eban addressed the meeting, laying 
out Israel’s case. Their arguments focused on two areas that would be at the centre of 
international diplomacy for the next two months: the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.
Concerning Gaza, Meir phrased things more carefully than she had in early 
November 1956, when she declared to an Israeli audience that the territory would be 
permanently annexed by Israel.173 In the intervening months, both international pressure
and Israeli deliberations about how to deal with Palestinian refugees had nuanced 
Israel’s position. Mackay reported that Meir conceded in principle that Israel should not 
annex Gaza. ‘In the present circumstances,’ she nonetheless insisted, ‘the inhabitants 
of Gaza and the refugees were happier under Israel than they had been under 
Egypt.’174 Meir argued that it would be best for the UN to formally take control of Gaza, 
with Israel retaining administrative and policing authority.
It is significant that Meir differentiated between those Palestinians who had lived 
in the Gaza Strip before 1948 (alone deemed its ‘inhabitants’) and the majority, who 
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came from lands now held by Israel. The Israeli leadership still hoped to further 
disperse these refugees. This would involve a fierce confrontation. Palestinian refugees
in Gaza overwhelmingly demanded their right to return. An indication of Palestinian 
opinion about resettlement schemes had come in 1954, when the Nasser government 
pursued discussions with the US and UNRWA concerning relocation of Palestinian 
refugees to the Sinai. When the plan was leaked it provoked a sharp Palestinian 
reaction, including two days of demonstrations and rioting in the Gaza Strip; Egyptian 
authorities were forced to abandon the plan.175 Such a policy could only be executed by 
authorities more willing to suppress Palestinian resistance and less concerned with 
Arab public opinion. This prospect loomed large over Israeli proposals that Israel and a 
UN force co-govern Gaza.
Israeli claims on the Gulf of Aqaba were in some ways even more ambitious. 
Here Israel’s position needs to be put in context. In 1949 Israel occupied the southern 
tip of Palestine, opening onto this body of water. This completed a geographic splitting 
of the Arab world between Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli foothold on the Gulf of Aqaba 
was enforced by Israel’s establishment in 1951 of the port city of Eilat. In the period 
leading up the Suez Crisis, this area was at the centre of British and US diplomacy on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, reasoned Anglo-American planners, had occupied 
territory well beyond what was recommended by the 1947 partition plan; it would not be 
unreasonable to ask that it make border concessions to the Arab states in return for 
peace. If Israel conceded a land link between Egypt and Jordan in the south, it would 
lessen the blow that Israel’s establishment had inflicted upon hopes for Arab regional 
integration. In 1955, British planners even suggested to their US counterparts that Israel
be pressed to provide ‘direct access between Egypt and Jordan on the Gulf of 
Aqaba.’176 This implied that Israel would cede what was now Eilat. US planners aimed 
for a more modest formula, linking Egypt and Jordan through a land corridor further 
north. Anglo-American discussions over possible details were pursued at length.177
Israel, on learning of these plans, declared its refusal to cede any territory. In 
November 1955, writes Zach Levey, ‘Eban told the Americans that Israel would not give
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up the Negev or any part of it.’ Levey explains that Eban went on to present a Cold War 
rationale for splitting the Arab world: ‘The West could “bless every day” the absence of 
territorial contiguity that would allow freedom of passage of communist technicians and 
Soviet arms to the entire Arab world, as well as the establishment of a military 
command that would operate against not only Israel but the West.’178 
Far from showing any willingness to cede ground in the south, Israel went on the 
diplomatic offensive. It pressed a case for expanded Israeli naval rights. Egypt controls 
the Straits of Tiran, through which the Gulf of Aqaba opens to the Red Sea. Israel 
demanded that Egypt allow access to Israeli vessels. Motti Golani’s analysis of Israeli 
government planning suggests that this was above all a tactic in the pursuit of war 
against Egypt. Cross-border provocations around Gaza were not yielding the desired 
escalation. Israel thus built up the infrastructure that would make its navigation 
demands relevant. ‘It was only when Israeli leaders began looking for a casus belli,’ 
writes Golani, ‘i.e., since early 1955, that the dust was shaken off the old plans to build 
a harbour at Eilat.’179 Others emphasize that the Straits of Tiran offered Israel a potential
air corridor through to the rest of Asia and Africa.180 In any event, establishing Israeli 
claims in the Gulf of Aqaba was a major aim of Israel’s Sinai campaign. So it was that 
Israel focused on occupying and holding the entire Egyptian coast of the Gulf all the 
way to Sharm al-Sheikh, on the Red Sea.
Meir and Eban’s diplomatic presentation of 7 January 1957 nuanced Israel’s 
position on the Gulf of Aqaba, as on Gaza. It had been two months since Ben-Gurion 
declared that Sharm al-Sheikh was no longer Sharm al-Sheikh at all, having been re-
baptized ‘Mifratz Shlomo.’ Mackay reported that Meir and Eban were more rhetorically 
restrained. Meir argued that the Straits of Tiran should be recognized as an 
international waterway, in which Israeli navigation rights were guaranteed. She 
‘admitted that technically Israel was required to withdraw’ and focused on Israeli 
preconditions. If Israel was not to be allowed to occupy the Egyptian coast itself, an 
international force should deploy to enforce Israeli rights.
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As ever, the Israeli representatives argued that there was something in it for the 
West for supporting Israeli demands. ‘Eban attempted to win sympathy,’ reported 
Mackay, ‘by saying that in a very short time there would be a link by pipeline and road 
between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mediterranean, a link which would release Western 
Europe from the “monopolistic stranglehold” which Egypt had on the Suez Canal.’ 
Through Israel, in other words, the West could find a secure path between the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, unobstructed by the Arabs. Mackay felt that Israel was
over-reaching: ‘Whatever influence this might have had on the West Europeans was 
probably offset by their lack of sympathy with Israel’s bold attempt to capitalize on 
armed aggression.’181 Several days later Mackay seemed to correct himself, reporting 
that France had offered to help Israel build the planned pipelines.182
Through January and February of 1957, allied differences built up over the terms
of Israeli withdrawal. France aligned with Israel most wholeheartedly. Put simply, it had 
the least to lose. Since de Gaulle’s ill-fated bombardment of Syrian parliament, French 
influence in the region had faded. Moreover, the war in Algeria already guaranteed a 
regional backlash. France could by its policies on Egypt or Palestine scarcely earn anti-
colonial hostility in the Arab world more intense than what was already developing over 
Algeria. Even before the Suez Crisis, France and Israel were aligned to the point of 
planning a coordinated assassinations policy across North Africa.183 This was the 
historic peak of French support for Israel. It was on the strength of Michael Bar-Zohar’s 
glowing account of this ‘golden age’ of Franco-Israeli relations, Suez: Ultra-Secret, that 
Ben-Gurion commissioned him as his authorized biographer.184 Bar-Zohar records 
French foreign minister Christian Pineau’s argument against the demand that Israel 
withdraw from Gaza. France, Pineau explained, ‘considers the Gaza Strip an integral 
part of Palestine’; and since it was Israel, not Egypt, that was the rightful ruler of 
Palestine, demands for a restoration of the 1949 armistice were inappropriate.185 
The British position was more restrained. The British government was as hostile 
to Egypt as was the French; but if British influence in the Arab world was declining, it 
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was still appreciable. Further British association with Israel would only make it more 
difficult to defend Britain’s Arab protectorates against popular opposition. The British 
desire to see Egypt cede ground through the Suez Crisis had, however, not at all 
dissipated. Pearson suggested that Canadian opinion wished to see Egypt concede to 
Israel in part out of support for Israel, but also as a result of the Egyptian government’s 
perceived slighting of the West.186 The British position was no doubt informed by the 
same sentiment.
On 9 January, Mackay reported to Pearson on a conversation he had with a 
British delegate to the UN, Peter Ramsbotham. ‘Ramsbotham confirmed our impression
that the UK was disposed to mobilize support in the Assembly for the position taken by 
Mrs. Meir,’ wrote Mackay. Ramsbotham argued that Israel should not be required to 
withdraw without at least some of its demands being met. Israel, he insisted, ‘could not 
be expected to relinquish its hold on the Gaza Strip and on the Strait[s] of Tiran unless 
and until Israel had adequate assurances about future developments in these two 
areas.’187 The British delegate argued that UNEF should be enforced and deployed to 
replace Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip and at Sharm al-Sheikh; in this way ‘the 
Egyptians would be prevented from restoring their military position there. Until some 
arrangement along these lines could be made we should resist efforts to bring pressure
on Israel to withdraw.’188 This British posture produced a new dynamic in Anglo-
American relations. The Eisenhower administration seemed intent on bringing about an 
unconditional Israeli withdrawal in the manner of Anglo-French withdrawal from Port 
Said. Britain, in contrast, aimed to avert any outcome that would be perceived as an 
Egyptian victory. This was the first time since the Israeli state’s establishment that 
Britain was more supportive of Israeli demands than the US.189  
Whether at the British government’s prompting or of his own volition, Pearson 
took up the task of resisting pressure for unconditional Israeli withdrawal with gusto. It 
seemed that there were two ways, broadly speaking, in which the Suez Crisis could 
now be resolved. The first was for international pressure on Israel to build to such a 
point that Israel felt compelled to withdraw, an approach requiring credible momentum 
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towards sanctions. The second was for the international community to accommodate 
Israeli war gains and pressure Egypt to accept them in some form, to provide Israel with
an ‘inducement,’ in Pearson’s language, to withdraw with a sense of victory. Pearson 
directed Canadian diplomats to act with some flexibility. But his priority was the second 
approach; and he ended up distinguishing himself as one of the most insistent Western 
spokespeople for Israeli demands, especially on Gaza.
In the UN diplomacy of January-February 1957, this required parallel efforts: to 
deflect Afro-Asian demands for sanctions; and to establish an internationally palatable 
iteration of Israel’s demands. The activities of Canadian diplomats on 15 January offer a
snapshot of these inter-connected efforts. Mackay spoke to the Indian delegation, which
was once again the main point of contact between Western and Third World diplomats. 
‘Lall indicated that efforts were being made to tone down the Afro-Asian draft,’ Mackay 
reported, ‘and that perhaps it need not be pressed to a vote this week, provided that a 
sufficient number of delegations outside the Afro-Asian group should support in 
principle the contention that the Israeli withdrawal must be unconditional.’190 The 
challenge for Pearson was thus to counter calls for unconditional Israeli withdrawal 
without framing Israeli demands as conditions. Pearson records the formulation he used
in discussions that day with Henry Cabot Lodge, anchor of the US delegation: ‘I agreed 
that Israel should not be allowed to attach conditions to its withdrawal but the Israelis 
could not reasonably be expected to accept the conditions which existed before 
October 29.’191 Israel, so Pearson proposed, should not be permitted to impose 
conditions on its withdrawal. Nonetheless, it could reasonably refuse to withdraw until it 
received adequate assurances. In the first new round of General Assembly voting, on 
19 January, these distinctions did not come into play. Pearson was satisfied that ‘the 
Afro-Asian draft resolution on withdrawal had been watered down’ as much as was 
realistic.192 He felt there was no point in trying to press things further. Only France joined
Israel in voting against this resolution. But further allied differences were taking shape. 
By 22 January, Pearson acknowledged that Canadian opposition to sanctions against 
Israel might involve a split with the US.193
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That day marked the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from most of the Sinai 
Peninsula, and the arrival of UNEF on the outskirts of the Gaza Strip. Controversy 
immediately escalated concerning whether and under what conditions Israel would 
withdraw from Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh. On 23 January Eban sent an aide-mémoire 
to secretary-general Hammarskjöld, confirming Israeli rejection of the withdrawal 
resolution of 19 January. In the Gaza Strip, Eban declared, Israel would retain policing 
powers; but he added that Israel was still open to coordinating with UN partners to 
govern the territory. The aide-mémoire invoked possible dispersal of the refugees: 
‘Israel will make its full contribution towards any UN plan for the permanent settlement 
of the refugees, including those of Gaza.’ As for Sharm al-Sheikh, Israel would agree to 
withdraw – but only on the condition that Egypt would be blocked from re-establishing 
its authority there. Israeli forces would instead be replaced by UNEF, armed with an 
international mandate to enforce Israeli freedom of navigation. The US delegation to the
UN was outraged. Lodge described Israel’s position as ‘on a par with the invasion of 
Sinai on 29 October of which it is a continuation.’194
Pearson busied himself trying to work Israeli demands into terms that could be 
sold to the General Assembly. On 26 January he discussed Israel’s refusal to withdraw 
with Michael Comay, Israeli ambassador to Canada. He provided words of 
encouragement: ‘I said that in the absence of satisfactory assurances I could hardly 
blame Israel for adopting this attitude.’195 He meanwhile worked to establish an agreed 
text that the US could join Canada in presenting to the UN, responding to Israeli 
demands on Gaza and the Straits of Tiran. As he worked to develop an ‘inducements’ 
track for General Assembly diplomacy, Pearson travelled to New York to participate 
directly in the proceedings. He wrote somewhat dismissively about General Assembly 
plenary discussions: ‘There was much to be said for letting the Afro-Asians, and 
especially the hotheads, talk themselves out before serious efforts should be made 
behind the scenes to break the deadlock.’196 Yet he himself repeatedly addressed the 
General Assembly to put the call for ‘assurances’ for Israel on the record. On 29 
January, for example, he argued in favour of deploying UN forces for ‘pacification 
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purposes’ in both Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh.197 His position earned praise from 
traditional allies. ‘The representatives of Australia, [the] UK and a number of West 
European countries privately expressed satisfaction to us,’ he reported to Ottawa.198 But
as the US delegation worked to ease the confrontation with Arab and other Third World 
diplomats, Pearson once again found himself siding with the Western opposition. 
The Canadian split with the US delegation opened up when Pearson saw US 
revisions to the text that Canada had proposed to jointly move in the General Assembly.
Canadian diplomats felt that the US delegation had diluted the assurances to Israel in 
order to secure Indian support. What was once considered a partly Canadian draft was 
now discussed with resentment as ‘the Lodge-Menon text.’ The Canadian delegation 
withdrew Canada’s co-sponsorship of the resolution on the grounds that it had become 
‘inadequate to the purpose for which it was designed, that is, as an inducement to Israel
to comply with the resolution on withdrawal.’199 On 1 February Pearson informed Lodge 
of this decision. In the weeks ahead, he fully aligned Canadian diplomacy with the pro-
Israel opposition to the Eisenhower administration.
The diplomacy of February 1957 sheds unflattering light on contemporary 
Canadian liberalism’s reverence for Pearson. Pearson’s resentment over fraying US 
racial solidarity was barely disguised. Just as it was understood that ‘old 
Commonwealth’ meant ‘white Commonwealth,’ ‘leader of the free world’ was taken to 
mean ‘leader of the Western world.’ It was in this sense that the West looked to 
Washington. To Western diplomats like Pearson, it seemed that US representatives 
were being inappropriately responsive to pressure from other quarters. Robert 
Mackay’s description of the US and Canadian experiences in the General Assembly 
meeting of 1 February is telling. Lodge, while not going so far as Pearson, spoke to the 
Assembly about ensuring ‘the non-exercise of any claim to belligerent rights’ on Egypt’s 
part, and implied US support for UNEF enforcement of Israeli navigation rights through 
to the Red Sea. Lodge’s assurances were not enough to satisfy Israel or many of its 
Western supporters; but to others they looked like an international reward for Israel’s 
invasion of Egypt. ‘Although the debate continued after Lodge had spoken,’ reported 
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Mackay, ‘the main centre of activity shifted from the Assembly to the corridors where the
USA delegation was under angry attack by the Arabs.’ Mackay immediately adds: ‘Our 
own activity behind the scenes was more concerned with the delegation of Israel, on 
the one hand, and with the Old Commonwealth representatives and some of the 
Western Europeans on the other.’200
European and white Commonwealth efforts to pull the Eisenhower administration
towards greater support for Israel were in sync with important sections of the US 
political system. In Congress, notably, Senator Lyndon Johnson headed up an 
influential pro-Israel opposition that called on the administration to be more 
forthcoming.201 The Eisenhower administration’s approach to developing neocolonial 
partnerships in the Arab world was running up against a culture of Western solidarity 
that combined identification with Israel with indifference to Third World opinion. Pearson
was among its spokespeople. On 19 February Pearson reported to the St.-Laurent 
Cabinet on his efforts at the UN. Pearson ‘found it hard to believe,’ recorded Cabinet 
secretary Robert Bryce, ‘that, in the last analysis, the US would support the Arab-Asian 
move for sanctions even though Mr. Lodge appeared to have said his government 
would take such a stand. He had told Mr. Lodge that the Canadian delegation would not
support such a resolution under any circumstances and would do its best to avoid a 
vote by introducing other ideas.’ Pearson explained that he was in regular 
communication with Israeli as well as Western diplomats. One of the themes that he 
emphasized was that directly controlling Gaza would be a challenge to the Zionist 
politics of exclusion. ‘The Minister,’ Bryce recorded Pearson as explaining to the 
Cabinet, ‘had told the Israeli Ambassador to the UN that, if Israel maintained its hold on 
Gaza, it would also have to assume responsibility for the welfare of the refugees in the 
area, of which there were over 250,000.’202 In friendship, Pearson cautioned Israel 
against taking responsibility for those it had displaced and excluded at such great effort.
Pearson’s advocacy for Israel through February was remarkably frank. On 11 
February, for example, he got into a heated exchange with UN under-secretary Ralph 
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Bunche, a US diplomat well-known for his involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and 
later in the US civil rights movement. Pearson and the Norwegian ambassador to the 
UN, Hans Engen, told Bunche that their countries would refuse to use sanctions to 
pressure for Israeli withdrawal. ‘Bunche was clearly disappointed by what Engen and I 
said about sanctions,’ writes Pearson. ‘He did not see how the UN could shrink from its 
duty of combating military aggression by any means available.’203 Pearson responded 
by taking exception to the description of Israel’s attacks as aggression. He retorted that 
‘many regarded Israel’s military action last November as a defensive move made in 
desperation, even though it was unwise.’204 Pearson, from this perspective, was not 
working to secure for Israel rewards for aggression; he was only aiming to ensure that 
Israel’s efforts to defend itself had not been undertaken in vain.
Such Western support for Israel was one of the factors that the Eisenhower 
administration had to reckon with in contemplating the use of sanctions against Israel. 
On 19 February the CIA produced a memorandum concerning the challenges that the 
US would face in imposing sanctions. ‘A program of UN sanctions against Israel would 
be supported by the Arab states and by the USSR,’ the CIA estimated, ‘which has 
already halted shipments of oil to Israel. It would also be complied with by most of the 
Arab-Asian and under US leadership by many Latin American states.’ Ensuring Western
compliance, the CIA authors continued, would be more difficult:
Even given active US participation in the program, most of the NATO countries, including the UK,
would at best give reluctant support to a program of sanctions. Canada, which from the start 
backed UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from Egypt and itself proposed the UN 
Emergency Force, has indicated that it would not cooperate. West Germany has stated it would 
not suspend reparations payments. France would almost certainly refuse to participate in 
economic sanctions and in fact would probably increase shipments to Israel.
It is possible that this CIA assessment reflected bureaucratic divisions within the US 
government. The Eisenhower presidency was only one element of the US political 
system among others, and although it predominated in foreign policy making, influential 
US strategists and ideologues alike wished that the administration had shown more 
consideration to the attacking powers in the Suez Crisis. The case against sanctions 
would be strengthened to the extent that the policy did not seem feasible. In any case, it
is significant that the CIA authors repeatedly mention ‘the attitudes of France, Canada, 
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and other countries’ as a factor emboldening Israel in its resistance to pressure from the
Eisenhower administration.205
The US administration had too much invested in Israeli withdrawal to back off 
entirely. On 20 February, Eisenhower delivered a dramatic televised address intended 
to marshal public support against those advocating full satisfaction of Israel’s demands. 
He criticized Israel for demanding ‘firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its 
forces of invasion.’ Eisenhower asked rhetorically: ‘Should a nation which attacks and 
occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose
conditions on its withdrawal?’206 In the US and throughout the West, many were 
responding: Yes. In fact, through secretary of state Dulles, the Eisenhower 
administration itself had already begun promising Israel war gains. Outside of the UN 
structures, Dulles was offering a US declaration of support for Israeli navigation rights 
through the Straits of Tiran if Israeli forces withdrew to the armistice line.207 Israeli and 
allied resistance to demands for an immediate withdrawal continued. But by this point, 
the differences among allies really concerned the extent of Israeli war gains.
On 24 February, Israeli ambassador Comay approached Pearson ‘unofficially 
and confidentially,’ addressing himself to a perceived ally. Comay continued to list 
Israeli demands to which even Pearson, much less the Eisenhower administration, 
could not agree. But in the face of mounting pressure, the Israeli government also 
showed some signs of flexibility. Concerning Gaza, Comay explained that Israel’s 
position had changed. Israel still demanded that Egyptian authorities be blocked from 
regaining control of the Gaza Strip. But, as an alternative to direct Israeli policing 
powers within Gaza, ‘Israel would accept instead a UN administration of the area.’ 
Comay explained that allies at the UN could then take on the task of dealing with the 
two distinct groups in the Gaza Strip, ‘the refugees’ and ‘the indigenous inhabitants,’ 
while ‘maintaining order in the area.’ Pearson praised Israeli concessions but suggested
that more flexibility on various points was needed if the allies were to have a chance of 
success with the General Assembly. Pearson’s approach was the polar opposite of 
imposing a deterrent on a possible aggressor. Instead, he argued that the Israeli 
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leadership should already feel empowered by its military efforts, and should appreciate 
and build upon what the invasion had already accomplished: ‘I suggested that Israel 
had gained something out of the Sinai expedition. If Israel completed her withdrawal 
now the main problem for the Arabs would be to hold Israel behind its present borders 
and there would be less heard about the partition plan of 1947; less about territorial 
adjustment and the status of Jerusalem.’ Comay agreed that the attack had been 
‘worthwhile.’208 Pearson then returned to his own efforts at the UN, seeing how far 
Israeli gains could be pressed.
The resumption of General Assembly discussions on 26 February provided the 
occasion for Pearson’s last contribution to Suez Crisis diplomacy. It was not especially 
influential. Pearson was positioned to advocate for Israel and against the Arabs much 
more freely than, for example, the British delegation, much as it was largely from Britain
that the Canadian political system had absorbed its hostility to Israel’s enemies. Even if 
British planners did not always match the neocolonial sense of their US counterparts, 
they retained weighty imperial responsibilities. The Canadian government, on the other 
hand, had little influence in the Middle East to squander. The same lack of ‘purely 
national interests in the area’ that had allowed the Canadian government to approve 
shipment to Israel of F-86 fighter jets a few months earlier now allowed Pearson to 
distinguish himself in his support for Israeli demands. Of course, this lack of influence 
also softened the impact of the policy that it enabled. These final days of the Suez 
Crisis nonetheless reveal much about the approach to Palestine and racial entitlement 
underlying Pearsonian politics.
In front of the General Assembly, Pearson boldly called for a UN-authorized 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sharm al-Sheikh. On Gaza, he scarcely concealed 
that he was aiming to internationalize the implementation of Israeli objectives. Pearson 
tried to orient the General Assembly to the difficult reality that Israel faced in Gaza: ‘In 
this tiny area are crowded 267,000 refugees and a much smaller native population. 
They are bitter and frustrated, administered by strangers; rebellious, riven by frictions, 
and in a mood, I have no doubt, to erupt in violence and bloodshed if firm control were 
removed.’ For Pearson, as for the Israeli diplomatic corps, it was an important point that
208 DCER Vol. 22, 450.
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the majority of the Gaza Strip’s population was not ‘native’ to Gaza. The implication was
that a future for these refugees could perhaps be found elsewhere. Whatever the 
solution, Pearson suggested that Egypt lacked the political will to exercise ‘firm control’; 
Israel lacked international authorization. Pearson thus called for deployment of a UN 
force in Gaza that could allow ‘transition from the administration of Israel to something 
no less strong and effective and at the same time more generally acceptable.’209 
What is as remarkable as this proposal is Pearson’s indignation that US 
representatives were no longer welcoming its advocate into their diplomatic inner circle.
‘The most disconcerting and disappointing feature of today’s developments,’ he wrote 
some hours after the General Assembly met, ‘is the failure of the USA delegation to 
show us or even take us into their confidence about their draft [resolution]. The UK, 
French, Australian, and NZ delegations are even more in the dark, having been told 
nothing. As Spender put it to me, “The Assembly apparently think the Indians, Egyptians
etc. speak better English.” It would be easy for us to become very annoyed about this 
and to suspect that Lodge is trying to pay us [back] for not having sponsored his earlier 
resolution.’210 Representatives from the dependencies seemed to be getting a hearing 
at the expense of the empire’s rightful Western partners.
The US guarantee for Israeli navigation through the Straits of Tiran ultimately 
proved much more consequential than ‘the Canadian proposal’ on Gaza.211 Deployment
of the UNEF in Gaza, against Egyptian wishes and in the face of local resistance, would
have involved a diplomatic effort for which there was scarce international support. ‘We 
expected a violent Arab reaction to the manoeuvre,’ acknowledged Mackay, ‘and we 
knew that this could lead to the breakup of UNEF, because India, Indonesia and 
Yugoslavia, for example, might refuse to allow their contingents to be used for the 
“occupation” of the Gaza Strip and Sharm-El-Sheikh.’212 As it happened, the Egyptian 
government accepted a UNEF presence in the Sinai and a temporary presence in Gaza
during the transition between Israel’s occupation and the restoration of Egyptian 
authority. With the imposition of US-backed UN sanctions looming, Golda Meir 
announced that Israeli forces would withdraw; the withdrawal was carried out in the first 
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week of March. The guarantee that Israel extracted concerning the Straits of Tiran 
would reverberate in the politics of the Middle East. In the spring of 1967, Israel used 
this guarantee as leverage to develop wide Western support for its expanded military 
conquests. The cultivation of this casus belli over the preceding twelve years paid off 
spectacularly. The brief presence of UNEF troops in Gaza in March 1957 was by 
comparison a small historical footnote.
The observations of Burns, under whose command UNEF supervised the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops and then briefly replaced them, nonetheless speak to the 
substance of Pearson’s proposal. ‘Suggestions backed by very little evidence had been 
put about that the Strip population would prefer UN administration to the previous 
Egyptian régime,’ reflected Burns. The reality he observed was altogether different. 
Burns reported large Palestinian demonstrations denouncing the Eisenhower doctrine 
and displaying a mood of assertive anti-colonialism. 
It was perfectly clear from the attitude of the crowds that, whatever they wanted, they did not 
want rule by outsiders. There were slogans against colonialism and imperialism (the Arabic word 
ista’amar is translated as either of these ‘isms’). They might not have particularly desired to be 
governed by Egyptians, but the Egyptians . . . were better than any ‘white’ foreigners.
Burns was not charged with exercising the ‘firm control’ that Pearson had advocated. 
Nonetheless, on 10 March a Palestinian was killed as UNEF units under his command 
dispersed a demonstration at one of their positions. Burns did not aim to continue 
occupation of the Gaza Strip against local opposition; but his command contemplated 
what would happen if the Palestinians actively opposed the presence of UNEF. ‘Once 
the problem was considered,’ he wrote, ‘it was plainly impossible to think of UNEF’s 
checking disorders as the Israelis had done, by shooting enough rioters to cow the 
rest.’213 Exactly what Pearson intended when he called for deployment of a force ‘no 
less strong and effective’ than the IDF in its control of Gaza may be debated. What is 
clear is that he was either woefully ignorant of local realities or advocating a brutal 
military campaign to pacify the territory.
There may be little point in rebutting the judgement of Israeli and Canadian 
scholar-statesmen Oren and Bell that Pearson’s approach was above all ‘fair-minded.’ 
This is a question of values and priorities. There is, in any event, little in the record of 
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the ‘golden age’ of Canadian diplomacy that can serve as the precedent for a genuine 
internationalism, on Palestine or in international affairs more generally.
Conclusion
The Suez Crisis is conventionally regarded as marking the high point of liberal 
Canadian internationalism in the Middle East. It is perhaps fitting that Canadian 
diplomacy at the time so clearly showcased both the scope and the bounds of this 
internationalism. That a Canadian policy so manifestly at odds with Afro-Asian opinion 
and diplomacy is remembered for its ‘fair-minded’ beneficence says as much about 
contemporary Canadian political culture as it does about the history itself. The pretence 
of US anti-colonialism in the Middle East appears, in retrospect, as a subterfuge under 
which was developed what would become the most important imperial presence in the 
Middle East for the remainder of the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first. It bears 
repeating that Pearsonian diplomacy was unwilling to match even this pretence. The 
Western internationalism that Canadian diplomats championed may have involved 
greater tactical moderation than exhibited by the European powers; but it was as their 
allies, and against majority world diplomacy, that Pearson and his colleagues operated.
Tareq Ismael has noted the Western parochialism of Canadian diplomacy during 
the Suez Crisis.214 This chapter uses an analysis of the Canadian documentary record 
to build upon this theme. It finds not only that Canadian responses to Anglo-French 
belligerence were limited by allied sympathies and framed by a deference to US power, 
but also that Canadian diplomats in turn pressed Eisenhower administration officials to 
temper what seemed to Canadian diplomats an excessive anti-colonialism – the 
Canadian priority was the restoration of Western alliance cohesion against common 
enemies. On the question of Palestine more specifically, the extent of Pearson’s pro-
Israel belligerence at the time has not been properly represented in the existing 
literature. Pearson was among the most persistent international opponents of 
compelling an Israeli withdrawal by means of sanctions, and he distinguished himself in 
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the effort to reward Israel for its military campaign by means of ‘inducements,’ notably 
an international occupation of the Gaza Strip. This speaks to the weakness of 
contemporary efforts to ‘balance’ Canadian diplomacy in the Middle East through the 
invocation of Pearsonian diplomacy.
As against this mythology, Canadian Middle East diplomacy in this ‘golden age’ 
of Pearsonian internationalism ought to be remembered, from arms supply policy 
through to Suez Crisis diplomacy, in the wider context of Canada’s ‘national role of 
helper to larger Western nations in their colonial activities in the Third World.’215
215 See Sherene H. Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the 




‘[W]e are now in a Third World War. And when I am saying “we,” it is not the Israelis. It is the whole Free 
World. It’s Europe, North America, Australia; all the Free World is part of this war.’1 
-Matan Vilnai, at Israel’s annual Herzliya Conference (2011)
‘[I]t is a fantastic environmental project, but the ... most important thing is this: It is where it is, in the 
homeland of the Jewish people, in that light of freedom and democracy in what is otherwise a region of 
darkness, the State of Israel.’2
-Stephen Harper, addressing a JNF gathering on the occasion of
its dedication to Harper of an Israeli project in the Galilee (2013)
* * *
The international politics of the Zionist and Israeli leadership show considerable 
historical continuity. Theodor Herzl’s suggestion that a Jewish state in Palestine could 
form ‘an outpost of civilization against barbarism,’ as he phrased it at the end of the 
nineteenth century, echoes into the twenty-first. On the plane of ideological 
declarations, leading figures in contemporary Israel suggest that their state is ‘a villa in 
the jungle,’ in Ehud Barak’s well-known formulation.3 This rhetoric is paired with a 
familiar strategic orientation. In 2007, for example, in the context of the so-called war on
terror, a number of influential Israeli planners insisted upon the continued need for 
Israel to prioritize ‘comprehensive association with both North America and Europe 
across the political, economic, societal and military spectrums.’4
A measure of Canadian association with Israel against Palestinian and 
neighbouring Arab societies has likewise proved durable. Pearson’s description of Israel
as a Western outpost in the Middle East finds continued expression in comments like 
those of Stephen Harper, cited above, which stress identification with Israel against the 
‘region of darkness’ in which it was established. This dissertation finds that a similar 
identification with Israel historically extended across Canada’s main governing factions, 
and has roots in the era of formal imperialism. From the outset, shared imperial 
alignments shaped Canadian engagement with the Zionist enterprise.
1 Matan Vilnai, ‘Shared Strategic Challenges: Panel of Defense Ministers,’ Eleventh Annual Herzliya 
Conference (6 February 2011), <www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=440>.
2 Adrian Morrow, ‘Harper to promote “Canadian values” on first Middle East visit,’ Globe and Mail (2 
December 2013); fuller citation at ‘JNF Canada honors Canadian PM Stephen Harper,’ 
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3 Cited, for example, in Yitzah Laor, The Myths of Liberal Zionism (London: Verso, 2009), xxxvi.




Canada is, of course, far removed from the Middle East. But this very distance 
has facilitated the Canadian tendency towards pro-Israel partisanship in the Palestine 
conflict. The Canadian state has not only formed part of the Western alliance to which 
the Zionist and Israeli leadership have sought to attach themselves; it has also had 
particularly close relationships with the Zionist movement’s primary Great Power 
sponsors: Britain until the 1940s, and subsequently the United States. The politics of 
Canadian partnership with empire have repeatedly encouraged support for Zionism and
for Israel. This was the case of successive Canadian governments’ declaratory support 
for Zionism in the interwar years, and of the diplomatic support that Canada provided 
for the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948.
From early on, the assertion of Canadian autonomy within the British Empire was
matched by processes of North American continental integration. In the years after 
World War II, the Canadian state became formally attached to US power. A telling 
moment in the process of Canada’s incorporation into US-led imperial coalition politics 
in the Middle East came with the Liberal government’s decision to supply Israel with 
swept-wing fighter aircraft. Despite the cancellation of this sale as a result of Israel’s 
Gaza-Sinai campaign, this episode attests to the realignment of Canadian foreign policy
that began in earnest in the 1940s. Canada was transitioning from its former status as 
one of Britain’s white Dominions to that of a secondary Western state closely aligned 
with Anglo-American power (‘with the accent on “American”’).
Unlike Britain and the US, however, Canada, owing to its distance from the 
Middle East and its limited global reach, had few regional commitments to temper a 
posture of indifference to Arab opinion. At the level of government policy, this permitted 
forms of support for Israel that Canada’s Great Power allies – committed as they were 
to the cultivation of neocolonial relationships with the Arab world – did not feel they 
could afford. The decision to supply Israel with F-86 fighter jets is a case in point. 
Notably, so too is Pearson’s famed Suez Crisis diplomacy, at least in 1957. The role 
that Pearson played in the diplomacy of autumn 1956 is well known. In this context, it is 
true that the Canadian government was less rigidly aligned with Britain than were other 
members of the ‘old Commonwealth,’ and that it urged greater tactical moderation than 
217
Conclusion
was exhibited by the European powers. Its internationalism during the Suez Crisis 
nonetheless proved to be sharply restricted.
Like France, whose war in Algeria had already earned it fierce regional hostility, 
Canada, with little standing in the region to begin with, discarded international legal 
norms in order to support Israel’s demand that it be diplomatically rewarded for its 
military campaign against Gaza and Egypt. The Canadian government’s initial 
diplomatic effort to encourage Anglo-French realignment with the US evolved, by the 
end of November 1956, into lobbying for greater US support for the attacking powers, 
and by early 1957 found Pearson representing Canada from the pro-Israel fringe of the 
UN General Assembly. ‘Pearsonian internationalism’ involved a diplomacy anchored in 
the Western alliance and facing off against Afro-Asian adversaries who were viewed 
with a disrespect bordering on contempt. Pearson thus earned for Canada a share of 
Western responsibility for the Israeli leadership’s sense of impunity emerging from the 
Gaza-Sinai campaign. The war gains secured for Israel in 1957, along with the 
impression that the campaign left – that further military aggression could also be 
‘worthwhile’ – had dire consequences for the region in the decades ahead.
At the time, Pearson faced Tory criticism for having not more directly supported 
the Anglo-French assault. If it is the replacement of rigid British with more varied 
imperial commitments that makes for Pearsonian internationalism, this should be 
spelled out with greater honesty. Contemporary liberal invocation of this tradition as a 
positive precedent is another matter. The approach of Pearson’s department of external
affairs was framed by narrow international alignments and a racialized politics of 
entitlement. Especially telling was Pearson’s echo of Spender’s complaint about Third 
World upstarts who were pretending to ‘speak better English’ than those accustomed to 
a privileged seat at international tables. This was the entitlement of leaders who felt that
they shared in the rightful global predominance of the English-speaking West.
It was, at the turn of the twentieth century, an explicitly racialist doctrine that 
prompted James Bryce to stress the value of ‘constant cordial co-operation’ between 
the Anglo-Saxon nations. Canadian attachment to this conception evolved with the 
times. Still, this heritage loomed large over the postwar Canadian effort at ‘playing the 
triangle in the international symphony.’ These were the politics of imperial partnership 
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through which Canadian officials approached the world; and they had long reverberated
in respectable Canadian society.
Even before global imperial alignments brought the Canadian government into 
sustained engagement with the Middle East, they helped to cultivate within Canada a 
remarkably pro-Zionist domestic political environment. Not that the Zionist movement 
was uniformly celebrated in Canada, least of all when conflict between British 
authorities and the Yishuv peaked just prior to the Israeli state’s establishment. 
However, in the long term, support for Zionism was generally quite compatible with the 
patriotic norms of Canadian civil society. This determined the early realities of Canadian
Zionist leadership. From the beginning, the Canadian Zionist movement was directed 
not from those sections of the Canadian Jewish community involved in dissident politics
or the development of independent social movements, but from more respectable 
circles, socially and politically aligned with the Canadian establishment. In this setting, 
the movement owed its standing in Canadian society to dynamics much wider than 
Jewish communal politics.
The argument that racism played a central role in shaping Canadian 
engagement with the Palestine question is sure to be contentious. To suggest that the 
politics of support for Zionism and Israel were shaped by structural realities of racism is,
within the terms of contemporary liberal discourse, counterintuitive. Support for a state 
that claims to be Jewish is more often presented as atonement for the Western history 
of racism, counterposed to the horrific realities of European antisemitism. Liberal 
conventional wisdom would have it that the support that the English-speaking West 
provided for Zionist settlement, and later for Israel, is yet another indication of its 
inclusive tolerance. The research findings presented in the preceding chapters suggest 
a different interpretation.
Hints of another possibility can even be found in studies of Canadian Jewish 
politics written by assertively pro-Zionist academics. For example, consider how Daniel 
Elazar and Harold Waller introduce the question of racism in their study, Maintaining 
Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar World. They write,  
Modern racism took shape in the generation that began in the late 1870s and lasted until World 
War I, when Western imperialism was at its height. . . . The Western world saw itself as a great 
civilizing force confronting inferior nonwhite elements. This view became strongest in the Anglo-
Saxon and Teutonic countries, whose people saw themselves as the culmination of civilization 
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and even doubted the ‘whiteness’ of the ‘inferior’ peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe 
including Jews. Even those not swayed by the new anti-Semitism saw the Jews as an Oriental 
people. It is no wonder that the Jews suffered as a result.5
Antisemitism, as the authors suggest, developed in conjunction with an imperial racism 
that was also directed at ‘Oriental peoples’ more fully outside the supposed bounds of 
Western civilization. Zionism was not insulated from this political atmosphere. For all 
the mythology of a Jewish ‘return’ to Palestine, the Zionist leadership actively 
accommodated itself to Western derision of the peoples of the region. ‘Although we 
were an Oriental people,’ insisted Ben-Gurion, ‘we had been Europeanized and we 
wished to return to Palestine in the geographical sense only.’6
Early Canadian support for Zionism embodied the racial logic of the era. The 
reigning Western approach both to Indigenous peoples and to Jews seemed to 
recommend the Zionist option. Discussing contemporary politics, the Israeli writer 
Yitzhak Laor observes that ‘it has become common in the West to see “us” Israelis as 
part of “them,” at least as long as we are here, in the Middle East, a late version of 
pieds noirs.’7 In considering early Canadian politics on Palestine, the phrase ‘as long as
we are here’ is especially significant. Support for Zionism reflected not only indifference 
to the Arab world, but also the limits of Jewish inclusion in the Canadian polity. The 
presumed hierarchy of peoples allowed for the casting of European Jews as the 
bearers of civilization vis-à-vis Arabs, while also as racialized European foreigners not 
fully suited to becoming ‘true Canadians.’ Unfortunately, the first of these racial 
premises has not been excised from Canadian politics as effectively as has the second.
The problem lingers, including in Canadian scholarship. The devaluing of Arab 
societies within imperial political culture historically took on different forms, associated 
with the forms of political domination with which various societies were targeted. For its 
part, the colonization of Palestine was indeed enveloped in an ideological assault on its 
native population; however, Palestinians, facing a colonization of exclusion rather than 
exploitation, were subjected to ideological erasure rather than vilification. More 
precisely, efforts at erasure preceded efforts at vilification, and substituted for them 
5 Daniel Elazar and Harold Waller, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar 
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whenever possible. The slogan suggesting that Palestine was ‘a land without a people 
for a people without a land’ did not result from innocent misunderstanding, but from an 
effort to brush aside native in promotion of settler claims. Outside of the circles of 
Zionist leadership, genuine misunderstanding did develop around this concept. But it is 
difficult to see how researchers with access to the relevant materials could still be party 
to this misunderstanding. Whatever the reasons, Canadian Zionism’s impact on 
Palestinian society has been all but written out its history. This dissertation identifies a 
series of points of contact between Canadian Zionism and Palestinian society, from the 
displacement of the community of Wadi al-Hawarith through to the atrocities of 
Operation Hiram, that demand a presence in the Canadian historical record.
This dissertation points to various possibilities for future research. Notably, the 
theme of long-term continuity in Canadian engagement with the Palestine problem finds
further grounding in developments since Canada’s internationalist ‘golden age.’ A brief 
sketch of subsequent trends can serve to highlight the possibilities.
In the period covered in this dissertation, there exists a parallel between the 
nature of Canadian association with the Zionist enterprise in the eras of British and then
of growing US predominance in Canadian politics. Following the First World War, the 
Zionist movement was brought into the British imperial orbit within which Canada 
operated. The association of Zionism with official imperial policy commanded a 
measure of deference from the Canadian government, and enforced a Canadian variety
of patriotic Zionism. The international Zionist leadership’s reorientation from Britain 
towards the US in the 1940s roughly corresponded with a parallel shift on the part of the
Canadian leadership; Canada’s relationship with the Empire diminished in relation to 
the leadership of the US. Similar dynamics to those that took shape in the era of British-
Zionist alignment can be discerned. Initial research suggests that it was in the 1960s, 
however, that the parallel became most striking.
From the summer of 1957 through to the spring of 1963, Canada’s Progressive 
Conservatives held federal office under the leadership of John Diefenbaker. The 
Diefenbaker government sought with limited success to reassert Canada’s relationship 
with Britain.8 In 1963, however, a Liberal Party now under Pearson’s leadership 
8 See John Hilliker and Greg Donaghy, ‘Canadian Relations with the United Kingdom at the End of 
Empire, 1956-73,’ in ed. Phillip Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: University of British 
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returned to federal office, and accommodated itself to accelerated North American 
integration. The Canadian political economy was further restructured around a US 
centre. In early 1965, notably, Pearson travelled to US president Lyndon Johnson’s 
Texas ranch to sign a new economic agreement between the two countries, the Auto 
Pact. Victor Levant’s study of Canadian policy towards Vietnam notes the newfound 
public confidence of calls to match these links with a US-aligned foreign policy. Levant 
cites the report Principles for Partnership, co-authored by Arnold Heeney, former 
Canadian ambassador to US, and Livingston Merchant, former US ambassador to 
Canada. The report affirmed Canadian independence. But the essential thrust of its 
argumentation was that ‘Canadian authorities should have careful regard for the United 
States Government’s position . . . as leader of the free world and specifically under its 
network of mutual defence treaties around the globe.’9 This approach was increasingly 
coming to dictate Canadian foreign policy. Were Pearson’s government not already 
substantially aligned with Israel, it would have drawn it in that direction.
Noam Chomsky cites a US National Security Memorandum from 1958, 
recommending ‘support [for] Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Middle 
East.’10 The terms of US strategic discussion were shifting. It was in the 1960s and 
1970s, though, that US military and economic aid to Israel truly exploded. Especially 
after Israel’s expanded conquests of June 1967, two opposing dynamics thus reshaped 
the international politics of Palestine. On the one hand, Israel gained unprecedented 
standing as a regional surrogate for US power. And on the other, the independent 
reconstitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) provided a new means of 
Palestinian self-assertion. As Palestinian claims were buoyed by growing support from 
the Non-Aligned Movement, Israel/Palestine became a major flashpoint for diplomatic 
tension between the US-anchored Western alliance and the wider world community. 
Few states in the world were as closely aligned as was Canada with the US and Israel.
In the years after the Balfour Declaration, support for Zionism in Canada carried 
the prestige of official imperial policy. By virtue of a similar dynamic, patriotic Zionism 
Columbia Press, 2005), 25-33.
9 Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (Toronto: Between the Lines,
1986), 18.
10 Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Montreal: Black 
Rose Books, 1999), 21.
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surged in Canada in the years after 1967: support for Israel involved simultaneous 
alignment with the US and Canadian governments, and served as a proud marker of 
Western alliance patriotism. In the existing literature, this dynamic is only indirectly 
discussed in terms of the domestic politics of empire that shaped it. But scholars of 
Jewish community politics struggle to contain these dynamics within a communal 
framing. ‘During the Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973,’ write Daniel Elazar and Harold 
Waller, ‘there was some surprising non-Jewish involvement, especially in terms of 
contributions to the Israel Emergency Fund.’11 David Taras likewise notes: ‘Given the 
involvement of major corporate interests, financial aid to Israel cannot be described as 
exclusive to the Jewish community.’12 It remains to seriously analyze the interplay 
between Canada’s place in US-led imperial coalition politics and the domestic base of 
organized support for Israel that in turn resulted from and enforced it.
The evolution of this interplay through the end of the twentieth century and into 
the twenty-first is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The present submission stands 
in its own right as an original contribution to understanding of the historical engagement
of Canadian state and society with the Palestine problem. It also offers a strong 
foundation for further research concerning the dynamics of Western association with 
the Zionist enterprise and Israel, in the realms of government policy, political culture, 
and civil society organization – both in the Canadian case and more broadly.
11 Elazar and Waller, Maintaining Consensus, 83-4.
12 David Taras, ‘From Passivity to Politics: Canada’s Jewish Community and Political Support for Israel,’ in
eds. David H. Goldberg and David Taras, The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli 
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